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The unsustainable rationality of Impact Assessment

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Abstract

The idea behind evidence-based instruments for policy-making is to provide objective information regarding the costs, benefits and risks involved in legislative proposals. An example of these instruments is the integrated Impact Assessment system, which has been in place in EU policy-making since 2003. Impact Assessments are designed according to rational decision models and aim to enhance the neutrality and objectivity of policy-making. This paper draws a comparison between the rational paradigm emerging from the EU template and the empirical evaluations carried out to date on Impact Assessments. It questions the conventional concept of Impact Assessments as rational policy-making instruments, because of the influential roles played by individual knowledge and data quality.

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Acknowledgments

This paper was written as part of the Jean Monnet Fellowship at the Florence School of Regulation, European University Institute, Florence. I thank Alberto Alemanno (European Court of Justice), Robyn Fairman (King’s College London), Nicola Hargraves (European University Institute) Veerle Heyvaert (London School of Economics), Colin Kirkpatrick (University of Manchester) and Ragnar Löfstedt (King’s College London) for their useful comments. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author.

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Correspondence to Jacopo Torriti.

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Torriti, J. The unsustainable rationality of Impact Assessment. Eur J Law Econ 31, 307–320 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-010-9202-y

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