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Evidence on learning in coordination games

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Abstract

This paper reports an experiment designed to detect the influence of strategic uncertainty on behavior in order statistic coordination games, which arise when a player’s best response is an order statistic of the cohort’s action combination. Unlike previous experiments using order statistic coordination games, the new experiment holds the payoff function constant and only changes cohort size and order statistic.

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Correspondence to John B. Van Huyck.

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R.C. Battalio deceased.

Related research available at http://erl.tamu.edu

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Van Huyck, J.B., Battalio, R.C. & Rankin, F.W. Evidence on learning in coordination games. Exp Econ 10, 205–220 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-007-9175-z

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