Abstract
Bird (2007) argues that scientific progress consists in increasing knowledge. Dellsén (2016a) objects that increasing knowledge is neither necessary nor sufficient for scientific progress, and argues that scientific progress rather consists in increasing understanding. Dellsén also contends that unlike Bird’s view, his view can account for the scientific practices of using idealizations and of choosing simple theories over complex ones. I argue that Dellsén’s criticisms against Bird’s view fail, and that increasing understanding cannot account for scientific progress, if acceptance, as opposed to belief, is required for scientific understanding.
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Notes
Bird conjectures, a referee points out, that “the relevant developments that promote knowledge will themselves be knowledge” (2007, 84). In my view, however, Bird seems to mean gathering observational knowledge by ‘the relevant developments.’ In any event, the epistemic approach requires only the mean-end thesis.
Should they believe that Newtonian mechanics is true? Dellsén would say no, but I (2015: 226–228; 2016: 77–78; 2017: 59–60) argue that problems arise when we explain something in terms of a scientific theory without believing that it is (approximately) true. This paper, however, assumes for the sake of argument that Dellsén is right, i.e., that it is legitimate merely to accept a scientific theory and then use it to explain phenomena.
Approximate knowledge concerns an approximately true proposition. Suppose, for example, that I know that Alice is 170.1 cm. Then, I approximately know that she is 170 cm.
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This paper improved a lot thanks to the insightful comments from anonymous referees and Prof. Beisbart.
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Park, S. Does Scientific Progress Consist in Increasing Knowledge or Understanding?. J Gen Philos Sci 48, 569–579 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-017-9363-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-017-9363-2