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How real is the threat of imprisonment for environmental crime?

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Abstract

In this contribution, we investigate whether prison sentences for environmental crime are indeed used in practice, how they are used and whether they imply a real threat to violators. To this end we examine previous studies on the role of imprisonment and confront these models with some empirical data. The empirical application summarizes evidence from several countries, but focuses on detailed data for criminal prosecution of environmental legislation in Flanders (Belgium) between 2003 and 2007. Thus we are able to highlight some interesting policy issues and directions for future research.

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Notes

  1. Firestone (2003) mentions, for instance, that the US federal government prosecuted only 25 environmental criminal cases during the 1970s.

  2. In fiscal year 2002, the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) referred 250 matters to the Department of Justice (DOJ) for criminal prosecution, up from 31 in 1984. The total number of defendants charged rose from 36 in 1984 to 371 in 2001 (O'Hear 2004).

  3. Later we use the terms ‘conditional’ or ‘probationary’ as an alternative to a ‘suspended’ sanction, since these type of sanctions share the same basic principle, namely execution of a sanction conditional on the fulfilment of certain conditions. These conditions can however differ according to the judicial system and thus we use the terminology mentioned in the original texts when possible.

  4. Other studies concerning harsher punishments for repeat offenders include, among others, Emons (2003, 2007), Chu et al. (2000) and Polinsky and Rubinfeld (1991). However, these studies do not explicitly analyse this topic in a framework of multiple sanctioning instruments.

  5. The analysis by Cherry (2001) is, however, done on an aggregate county level and measures the level of criminal activity by the index crime rate, which does not include environmental crime. The index includes seven major crimes: murder, rape, robbery, assault, burglary, larceny, and auto theft.

  6. With ‘green collar’ offenders O’Hear (2004) refers to environmental offenders in a corporate context.

  7. Data are collected within the SBO-project “Environmental law enforcement: A comparison of practice in the criminal and administrative tracks” (2007–2011). More information can be found on the website www.environmental-lawforce.be.

  8. Data for each individual offender are collected in Brugge, Dendermonde, Gent, Ieper, Kortrijk, Oudenaarde and Veurne. Thus we collected data for seven out of the thirteen first instance districts in Flanders. All appeals at these seven courts are dealt with by the Court of Appeal in Gent, one of the five Belgian courts of appeal.

  9. Note that the postponement of a verdict implies that the facts of the offending act are proven for that particular offender, but that the favour of postponement is awarded to the offender on condition that there is no recidivism within a certain period.

  10. On average one offender was prosecuted for 2.1 proven accusations. This is exactly the same average as for all offenders that were criminally prosecuted.

  11. An offense classifies as a priority offense based on a memorandum drafted by the Council of Prosecutors-General. Some 23% of the offenders committed at least one priority offense according to the verdicts in first instance in our dataset. Priority offenses include exploiting an installation without the appropriated environmental permit or the illegal disposal of hazardous waste.

  12. Art. 8 and 14 Law 29 June 1964 relative to the suspension, postponement and probation.

  13. See Directive nr. 1771 of the federal Minister of Justice of 17 January 2005.

  14. See the same directive.

  15. Directive nr. 1771 of the federal Minister of Justice of 17 January 2005.

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Acknowledgments

We would like to thank the Strategic Basic Research program of the Institute of Science and Technology for the financial support provided during the research project 060034 (www.environmental-lawforce.be). Moreover we would like to thank Michael Faure for his useful comments on a previous version of the text.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Center for Environmental and Energy Law, Universiteit Gent, Universiteitsstraat 4, 9000, Gent, Belgium

    Carole M. Billiet

  2. Faculty of Economics, HUBrussel & Center for Economic Studies—K. U. Leuven, Stormstraat 2, 1000, Brussel, Belgium

    Sandra Rousseau

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  1. Carole M. Billiet
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Correspondence to Sandra Rousseau.

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Billiet, C.M., Rousseau, S. How real is the threat of imprisonment for environmental crime?. Eur J Law Econ 37, 183–198 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-011-9267-2

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