Abstract
In considering the nature of properties four controversial decisions must be made. (1) Are properties universals or tropes? (2) Are properties attributes of particulars, or are particulars just bundles of properties? (3) Are properties categorical (qualitative) in nature, or are they powers? (4) If a property attaches to a particular, is this predication contingent, or is it necessary? These choices seem to be in a great degree independent of each other. The author indicates his own choices.
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Armstrong, D.M. Four Disputes About Properties. Synthese 144, 309–320 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-005-5852-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-005-5852-7