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Positive skeptical theism and the problem of divine deception

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Abstract

In a recent article, Erik Wielenberg has argued that positive skeptical theism fails to circumvent his new argument from apparent gratuitous evil. Wielenberg’s new argument focuses on apparently gratuitous suffering and abandonment, and he argues that negative skeptical theistic responses fail to respond to the challenge posed by these apparent gratuitous evils due to the parent–child analogy often invoked by theists. The greatest challenge to his view, he admits, is positive skeptical theism. To stave off this potential problem with his argument, he maintains that positive skeptical theism entails divine deception, which creates insuperable problems for traditional theism. This essay shows that Wielenberg is mistaken. Although positive skeptical theism claims that we should expect the appearance of gratuitous evil (when there is no actual gratuitous evil) given Christian theism, this does not entail divine deception. I maintain that God is not a deceiver on positive skeptical theism because God does not meet two requirements to be a deceiver: (1) God does not intend to cause people to believe any false propositions and (2) God does not provide evidence for someone to justifiably believe a false proposition. Consequently, Wielenberg’s new argument from evil fails and positive skeptical theism remains a viable response to the evidential argument from evil.

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Notes

  1. See Rowe (1979, 2006).

  2. For example, Hasker (2004), MacGregor (2012), van Inwagen (2008).

  3. See especially Rowe (1979, 2006).

  4. See Bergmann (2001, 2009, 2012), Bergmann and Rea (2005), Howard-Snyder (1996a), Wykstra (1984).

  5. See Wykstra (1984). The nature of this “expectation” is clarified in a later essay where Wykstra provides a modest interpretation such that the expectation is psychological but not evidential. His point is that psychologically it is unsurprising, but he clearly doesn’t intend the expectation to be understood as providing positive evidence for theism. As a reviewer for this journal has stressed, Wykstra is only providing something to undercut the atheist’s grounds for disbelieving that God exists. See Wykstra (1996). Michael Bergmann also explicitly repudiates any notion that his version of skeptical theism should lead us to have evidence to expect the appearance of gratuitous evil. See Bergmann (2009, 380).

  6. For some of the complexities of the current state of this debate see Howard-Snyder (1996b), Plantinga and Tooley (2008), Dougherty and McBrayer (2014).

  7. See Wielenberg (2015).

  8. Ibid., 307.

  9. Wielenberg is exploiting a tension with the parent analogy as it is used by skeptical theists generally. On this point see Dougherty (2012).

  10. See Wielenberg (2015).

  11. Ibid., 309–310.

  12. See DePoe (2014).

  13. See Hick (1978, 335–336).

  14. See Moser (2008, 57).

  15. See Hick (1978, 373).

  16. See Pascal (1995, 50).

  17. Much of my reasoning in this paragraph is drawn from Hick (1978, 334–335).

  18. See Wielenberg (2015, 311).

  19. Ibid.

  20. For some of the recent literature defending this position see Wielenberg (2010, 2014), Hudson (2012), Law (2015).

  21. See Wielenberg (2015, 312).

  22. The belief that it is impossible for God to lie or deceive is the mainstream tradition that is clearly found in Augustine, Anselm, and Thomas Aquinas, among many others. For some explanation of this belief and for evidence of its continued mainstream status see Berkhof (1996, 69), Erickson (1998, 261), Grudem (1994, 82–83). All quotations from the Bible are taken from the ESV.

  23. Lest anyone think all Christians share my conviction that God cannot be a deceiver, at least one theistic response to Wielenberg accepts the possibility that God could act in deceptive ways. See McBrayer and Swenson (2012).

  24. These two points are based on a definition of deception that requires the intentionality of the agent to deceive and providing sufficiently misleading evidence by the agent. The former condition is sometimes contested (see discussion of “deceptionism and non-deceptionism” in Mahon (2016, sec. 2). Both conditions are defended as part of Mahon’s analysis of deceiving, which I believe is roughly correct. See Mahon (2007).

  25. See Keener (2009, 379).

  26. An anonymous referee for this journal has suggested that this overlooks that the appearance of gratuitous evil is evidence (albeit defeasible and possibly inconclusive) for the proposition that gratuitous evil exists. I do not think seemings or appearances are intrinsically evidential. My reasons for this are similar to my reasons for rejecting seemings or appearances constitute a source of prima facie justification. See DePoe (2011, especially 355–358).

  27. A proper understanding of passages like Romans 1:18–20; Acts 14:15–18, 17:25–30 is an important part of fleshing out the particularly Christian flavor of my response to Wielenberg.

  28. Of course, there is much controversy concerning how to assess the evidence for theism. I believe there are sound and compelling arguments for theism. For some recent evidential defenses of theism see Swinburne (2004), Craig (2008), Craig and Moreland (2009).

  29. See Butler (1824, 277, part II, chapter 6).

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Acknowledgements

I am grateful for the helpful and critical feedback I received while thinking and working on this paper, including Kristopher Phillips’s undergraduate philosophy of religion class at Southern Utah University that graciously invited me to discuss positive skeptical theism via skype, and John Churchill who provided significant criticisms that forced me to make substantial improvements to this paper.

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    John M. DePoe

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DePoe, J.M. Positive skeptical theism and the problem of divine deception. Int J Philos Relig 82, 89–99 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-017-9615-4

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