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Instrumentalist analyses of the functions of ethics concept-principles: a proposal for synergetic empirical and conceptual enrichment

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Abstract

Bioethics has made a compelling case for the role of experience and empirical research in ethics. This may explain why the movement for empirical ethics has such a firm grounding in bioethics. However, the theoretical framework according to which empirical research contributes to ethics—and the specific role(s) it can or should play—remains manifold and unclear. In this paper, we build from pragmatic theory stressing the importance of experience and outcomes in establishing the meaning of ethics concepts. We then propose three methodological steps according to which the meaning of ethics concepts can be refined based on experience and empirical research: (1) function identification, (2) function enrichment, and (3) function testing. These steps are explained and situated within the broader commitment of pragmatic ethics to a perspective of moral growth and human flourishing (eudaimonia). We hope that this proposal will give specific direction to the bridging of theoretical and empirical research in ethics and thus support stronger actualization of ethics concepts.

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Notes

  1. Dewey uses the notion of consummatory experience to describe the experience of responding satisfactorily to a given situation when the capacities of the agent are liberated and fulfilled and feeling at one, united, harmonious with oneself, others, and one’s environment. This is akin to how some scholars envision self-transcendence, that is, the experience of overcoming one’s limitations and growing from that experience, including cultivating a broader worldview [37].

  2. As explained below, the concept component refers mostly to the apprehension of a given experience through the lens of valuations, while the principle component refers to the commanding and guiding orientation stemming from this experience. The function of a given ethics concept-principle is both to refer to a given kind of experience and to state a normative force that helps promote (or prevent) that experience. Sometimes concepts and principles are distinguished (e.g., concept of autonomy and principle of respect for autonomy), but oftentimes they are much less clearly differentiated, such as in the case of concept-principles like consent, vulnerability, dignity, care, compassion, empathy, and so on. Sometimes we distinguish the two components to reflect an author’s intent or to emphasize the separation between the concept and the principle. That which we designate as “ethics concept-principles” (within a broader pragmatic ethics epistemology) reflects a distinctive outlook on human realities, one which questions their meaning and purpose within the broader perspective of human flourishing. In other words, ethics concept-principles are instrumentalized within the broader ecosystem of an ethics of human flourishing. They are not ends in themselves but tools in service of a higher goal. Figure 1 provides a more detailed summary of the differences between moral experiences, ethics concepts, and ethics theories.

  3. Ethics and morality are differentiated. Morality designates the domain of lived experiences guided by unthematized, unproblematized attitudes, while ethics designates the structured field of inquiry that steps in when intuitions within common morality conflict or do not satisfactorily guide human behavior.

  4. A definition here means a basic definition that describes what the concept is about, what it refers to. However, in the fullest sense, in the pragmatic tradition, the definition (or meaning) of a concept encompasses also its functions and other aspects. In other words, the meaning of a concept is not confined to its formal definition.

  5. Dewey writes: “Every need, say hunger for fresh air or food, is a lack that denotes at least a temporary absence of adequate adjustment with surroundings. But it is also a demand, a reaching out into the environment to make good the lack and to restore adjustment by building at least a temporary equilibrium. Life itself consists of phases in which the organism falls out of step with the March of surrounding things and then recovers unison with it—either through effort or by some happy chance. And, in a growing life, the recovery is never mere return to a prior state, for it is enriched by the state of disparity and resistance through which it has successfully passed. If the gap between organism and environment is too wide, the creature dies. If its activity is not enhanced by the temporary alienation, it merely subsists. Life grows when a temporary falling out is a transition to a more extensive balance of the energies of the organism with those of the conditions under which it lives” [50, pp. 35‒36].

  6. Literature in psychology has suggested important advantages of intrinsically motivated behavior [51], and our proposal is consistent with this general idea that ethics is inherently associated with intrinsically motivated behavior as an effort to reflect on values and principles guiding one’s conduct and deciding upon them.

  7. We leave aside detailed discussions on the extent to which function enrichment is required when there is already literature on stakeholder views on a given concept-principle. Obviously, reviewing this literature carefully (when available) can help refine the focus of function enrichment and could even offset the need for consultation if this has been done well previously and in ways that match the nature of the problem situation in which the function of the concept-principle is being investigated.

  8. Similar to Callahan’s seminal observation about the role of experience-based ordinary language and its distance from theoretical ethics language [75], Lucy Diep and Gregor Wolbring report in a study on the perception of brain-machine interfaces of mothers of disabled children: “What was striking from our findings was that although the mothers we interviewed raised concerns discussed within ethics and policy discourses such as: privacy, communication as a human right, control, and lack of access due to cost and other barriers, these statements were not conceptually expressed using terminology common in ethics and policy discourse, for example: ‘morality’, ‘dignity’, ‘beneficence’, ‘non-maleficence’, ‘distributive justice’, ‘ethics’, ‘equality’, or ‘equity’” [87]. Similar observations about ordinary language have been made in other areas of health ethics [88].

  9. According to Dewey: “All general conceptions (ideas, theories, thought) are hypothetical. Ability to frame hypotheses is the means by which man is liberated from submergence in the existences that surround him and that play upon him physically and sensibly. It is the positive phase of abstraction. But hypotheses are conditional; they have to be tested by the consequences of the operations they define and direct. … But their final value is not determined by their internal elaboration and consistency, but by the consequence they effect in existence as that is perceptibly experienced” [29, p. 130]. However, “the experimental character of moral judgments does not mean complete uncertainty and fluidity. Principles exist as hypotheses with which to experiment. Human history is long. There is a long record of past experimentation in conduct, and there are cumulative verifications which give many principles a well-earned prestige” [29, p. 144].

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Acknowledgements

We would like to thank members of the Pragmatic Health Ethics Research Unit for feedback on a previous version of this manuscript. This article expands on the ideas presented in a short paper published in the American Journal of Bioethics (https://doi.org/10.1080/15265161.2017.1388869).

Funding

Funding for this study was provided by Fonds de recherche du Québec – Santé, Banting Postdoctoral Fellowship, Kids Brain Health Network, and IRCM Foundation.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institut de recherches cliniques de Montréal, Montreal, QC, Canada

    Eric Racine, M. Ariel Cascio, Marjorie Montreuil & Aline Bogossian

  2. Université de Montréal, Montréal, QC, Canada

    Eric Racine & Aline Bogossian

  3. Central Michigan University, Mount Pleasant, MI, USA

    M. Ariel Cascio

  4. McGill University, Montréal, QC, Canada

    Eric Racine & Marjorie Montreuil

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  1. Eric Racine
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  2. M. Ariel Cascio
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  4. Aline Bogossian
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Correspondence to Eric Racine.

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Racine, E., Cascio, M.A., Montreuil, M. et al. Instrumentalist analyses of the functions of ethics concept-principles: a proposal for synergetic empirical and conceptual enrichment. Theor Med Bioeth 40, 253–278 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11017-019-09502-y

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