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Economic Consequences of Union Dissolution in Italy: Findings from the European Community Household Panel

Les conséquences économiques des ruptures d’union en Italie: une exploitation du Panel Européen des Ménages

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Abstract

Union dissolution is a constantly increasing phenomenon across Europe—even in Italy where the prevalence of divorce has always been among the lowest. This poses several questions on the potential consequences of such an event on the families involved. Many studies show that women usually experience the worst financial consequences, although there are few analyses on Italy, given the relatively low levels of union instability. In this work we study the impact of separation on the economic well-being of men and women using data from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP), analyzed using both objective and subjective measures. By means of a matching method, we also estimate the effect of union dissolution, taking account of possible variations according to the different living arrangements adopted by ex-partners after separation. Results confirm that women experience worse economic distress than men. However, there is also a significant drop in economic well-being among non-custodial fathers who live alone after separation. In addition, it is found that income-based measures do not encapsulate all the dimensions of well-being, and therefore need to be complemented with other measures.

Résumé

Les ruptures d’union sont en hausse constante en Europe-même en Italie où la fréquence des divorces est parmi les plus basses. Cette tendance soulève différentes questions sur les conséquences des ruptures sur les familles concernées. De nombreuses études ont montré que c’étaient les femmes qui subissaient les conséquences financières les plus défavorables, mais la situation est mal connue en Italie, du fait de la rareté relative du phénomène. Nous analysons l’impact de la séparation sur le bien-être économique des hommes et des femmes à partir des données du Panel Européen des Ménages (ECHP), en nous appuyant à la fois sur des mesures objectives et subjectives. A l’aide d’appariements, les effets des ruptures d’unions sont estimés, en considérant une variation possible suivant le type de ménage dans lequel les anciens conjoints s’installent après la séparation. Les résultats confirment l’existence de plus grandes difficultés économiques chez les femmes. Toutefois, il y a également une chute significative de bien-être économique parmi les pères qui n’ont pas la garde des enfants et vivent seuls après la séparation. En outre, il apparaît que les mesures basées sur le revenu ne reflètent pas toutes les dimensions du bien-être, et doivent par conséquent être complétées par d’autres mesures.

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Notes

  1. In 2002, after separation, in 85% of cases the custody of children under 18 was granted to mothers, in 4% to fathers and 11% to both parents.

  2. In addition, Italian regulations do not provide fast inexpensive means of constraining reluctant partners to pay alimony (e. g. there are not forms of direct monetary transfer at source).

  3. Women do not always maintain their advantage. With divorce, things change, since 48% of couples leave their family house for separate, independent dwellings (ISTAT 2004). According to a 1990 survey (moreover, not representative of Italian reality) 2 years after separation, a woman with the custody of children maintains the use of a house only if it is the property of the woman herself, or of both partners; if the owner is the man or the man’s parents, the use of the house generally returns to him (Barbagli and Saraceno 1998).

  4. The categories available for marital status were: married, separated, divorced, widowed, never married.

  5. For married couples this mainly corresponds to separation: we focus on separation and not divorce, because separation is connected to greater economic changes than legal divorce, which follows separation—sometimes several years later, when the economic situation may already have stabilized (see Andreß and Gullner 2001, quoted by Andreß et al. 2006).

  6. From another survey (Family and Social Subjects 2003) conducted by ISTAT, we find that the percentage of married individuals living outside the conjugal home is 2.7%. Given the rarity of the phenomenon, the number of studies on this topic is negligible in Italy.

  7. In the household interview, respondents are asked to recall all the sources of income (wages and salaries, income from self-employment or farming, pensions, unemployment/redundancy benefits, any other social benefits or grants and private income such as housing allowances) without specifying the amount of income from each source. Then the amount of household income is asked: “What is your household’s total net income per month?”.

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Correspondence to Stefano Mazzuco.

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Ongaro, F., Mazzuco, S. & Meggiolaro, S. Economic Consequences of Union Dissolution in Italy: Findings from the European Community Household Panel. Eur J Population 25, 45–65 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10680-008-9157-7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10680-008-9157-7

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