Abstract
We investigated, experimentally, the contention that the folk view, or naïve theory, of time, amongst the population we investigated (i.e. U.S. residents) is dynamical. We found that amongst that population, (i) ~ 70% have an extant theory of time (the theory they deploy after some reflection, whether it be naïve or sophisticated) that is more similar to a dynamical than a non-dynamical theory, and (ii) ~ 70% of those who deploy a naïve theory of time (the theory they deploy on the basis of naïve interactions with the world and not on the basis of scientific investigation or knowledge) deploy a naïve theory that is more similar to a dynamical than a non-dynamical theory. Interestingly, while we found stable results across our two experiments regarding the percentage of participants that have a dynamical or non-dynamical extant theory of time, we did not find such stability regarding which particular dynamical or non-dynamical theory of time they take to be most similar to our world. This suggests that there might be two extant theories in the population—a broadly dynamical one and a broadly non-dynamical one—but that those theories are sufficiently incomplete that participants do not stably choose the same dynamical (or non-dynamical) theory as being most similar to our world. This suggests that while appeals to the ordinary view of time may do some work in the context of adjudicating disputes between dynamists and non-dynamists, they likely cannot do any such work adjudicating disputes between particular brands of dynamism (or non-dynamism).
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Notes
See Callender (2017).
Dynamists hold that events are ordered in terms of whether they are objectively past, present or future; the location of events within that ordering is dynamic in that a set of events, E, is future, will be present, and will then become past. According to dynamists, time flows by virtue of a set of events being objectively present, and which sets of events that is, changing. Dynamists take tensed thought and talk to pick out genuinely dynamical (A-theoretic) properties. For defenses of dynamism in its various guises see Broad (1923, 1938), Cameron (2015), Tallant (2012), Tooley (1997), Prior (1967, 1968, 1970), Gale (1968), Schlesinger (1980, 1994), Smith (1993), Craig (2000), Crisp (2003), Markosian (2004), Baron (2014), Bourne (2006), Monton (2006), Sullivan (2012) and Zimmerman (2005).
See Baron et al. (2015).
See Miller (2008).
Non-dynamists suppose that there are no objective tensed properties of properties of pastness, presentness or futurity; all that exists is an ordering of events in terms of the relations of earlier-than, later-than and simultaneous-with. Non-dynamists take tensed thought and talk to be indexical, picking out the time at which a proposition is expressed either in speech or via some doxastic state. According to non-dynamists there is no temporal flow. Defenders include Callender (2008), Lee (2014), Mellor (1981, 1998), Paul (2010), Price (1997, 2011) and Prosser (2000, 2007, 2012, 2013).
See Callender (2008).
Or, at least, they are closer to being temporal dynamists than non-dynamists.
Fuhrman et al. (2011) discuss how the spatial morphemes sháng (up) and xiá (down) are used to talk about the ordering of events, weeks, months, and so on. Earlier events are sháng (up), and later events are xiá (down). For example, ‘sháng ge yuè’ refers to the last or previous month, and ‘xiá ge yuè’ refers to the next or following month.
These are people in a large database who partake in a range of online experiments, usually in psychology, behavioral economics and sociology, for monetary compensation. While they have significant experience in completing online experiments, there is little reason to think that these people will have a particular interest in, or knowledge of, philosophy.
The view that only the present exists, and that the present changes. See Tallant (2012).
The view that the past, present, and future exist, but that which moment is objectively present changes as the ‘light’ of presentness moves over a fixed four-dimensional block. More recent versions of the view are somewhat more sophisticated than this, where the block is often rather unlike the fixed block of B-theoretic eternalism. See for instance Cameron (2015) and Skow (2015).
Also known as the block universe theory. This is the view that the past, present, and future exist, and no moment in objectively present. Instead, presentness is a mere indexical that picks out wherever one happens to be. See Mellor (1991, 1998). As we will present the theory, it is a theory in which although there is no temporal flow or passage (since there is no objective present to move) nevertheless, time has a direction: it points from earlier, to later. For discussion of direction and the B-theory see Tegtmeier (1996) and Maudlin (2007).
One might worry that, given that the C-theory and quantum gravity theories are not terribly popular amongst philosophers, these theories might generally strike people as being implausible. Then one might worry that if we eliminate these theories, it might be that people’s choice between the remaining accounts is at chance, which would undermine our claims in this paper. If this worry is right, then if we exclude those participants who chose the C-theory or the quantum gravity theory as being most like our world, the remaining participants should be evenly distributed amongst the remaining theories of time (moving spotlight, presentism, growing block, block universe). We do not find this. Instead, participants preferred the growing block over the other theories (X2 (3, N = 284) = 40.596, p < .001). We would like to thank an anonymous referee for raising this concern.
It makes no difference to the reported result if we include those who failed to correctly answer 2 of 3 comprehension questions for the vignette they chose as being most like the actual world. There was still no significant difference in confidence between those that think the actual world is most like a dynamical theory of time (M = 4.76, SD = 1.48) or most like a non-dynamical theory of time (M = 4.63, SD = 1.56; t(512) = 0.954, p = .34).
It makes no difference to the reported result if we include those who failed to correctly answer 2 of 3 comprehension questions for the vignette they chose as being most like the actual world. There was still no significant difference in level of agreement for the statement “I have some understanding of what science tells us about the nature of time” between those who think the actual world is most like a dynamical theory of time (M = 5.08, SD = 1.34) and those who think the actual world is most like a non-dynamical theory of time (M = 5.18, SD = 1.32; t(512) = 0.851, p = .395).
It makes no difference to the reported result if we include those who failed to correctly answer 2 of 3 comprehension questions for the vignette they chose as being most like the actual world. There was still no significant difference in level of agreement for the statement “It is very likely that through science we will discover that Universe [A/B/C/D/E/F] is most like our Universe” between those who think the actual world is most like a dynamical theory of time (M = 4.89, SD = 1.41) and those who think the actual world is most like a non-dynamical theory of time (M = 4.84, SD = 1.32; t(512) = 0.414, p = .679).
It makes no difference to the reported result if we include those who failed to correctly answer 2 of 3 comprehension questions for the vignette they chose as being most like the actual world. There was still no significant difference in level of agreement for the statement “It just seems obvious that Universe [A/B/C/D/E/F] is most like our Universe” between those who think the actual world is most like a dynamical theory of time (M = 4.76, SD = 1.45) and those who think the actual world is most like a non-dynamical theory of time (M = 4.68, SD = 1.47; t(512) = 0.595, p = .552).
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Acknowledgements
Thanks to David Braddon-Mitchell for helpful discussion. Andrew James Latham thanks the Ngāi Tai Ki Tāmaki Tribal Trust for their support. Funding was provided by Australian Research Council (Grant Nos. FT170100262, DP18010010).
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Latham, A.J., Miller, K. & Norton, J. Is our naïve theory of time dynamical?. Synthese 198, 4251–4271 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02340-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02340-4