Skip to main content
Log in

Searching Pareto Optimal Solutions for the Problem of Forming and Restructuring Coalitions in Multi-Agent Systems

  • Published:
Group Decision and Negotiation Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Coordination is one of the fundamental research issues in distributed artificial intelligence and multi-agent systems. Current multi-agent coalition formation methods present two limits: First, computation must be completely restarted when a change occurs. Second, utility functions of the agents are either global or aggregated. We present a new algorithm to cope with these limits. The first part of this paper presents a coalition formation method for multi-agent systems which finds a Pareto optimal solution without aggregating the preferences of the agents. This protocol is adapted to problems requiring coordination by coalition formation, where it is undesirable, or not possible, to aggregate the preferences of the agents. The second part of this paper proposes an extension of this method enabling dynamic restructuring of coalitions when changes occur in the system.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Aknine S, Caillou P (2004) Agreements without disagreements: a coalition formation method. ECAI04. IOS Press, Valencia, pp 3–7

    Google Scholar 

  • Aknine S, Pinson S, Shakun MF (2000) Coalition formation methods for multi-agent coordination problems. Group Decision and Negotiation, Glasgow, Scotland, July 2000

  • Aknine S, Pinson S, Shakun MF (2004) An extended multi-agent negotiation protocol. Int J Auton Agent Multi Agent Syst 8: 5–45

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Aknine S, Pinson S, Shakun MF (2004) A multi-agent coalition formation method based on preference models. Group Decis Negot 13: 513–538

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Binmore K (1999) Jeux et théorie des jeux. De Boeck, Bruxelles

    Google Scholar 

  • Caillou P (2000) Pareto optimality method for coalition formation and dynamic restructuring of agent coalitions. Université Paris 9, Paris

    Google Scholar 

  • Caillou P, Aknine S, Pinson S (2002) A multi-agent method for forming and dynamic restructuring of Pareto optimal coalitions. In: Castelfranchi C, Johnson WL (eds) AAMAS 02. ACM Press, Bologna, pp 1074–1081

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Caillou P, Aknine S, Pinson S (2002) Multi-agent models for searching Pareto optimal solutions to the problem of forming and dynamic restructuring of coalitions. In: Harmelen FV (eds) ECAI. IOS Press, Lyon, pp 13–17

    Google Scholar 

  • Kahan JP, Rapoport A (1984) Theories of coalition formation. LEA, Hillsdale

    Google Scholar 

  • Ketchpel S (1994) Forming coalitions in the face of uncertain rewards. National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), Seattle, pp 414–419

  • Kraus S, Shehory O, Taase G (2003a) The advantages of compromising in coalition formation with incomplete information, AAMAS 2003. ACM Press, Melbourne, pp 588–595

    Google Scholar 

  • Kraus S, Shehory O, Taase G (2003) Coalition formation with uncertain heterogeneous information, AAMAS 2003. ACM Press, Melbourne, pp 1–8

    Google Scholar 

  • Lerman K, Shehory O (2000) Coalition formation for large-scale electronic markets, ICMAS

  • Ossowski S (2000) Co-ordination in artificial agent societies. Springer, Berlin

    Google Scholar 

  • Rahwan T, Jennings NR (2005) Distributing coalitional value calculations among cooperating agents, AAAI 2005. AAAI Press, Pittsburgh, pp 152–157

    Google Scholar 

  • Sandholm TW (1996) Negotiation among self-interested computationally limited agents. University of Massachusetts, Amherst

    Google Scholar 

  • Sandholm TW (1999) Distributed rational desicion making. In: Weiss G (eds) Multiagent systems. MIT Press, Cambridge, pp 121–164

    Google Scholar 

  • Sandholm TW, Larson K, Andersson M, Shehory O, Tohmé F (1999) Coalition structure generation with worst case guarantees. Artif Intell 111: 209–238

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sen S, Dutta PS (2000) Searching for optimal coalition structures, ICMAS. IEEE Press

  • Shakun MF (1998) Evolutionary systems design: policy making under complexity and group decision support systems. Holden-Day, Oakland

    Google Scholar 

  • Shehory O, Kraus S (1998) Methods for task allocation via agent coalition formation. Artif Intell 1998: 165–200

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Shoham Y, Tennenholz M (1998) On the emergence of social conventions: modelling, analysis and simulation. Artif Intell 97: 139–166

    Google Scholar 

  • Smith RG, Davis R (1981) Frameworks for co-operation in distributed problem solving, vol 11. IEEE Transaction on System, Man and Cybernetics

  • Tsevovat M, Sycara K, Chen Y, Ying J (2000) Customer coalitions in the electronic marketplace, agents. Barcelona

  • Vauvert G, El Fallah-Seghrouchni A (2001) Coalition formation among strong autonomous and weak rational agents, MAAMAW 2001. Annecy, France

  • Wooldridge MJ (1999) Intelligent agents. In: Weiss G (eds) Multiagent systems. MIT Press, Cambridge, pp 27–78

    Google Scholar 

  • Wooldridge MJ (2001) An introduction to multiagent systems. Wiley, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Zlotkin G, Rosenschein J (1994) Coalition, cryptography and stability: mechanisms for coalition formation task oriented domains, AAAI. Seattle

  • Zlotkin G, Rosenschein J (1996) Mechanisms for automated negotiation in state oriented domains. J Artif Intell Res 5: 163–238

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Philippe Caillou.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Caillou, P., Aknine, S. & Pinson, S. Searching Pareto Optimal Solutions for the Problem of Forming and Restructuring Coalitions in Multi-Agent Systems. Group Decis Negot 19, 7–37 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-009-9183-9

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-009-9183-9

Keywords

Navigation