Nuclear forensics—metrological basis for legal defensibility

Abstract

The admissibility of nuclear forensics measurements and opinions derived from them in US Federal and State courts are based on criteria established by the US Supreme Court in the case of Daubert v. Merrell Dow and the 2000 Amendment of Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. These criteria are being addressed by new efforts that include the development of certified reference materials (CRMs) to provide the basis for analytical method development, optimization, calibration, validation, quality control, testing, readiness, and declaration of measurement uncertainties. Quality data is crucial for all stages of the program, from R&D, and database development, to actual casework. Weakness at any point in the program can propagate to reduce the confidence of final conclusions. The new certified reference materials will provide the necessary means to demonstrate a high level of metrological rigor for nuclear forensics evidence and will form a foundation for legally defensible nuclear chemical analysis. The CRMs will allow scientists to devise validated analytical methods, which can be corroborated by independent analytical laboratories. CRMs are required for ISO accreditation of many different analytical techniques which may be employed in the analysis of interdicted nuclear materials.