Abstract
This paper examines the effect of improved transparency in the bidder qualification process, using the experience gained from a case study of municipal public works auctions. A difference-in-differences analysis reveals that improved transparency reduces procurement cost by up to 8%. This finding is robust with regard to the concerns of both endogeneity and sample selectivity. The bidding-function estimates, combined with features of Japanese procurement system, imply that the introduction of transparent practices is insufficient to bring about efficiency in public procurement.
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Ohashi, H. Effects of Transparency in Procurement Practices on Government Expenditure: A Case Study of Municipal Public Works. Rev Ind Organ 34, 267–285 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-009-9208-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-009-9208-1