Abstract
Coordination is one of the fundamental research issues in distributed artificial intelligence and multi-agent systems. Current multi-agent coalition formation methods present two limits: First, computation must be completely restarted when a change occurs. Second, utility functions of the agents are either global or aggregated. We present a new algorithm to cope with these limits. The first part of this paper presents a coalition formation method for multi-agent systems which finds a Pareto optimal solution without aggregating the preferences of the agents. This protocol is adapted to problems requiring coordination by coalition formation, where it is undesirable, or not possible, to aggregate the preferences of the agents. The second part of this paper proposes an extension of this method enabling dynamic restructuring of coalitions when changes occur in the system.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Aknine S, Caillou P (2004) Agreements without disagreements: a coalition formation method. ECAI04. IOS Press, Valencia, pp 3–7
Aknine S, Pinson S, Shakun MF (2000) Coalition formation methods for multi-agent coordination problems. Group Decision and Negotiation, Glasgow, Scotland, July 2000
Aknine S, Pinson S, Shakun MF (2004) An extended multi-agent negotiation protocol. Int J Auton Agent Multi Agent Syst 8: 5–45
Aknine S, Pinson S, Shakun MF (2004) A multi-agent coalition formation method based on preference models. Group Decis Negot 13: 513–538
Binmore K (1999) Jeux et théorie des jeux. De Boeck, Bruxelles
Caillou P (2000) Pareto optimality method for coalition formation and dynamic restructuring of agent coalitions. Université Paris 9, Paris
Caillou P, Aknine S, Pinson S (2002) A multi-agent method for forming and dynamic restructuring of Pareto optimal coalitions. In: Castelfranchi C, Johnson WL (eds) AAMAS 02. ACM Press, Bologna, pp 1074–1081
Caillou P, Aknine S, Pinson S (2002) Multi-agent models for searching Pareto optimal solutions to the problem of forming and dynamic restructuring of coalitions. In: Harmelen FV (eds) ECAI. IOS Press, Lyon, pp 13–17
Kahan JP, Rapoport A (1984) Theories of coalition formation. LEA, Hillsdale
Ketchpel S (1994) Forming coalitions in the face of uncertain rewards. National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), Seattle, pp 414–419
Kraus S, Shehory O, Taase G (2003a) The advantages of compromising in coalition formation with incomplete information, AAMAS 2003. ACM Press, Melbourne, pp 588–595
Kraus S, Shehory O, Taase G (2003) Coalition formation with uncertain heterogeneous information, AAMAS 2003. ACM Press, Melbourne, pp 1–8
Lerman K, Shehory O (2000) Coalition formation for large-scale electronic markets, ICMAS
Ossowski S (2000) Co-ordination in artificial agent societies. Springer, Berlin
Rahwan T, Jennings NR (2005) Distributing coalitional value calculations among cooperating agents, AAAI 2005. AAAI Press, Pittsburgh, pp 152–157
Sandholm TW (1996) Negotiation among self-interested computationally limited agents. University of Massachusetts, Amherst
Sandholm TW (1999) Distributed rational desicion making. In: Weiss G (eds) Multiagent systems. MIT Press, Cambridge, pp 121–164
Sandholm TW, Larson K, Andersson M, Shehory O, Tohmé F (1999) Coalition structure generation with worst case guarantees. Artif Intell 111: 209–238
Sen S, Dutta PS (2000) Searching for optimal coalition structures, ICMAS. IEEE Press
Shakun MF (1998) Evolutionary systems design: policy making under complexity and group decision support systems. Holden-Day, Oakland
Shehory O, Kraus S (1998) Methods for task allocation via agent coalition formation. Artif Intell 1998: 165–200
Shoham Y, Tennenholz M (1998) On the emergence of social conventions: modelling, analysis and simulation. Artif Intell 97: 139–166
Smith RG, Davis R (1981) Frameworks for co-operation in distributed problem solving, vol 11. IEEE Transaction on System, Man and Cybernetics
Tsevovat M, Sycara K, Chen Y, Ying J (2000) Customer coalitions in the electronic marketplace, agents. Barcelona
Vauvert G, El Fallah-Seghrouchni A (2001) Coalition formation among strong autonomous and weak rational agents, MAAMAW 2001. Annecy, France
Wooldridge MJ (1999) Intelligent agents. In: Weiss G (eds) Multiagent systems. MIT Press, Cambridge, pp 27–78
Wooldridge MJ (2001) An introduction to multiagent systems. Wiley, London
Zlotkin G, Rosenschein J (1994) Coalition, cryptography and stability: mechanisms for coalition formation task oriented domains, AAAI. Seattle
Zlotkin G, Rosenschein J (1996) Mechanisms for automated negotiation in state oriented domains. J Artif Intell Res 5: 163–238
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Caillou, P., Aknine, S. & Pinson, S. Searching Pareto Optimal Solutions for the Problem of Forming and Restructuring Coalitions in Multi-Agent Systems. Group Decis Negot 19, 7–37 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-009-9183-9
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-009-9183-9