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In the Shadow of the Thucydides Trap: International Relations Theory and the Prospects for Peace in U.S.-China Relations

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A Correction to this article was published on 17 December 2018

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Abstract

Rising powers and the consequent shifts in the balance of power have long been identified as critical challenges to the international order. What is the likelihood that China and the United States will fall into the Thucydides Trap, meaning that the two countries will fight a major war during a potential power transition? This article creates a framework of seven variables, derived from dominant international relations theories and Graham Allison’s “twelve clues for peace,” that predict the likelihood of major conflict between a rising and an established power: degree of economic interdependence, degree of institutional constraints, domestic political system, nature of relevant alliances, nature of nuclear weapons programs, the sustainability of the rising power’s growth, and its level of dissatisfaction. It then evaluates the values of these variables in the context of the U.S.-China relationship to determine whether pessimism about the prospects of peace is warranted. This analysis leads to more mixed conclusions about the prospects of peace than liberal international relations theory and Allison’s twelve clues would suggest. This research further operationalizes power transition theory and has practical implications for U.S. policy toward China.

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Change history

  • 17 December 2018

    The original version of the article unfortunately contained a mistake. The right-side header of the “Theoretical Framework” table on page four is mislabeled. “Lower Likelihood of War” should be written as “Higher Likelihood of War.” The correct information is given below.

Notes

  1. Allison, Destined for War.

  2. For example, see [3,4,5]. One exception is Kang, who argues that Asian case studies reveal that power transitions in Asia are rarely dictated by security dilemma action-reaction dynamics, but instead occur due to the voluntary retreat and internal decline of the current hegemon and external challenges from the smallest powers [6].

  3. Glaser argues that if the United States did not support Taiwan, there would be no rationale for war, but this claim is controversial [7]. For criticism of Glaser’s argument, see [8]. Other work looks at whether the involvement of other countries can deter conflict [9].

  4. [12, 13]. The former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd warns that the U.S.-China trade war could escalate into a broader conflict if either side is backed into a corner [14].

  5. Heginbotham et al., The U.S.-China Military Scorecard, 26.

  6. Heginbotham et al., The U.S.-China Military Scorecard, 26–27.

  7. Heginbotham et al., The U.S.-China Military Scorecard, 26.

  8. Allison, Destined for War, 187–213.

  9. The declining power launches a preventive war as a last-ditch attempt to hold onto its position in the international system. See [30].

  10. Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, 187.

  11. Allison, Destined for War, 190.

  12. For a glimpse of this debate, see [40].

  13. Allison, Destined for War, 200.

  14. Paul, The Accommodation of Rising Powers in World Politics, 13.

  15. Christensen and Snyder, Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks, 140–142.

  16. Allison, Destined for War, 211–212.

  17. Allison, Destined for War, 206–210.

  18. Allison, Destined for War, 208.

  19. Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics.

  20. [57]; “Can India Become a Great Power?” The Economist, March 30, 2013, https://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21574511-indias-lack-strategic-culture-hobbles-its-ambition-be-force-world-can-india.

  21. Allison, Destined for War, 213.

  22. Times of India. China will guard its territory, not concede an inch of land: Xi. March 20, 2018. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/china/china-will-guard-its-sovereignty-not-concede-an-inch-of-land-xi/articleshow/63375561.cms.

  23. Associated Press. May 13, 2016. China has reclaimed 3200 acres in the South China Sea, says Pentagon. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/13/pentagon-report-china-reclaimed-3200-acres-south-china-sea .

  24. The leadership transition may have exacerbated the issue. See [76].

  25. USTR. U.S.-China Trade Facts.

  26. World Investment Report 2017. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, June 2018, http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2017_en.pdf.

  27. Major foreign holders of Treasury Securities. Treasury.gov, March 2018, http://ticdata.treasury.gov/Publish/mfh.txt.

  28. Allison, Destined for War, 191.

  29. Zhu, China, the International Criminal Court, and International Adjudication.

  30. Liptak, U.S. Says It Has Withdrawn from World Judicial Body.

  31. Johnston, Socialization in International Institutions: the ASEAN Way and International Relations Theory.

  32. He, Institutional Balancing in the Asia Pacific: Economic interdependence and China’s rise.

  33. Ikenberry and Lim, China’s emerging institutional statecraft: the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the prospects for counter-hegemony.

  34. On the United States, see [94]. On China, see [95].

  35. See [99].

  36. For a dissenting opinion, see [103].

  37. TRA 1979. Taiwan Relations Act. Pub. L. 96–8 Stat 14.

  38. Collective Defense Arrangements. U.S. Department of State. https://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/collectivedefense/.

  39. For a summary and assessment of this debate, see [112].

  40. Wu, Survivability of China’s Sea-Based Nuclear Forces.

  41. Glaser and Fetter think it would be more difficult. Glaser and Fetter, Should the United States reject MAD?

  42. While this debt-to-GDP ratio ranks with other developed economies such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and Italy, China’s PPP-adjusted GDP per capita is just $15,400 (barely a fourth of the United States) [120].

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Acknowledgements

The author thanks Annie Kowalewski, Christian Verhulst, and Qi Zhang for their expert research assistance.

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  1. Georgetown University, Washington, DC, USA

    Oriana Skylar Mastro

  2. American Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC, USA

    Oriana Skylar Mastro

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Mastro, O.S. In the Shadow of the Thucydides Trap: International Relations Theory and the Prospects for Peace in U.S.-China Relations. J OF CHIN POLIT SCI 24, 25–45 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11366-018-9581-4

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