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Non-Monotonic Reasoning from an Evolution-Theoretic Perspective: Ontic, Logical and Cognitive Foundations

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Abstract

In the first part I argue that normic laws are the phenomenological laws of evolutionary systems. If this is true, then intuitive human reasoning should be fit in reasoning from normic laws. In the second part I show that system P is a tool for reasoning with normic laws which satisfies two important evolutionary standards: it is probabilistically reliable, and it has rules of low complexity. In the third part I finally report results of an experimental study which demonstrate that intuitive human reasoning is in well accord with basic argument patterns of system P.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Chair of Theoretical Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, University of Düsseldorf, Universitätsstrasse 1, Gebäude 23.21, D-40225, Düsseldorf, Germany

    Gerhard Schurz

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  1. Gerhard Schurz
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Correspondence to Gerhard Schurz.

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Schurz, G. Non-Monotonic Reasoning from an Evolution-Theoretic Perspective: Ontic, Logical and Cognitive Foundations. Synthese 146, 37–51 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-005-9067-8

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