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Rent Seeking Behavior in Transition Countries: The Case of Romania

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Abstract

This paper points out, in the changing institutional setting of transition in Romania, Some relevant factors influencing economic actors to behave in a way that pushes them to devote resources to unproductive goals, rather than to embark on activities that add economic and social value. The theoretical insights offered in the literature of rent seeking are applied to the issues of transition. A mathematical model of a rent seeking economy is presented, analyzing the influence of interest groups activity on the overall income of the economy. Some examples of rent seeking behavior that severely hamper the economic efficiency are illustrated for the case of Romania. The conclusion is that, in appreciating the progress in transition, the reduction in rent seeking is an important factor to be taken into consideration.

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Correspondence to Ileana Tache.

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Tache, I., Lixandroiu, D. Rent Seeking Behavior in Transition Countries: The Case of Romania. Int Adv Econ Res 12, 395–407 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11294-006-9027-1

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