The urgent requirement for new radioanalytical certified reference materials for nuclear safeguards, forensics, and consequence management

Abstract

A multi-agency workshop was held from 25 to 27 August 2009, at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), to identify and prioritize the development of radioanalytical Certified Reference Materials (CRMs, generally provided by National Metrology Institutes; Standard Reference Materials, a CRM issued by NIST) for field and laboratory nuclear measurement methods to be used to assess the consequences of a domestic or international nuclear event. Without these CRMs, policy makers concerned with detecting proliferation and trafficking of nuclear materials, attribution and retribution following a nuclear event, and public health consequences of a nuclear event would have difficulty making decisions based on analytical data that would stand up to scientific, public, and judicial scrutiny. The workshop concentrated on three areas: post-incident Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) nuclear forensics, safeguard materials characterization, and consequence management for an IND or a Radiological Dispersion Device detonation scenario. The workshop identified specific CRM requirements to fulfill the needs for these three measurement communities. Of highest priority are: (1) isotope dilution mass spectrometry standards, specifically ²³³U, ^236gNp, ²⁴⁴Pu, and ²⁴³Am, used for quantitative analysis of the respective elements that are in critically short supply and in urgent need of replenishment and certification; (2) CRMs that are urgently needed for post-detonation debris analysis of actinides and fission fragments, and (3) CRMs used for destructive and nondestructive analyses for safeguards measurements, and radioisotopes of interest in environmental matrices.

Appendices

Appendix 1: Option for nuclear debris reference material

A series of low yield weapons-effects experiments were carried out at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) in the early 1960s. These events involved shallow burial or surface bursts that generated discreet local debris fields that have not been subsequently modified or altered over the course of the following nearly 50 years of active NTS operations. These sites represent an historical archive that replicates many aspects of a nuclear terrorist attack or IND event.

Samples collected from these sites represent authentic nuclear debris that could be used as reference materials to exercise and to validate the federal technical response planned in the event of a nuclear emergency. Focused narrowly on the analytical problem, these include:

• Sample collection and field measurements,

• Sample logistics and transport, and

• Laboratory analysis.

Judged as a potential reference material, these samples were originally subjected to the vaporization, melting, and condensation processes that are unique to a nuclear event. The samples contain an accurate composition of nuclear material, fission products, and environmental matrix that were intimately mixed in the fireball and then condensed to glassy debris (Fig. 1). Because of the historic nature of these samples, the short-lived fission products and nuclear activation products have long since decayed beyond detection. The samples do contain the long-lived actinides and long-lived fission products. Of the limited non-destructive assay that has been carried out to date, the samples contain a nominal 10 ppm Pu and on the order of 10¹⁴–10¹⁵ fissions/g. It should be noted that this relative composition of nuclear material to environmental matrix and fission product to environmental matrix are entirely characteristic of nuclear debris.

Fig. 1

Debris collected from historic low-yield NTS surface/shallow burial events

Depending on the needs of the analytical and radiochemistry communities, samples could be collected at these sites and prepared as reference materials after grinding and homogenizing the glassy debris. Suitable subsamples could be analyzed by all participating laboratories to generate certified values for Pu and U isotopes, ^237gNp, ²⁴¹Am, and selected long-lived fission products. Classification issues could be addressed by blending multiple events into a CRM.

Appendix 2: Workshop participants

 

Mohamad	Al-Sheikhly	University of Maryland
Steve	Barrett	Savillex Corporation
Joseph	Beckman	USANCA
Balazs	Bene	University of Maryland/NIST Radioactivity Group
David	Beutler	Sandia National Laboratories
Anitta	Bhatt	DOE Idaho
Debra	Bostick	Oak Ridge National Laboratory
Stanhope	Crooks	AWE PLC
Richard	Essex	New Brunswick Laboratory
Joe	Giaquinto	Oak Ridge National Laboratory
Stephen	Howard	U.S. Army TMDE Activity
Kenneth	Inn	NIST
Mansie	Iyer	DOE
Simon	Jerome	NIST
Sonia	Johnson	Health Canada
Robert	Jones	CDC
Thomas	Kiess	U.S. Department of Energy/NNSA
Jerome	La Rosa	NIST
Ken	Laintz	Los Alamos National Laboratory
Stephen	Lamont	Los Alamos National Laboratory
Jeffrey	Leggitt	Federal Bureau of Investigation
Randolph	Long	Department of Homeland Security
Pamela	Mackill	U.S. Food and Drug Administration
Daniel	Mackney	EPA
Dale	Newbury	NIST
Katherine	Nielsen	Department of National Defense
Svetlana	Nour	NIST
Warren	Oldham	Los Alamos National Laboratory
John	Ondov	University of Maryland
Brett	Palmer	DOE/NNSA
Donivan	Porterfield	Los Alamos National Laboratory
William	Pramenko	Joint Chiefs of Staff
Erick	Ramon	Lawrence Livermore National Library
Lee	Riciputi	Los Alamos National Laboratory
Gregory	Schaeff	B&W Y12
John	Small	NIST
Donna	Smith	NA-22 (LANL Detailee)
Nadereh	St-Amant	Health Canada, Radiation Protection Bureau
Tyler	St. Onge	Science Applications International
Lav	Tandon	Los Alamos National Laboratory
Daniel	Velazquez	Defense Threat Reduction Agency
Michael	Walsh	DTRA (L-3COM)
Carolyn	Wong	Lawrence Livermove National Laboratory
Ian	Watson	Dept of Nat’l Defence (DRDC)
Cong	Wei	U.S. Food And Drug Administration
Cynthia	Zeissler	NIST