Abstract
The idea of moral reform requires that morality be more than a description of what people do value, for there has to be some measure against which to assess progress. Otherwise, any change is not reform, but simply difference. Therefore, I discuss moral reform in relation to two prescriptive approaches to common morality, which I distinguish as the foundational and the pragmatic. A foundational approach to common morality (e.g., Bernard Gert’s) suggests that there is no reform of morality, but of beliefs, values, customs, and practices so as to conform with an unchanging, foundational morality. If, however, there were revision in its foundation (e.g., in rationality), then reform in morality itself would be possible. On a pragmatic view, on the other hand, common morality is relative to human flourishing, and its justification consists in its effectiveness in promoting flourishing. Morality is dependent on what in fact does promote human flourishing and therefore, could be reformed. However, a pragmatic approach, which appears more open to the possibility of moral reform, would need a more robust account of norms by which reform is measured.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
This principle of non-maleficence is different from preventing harm or alleviating suffering, which are not strictly speaking basic moral duties in Gert’s system (unless they are some role-specific duty).
Quote from Beauchamp and Childress is from [3].
In general, neither children nor severely disabled persons are likely to pose significant increased risk of harm to an adult rational person and moral agent, so it may be that there is also an implicit appeal here to the notion of low threat potential.
On Gert’s view, children are not moral agents but are (usually) included by moral agents in the group to whom moral rules apply. A being that is not a moral agent may be included in the group to whom moral rules apply, but it is not irrational to not include them, and there may be disagreement about what beings should be included and to what extent [1, pp. 140–143].
We might also note that there is a developing debate about the capacities of those who are cognitively disabled with respect to their status as moral agents to which Gert’s view about rational persons may not be wholly congenial.
Nor is included anything about the highly probable need for extensive care of aged and infirm rational persons.
Women apparently also continue to be the primary elder-caregivers.
Conditions of responsibility, too, would have to be specified, and might include situations in which one is the only one available or capable to help.
Something like what Kant meant by imperfect duties, which, while still duties, did not admit of the same degree of precision as perfect duties.
Arras makes a similar point in his discussion of the need in “free standing legal pragmatism” for “some normative conception of what constitutes good results” [16]. Raz, too, makes the point that norms are required to measure moral reform qua reform of morality understood as normative and not just a descriptive account of a social tradition [17].
This makes the pragmatic approach something like rule utilitarianism.
Jansen argues that clinical pragmatism has no standard for what would count as a successful moral decision [19, p. 25]. I am extending that point to the idea of moral reform.
Tong, in discussing clinical pragmatism, points out the danger of privileging medical facts over nonmedical values [20].
References
Gert, Bernard. 2005. Morality: Its nature and justification, revised ed. New York: Oxford University Press.
Gert, Bernard. 2004. Common morality: Deciding what to do. New York: Oxford University Press.
Beauchamp, Tom L., and J.F. Childress. 2001. Principles of biomedical ethics, 5th ed. New York: Oxford University Press.
Beauchamp, Tom L. 2003. A defense of the common morality. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 13 (3): 259–274.
Strong, Carson. 2008. Justifying group-specific common morality. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 29: 1–15.
MacIntyre, Alasdair. 1981. After virtue: A study in moral theory. South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
MacIntyre, Alasdair. 1988. Whose justice? Which rationality? South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
Turner, Leigh. 2003. Zones of consensus and zones of conflict: Questioning the ‘common morality’ presumption in bioethics. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 13 (3): 193–218.
Wolfe, Alan. 2008. Pew in the pews: A survey on American belief overturns some scholars’ theories. The Chronicle Review of The Chronicle of Higher Education, 21 Mar 2008: B5–B6.
Kaveny, M. Cathleen. 2005. Between example and doctrine: Contract law and common morality. Journal of Religious Ethics 33 (4): 669–695.
Gert, Bernard. 2005. Moral arrogance and moral theories. Nous Supplement Philosophical Issues, Normativity 15: 368–385.
Rauprich, Oliver. 2008. Common morality: Comment on Beauchamp and Childress. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 29: 43–71.
DeGrazia, David. 2003. Common morality, coherence, and the principles of biomedical ethics. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 13 (3): 219–230.
Gert, Bernard, C.J. Culver, and K.D. Clouser. 2000. Common morality versus specified principlism: Reply to Richardson. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 25 (3): 308–322.
Wallace, Kathleen. 2007. Moral reform, moral disagreement, and abortion. Metaphilosophy 38 (4): 380–403.
Arras, John D. 2001. Freestanding pragmatism in law and bioethics. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 22: 69–85.
Raz, Joseph. 1994. Moral change and social relativism. Social Philosophy and Policy: Cultural Pluralism and Moral Knowledge 11 (1): 139–158.
Ross, W.D. 1939. The foundations of ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Jansen, Lynn A. 1998. Assessing clinical pragmatism. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 8 (1): 23–36.
Tong, Rosemarie. 1997. The promises and perils of pragmatism: Commentary on Fins, Bacchetta, and Miller. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 7 (2): 147–152.
Acknowledgments
This article was written in part while I was a Visiting Scholar in the Philosophy Department at Dartmouth College and I am grateful for that support. Thanks also to Jed and Perry Williamson for their hospitality, to the members of the Central European Pragmatist Forum for helpful discussions about pragmatism, and to Carson Strong for insightful comments and suggestions on earlier versions of this paper.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Wallace, K.A. Common morality and moral reform. Theor Med Bioeth 30, 55–68 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11017-009-9096-2
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11017-009-9096-2