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Are Dispositions Causally Relevant?

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Abstract

To determine whether dispositions are causally relevant, we have to get clear about what causal relevance is. Several characteristics of causal relevance have been suggested, including Explanatory Power, Counterfactual Dependence, Lawfullness, Exclusion, Independence, and Minimal Sufficiency. Different accounts will yield different answers about the causal relevance of dispositions. However, accounts of causal relevance that are the most plausible, for independent reasons, render the verdict that dispositions are causally relevant.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Nebraska-Lincoln, 1008 Oldfather Hall, P.O. Box 880321, Lincoln, NE, 68588-0321, U.S.A

    Jennifer Mckitrick

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  1. Jennifer Mckitrick
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Correspondence to Jennifer Mckitrick.

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Mckitrick, J. Are Dispositions Causally Relevant?. Synthese 144, 357–371 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-005-5868-z

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-005-5868-z

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