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How a multiple orientation of control reduces governance failures: a focus on monastic auditing

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Abstract

This paper considers multiple control systems at the organizational level and argues for a nuanced and multifaceted approach for internal governance. For this undertaking, we look at a little-examined control and auditing instrument, the formalized audit procedures of Roman Catholic orders. These so-called visitations are one important pillar in the monastic governance system to counter aberrations. Utilizing surveys and interviews, we examine 96 Roman Catholic religious communities in Austria, Germany and Switzerland, and connect these visitations procedures with rule violations and sexual abuse cases. We argue that communities unaffected by scandals and rule violations rely strongly on process and clan control to address inefficiency and misconduct; whereas, affected communities focus more on business issues. We caution against the trend of relying predominantly on output-based processes while suggesting a balance between different types of control systems. Furthermore, we enhance the current discourse by considering implementation procedures of control. The religious orders attach great importance to the way control measures are carried out. To steer the behavior of their members, many successful orders even complement controls with personal support and identity strengthening.

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Notes

  1. We use a broad and classical definition of governance: it is understood as the set of processes, customs, policies, laws, and institutions affecting the way an organization is directed and controlled. The abuse cases represent a massive governance failure in the religious orders.

  2. See the Acknowledgements section for detailed information.

  3. Closely related to the framework of Ouchi (1979) is the levers of control model from Simons (1990, 1995, 2000). This equally comprehensive model shows many intersections and points of contact. For instance, diagnostic control shares many similarities with output control; whereas, belief systems build a bridge to clan control.

  4. A parallel historical study underscores the impressive significance of the little-known visitations in Christianity and supports the impression from the quantitative analysis. The existence over centuries—from late antiquity until today (Peters 2003), and in the religious orders for almost a millennium—of the visitations, plus their dissemination to all religious orders, dioceses and beyond the Catholic Church (Schwaiger 2003), point to an extraordinary, successful governance instrument. The history of their reception illustrates the flexibility and the broad applicability of this religious assessment tool, and reveals an instrument that heavily influenced the paths of the examined organizations. The focus on output-, process- and clan control to monitor economic health and spiritual life, a constituting element from the beginning, proved highly successful.

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Acknowledgments

We extend special gratitude to the Swiss National Foundation for their financial engagement. We thank the reviewers of JM&G and the participants of the 2012 Euram Conference subtheme on governance of public and nonprofit organizations for their valuable and considered comments. Our work would not have been possible without the commitment of many padres, brothers and employees of the religious orders. A special thanks goes to Prior Guido Muff (Benedictines, Engelberg), P. Thomas Morus Huber (Capuchins, Wil), P. Hans Weibel (Divine Word Missionaries, Steinhausen), P. Toni Kurmann (Jesuits, Zurich), P. Karl Widmer (Redemptorists, Baden) and Irene Hahn, who were involved in developing the survey. Further, we conducted detailed interviews on visitations with P. Franziskus Berzdorf (Benedictines, Maria Laach), P. Fidelis Schorer (Franciscans, Zurich), P. Paul Zahner (Franciscans, Näfels), P. Pierre Emonet (Jesuits, Provincial of Switzerland), P. Dr. Lutger Horstkötter (Premonstratensians, Hamborn), P. Josef Grünner (Salesians, Provincial of Munich), and P. Toni Rogger (Salesians, Beromünster). We gratefully acknowledge all communities that participated in the survey. Likewise, we are very grateful for the support of the umbrella organization of the orders in Switzerland (Konferenz der Vereinigungen der Orden und Säkularinstitute der Schweiz) and, in particular, the dedication of its superior, P. Ephrem Bucher (O.F.M. Cap.).

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Inauen, E., Osterloh, M., Frey, B.S. et al. How a multiple orientation of control reduces governance failures: a focus on monastic auditing. J Manag Gov 19, 763–796 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10997-014-9292-y

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