Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

The interplay of drivers and deterrents of opportunism in buyer–supplier relationships

  • Original Empirical Research
  • Published:
Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Fostering and maintaining buyer–supplier relationships is a fundamental premise of many channel initiatives. Indeed, these relationships may culminate in significant performance enhancements and competitive advantage. Yet these relationships may also result in competitively harmful events such as partner opportunism. Despite this potential competitive erosion, there is a lack of studies examining the interplay between the drivers and deterrents of opportunism. By building on transaction cost economics and social capital theory, we examine, via a sample of 400 manufacturing firms in China, how the interplay between drivers (relationship-specific investments and behavioral uncertainty) and deterrents (inter-firm social capital) of opportunism affect partner opportunism in buyer–supplier exchanges. The significance of this interplay between the drivers and deterrents sheds new light on how a firm can leverage social capital to curb the harmful effects of opportunism.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Fig. 1
Fig. 2

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Anderson, E. (1982). Contracting the selling function: the salesperson as outside agent or employee. Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation. University of California, Los Angeles.

  • Anderson, E. (1988). Transaction costs as determinants of opportunism in integrated and independent sales forces. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 9(3), 247–264.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Anderson, J. C., & Gerbing, D. W. (1988). Structural equation modeling in practice: a review and recommended two-step approach. Psychological Bulletin, 103(3), 411–423.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Axelrod, R., & Dion, D. (1988). The further evolution of cooperation. Science, 242(4884), 1385–1390.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bagozzi, R. P., & Heatherton, T. F. (1994). A general approach to representing multifaceted personality constructs: application to state self-esteem. Structural Equation Modeling, 1(1), 35–67.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Baker, W. E. (1990). Market networks and corporate behavior. The American Journal of Sociology, 96(3), 589–625.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Barney, J. (1991). Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage. Journal of Management, 17(1), 99–121.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Baron, R. M., & Kenny, D. A. (1986). The moderator-mediator variable distinction in social psychological research: conceptual, strategic, and statistical considerations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51(6), 1173–1182.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bello, D. C., & Gilliland, D. I. (1997). The effect of output controls, process controls, and flexibility on export channel performance. Journal of Marketing, 61(1), 22–38.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bergen, M., Dutta, S., & Walker, O. C., Jr. (1992). Agency relationships in marketing: a review of the implications and applications of agency and related theories. Journal of Marketing, 56(3), 1–24.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bryman, A., & Cramer, D. (2005). Quantitative data analysis with SPSS 12 and 13: a guide for social scientists: Routledge.

  • Burt, R. S. (1992). Structural holes. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Buvik, A., & John, G. (2000). When does vertical coordination improve industrial purchasing relationships? Journal of Marketing, 64(4), 52–64.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cannon, J. P., & Perreault, W. D., Jr. (1999). Buyer-seller relationships in business markets. Journal of Marketing Research, 36(4), 439–461.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Carson, S., Madhok, A., & Wu, T. (2006). Uncertainty, opportunism and governance: the effects of volatility and ambiguity on formal and relational contracting. Academy of Management Journal, 49(5), 1058–1077.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Coleman, J. S. (1988). Social capital in the creation of human capital. The American Journal of Sociology, 94, S95–S120.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Coleman, J. (1990). Foundations of social theory. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Craighead, C. W., Hult, G. T. M., & Ketchen, D. J., Jr. (2009). The effects of innovation-cost strategy, knowledge, and action in the supply chain on firm performance. Journal of Operations Management, 27(5), 405–421.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Craighead, C. W., Ketchen, D. J., Dunn, K. S., & Hult, G. T. M. (2011). Addressing common method variance: guidelines for survey research on information technology, operations, and supply chain management. IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management, 58(3), 578–588.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Crosno, J. L., & Dahlstrom, R. (2008). A meta-analytic review of opportunism in exchange relationships. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 36(2), 191–201.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dahlstrom, R., & Nygaard, A. (1999). An empirical investigation of ex post transaction costs in franchised distribution channels. Journal of Marketing Research, 36(2), 160–170.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Day, G. S. (2011). Closing the marketing capabilities gap. Journal of Marketing, 75(4), 183–195.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • De Clercq, D., Thongpapanl, N., & Dimov, D. (2009). When good conflict gets better and bad conflict becomes worse: the role of social capital in the conflict-innovation relationship. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 37(3), 283–297.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Desmet, P. T. M., Cremer, D. D., & Dijk, E. V. (2011). In money we trust? The use of financial compensations to repair trust in the aftermath of distributive harm. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 114(2), 75–86.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dwyer, F. R., & Oh, S. (1987). Output sector munificence effects on the internal political economy of marketing channels. Journal of Marketing Research, 24(4), 347–358.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dyer, J. H., & Singh, H. (1998). The relational view: cooperative strategy and sources of interorganizational competitive advantage. Academy of Management Review, 23(4), 660–679.

    Google Scholar 

  • Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). Agency theory: an assessment and review. Academy of Management Review, 14(1), 57–74.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fornell, C., & Larcker, D. F. (1981). Structural equation models with unobservable variables and measurement error: algebra and statistics. Journal of Marketing Research, 18(3), 382–388.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ghosh, M., & John, G. (2005). Strategic fit in industrial alliances: an empirical test of governance value analysis. Journal of Marketing Research, 42(3), 346–357.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ghoshal, S., & Moran, P. (1996). Bad for practice: a critique of the transaction cost theory. Academy of Management Review, 21(1), 13–47.

    Google Scholar 

  • Granovetter, M. (1985). Economic action and social structure: the problem of embeddedness. The American Journal of Sociology, 91(3), 481–510.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gulati, R. (1995). Does familiarity breed trust? The implications of repeated ties for contractual choice in alliances. Academy of Management Journal, 38(1), 85–112.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gundlach, G. T., & Cannon, J. P. (2010). “Trust but verify?” The performance implications of verification strategies in trusting relationships. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 38(4), 399–417.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Heide, J. B. (1994). Interorganizational governance in marketing channels. Journal of Marketing, 58(1), 71–85.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Heide, J. B. (2003). Plural governance in industrial purchasing. Journal of Marketing, 67(4), 18–29.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Heide, J. B., & John, G. (1990). Alliances in industrial purchasing: the determinants of joint action in buyer-seller relationships. Journal of Marketing Research, 27(1), 24–36.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Heide, J. B., & John, G. (1992). Do norms matter in marketing relationships? Journal of Marketing, 56(2), 32–44.

    Google Scholar 

  • Heide, J. B., & Miner, A. S. (1992). The shadow of the future: effects of anticipated interaction and frequency of contact on buy-seller cooperation. Academy of Management Journal, 35(2), 265–291.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hill, C. W. L. (1990). Cooperation, opportunism, and the invisible hand: implications for transaction cost theory. Academy of Management Review, 15(3), 500–513.

    Google Scholar 

  • Inkpen, A. C., & Tsang, E. W. K. (2005). Social capital, networks, and knowledge transfer. Academy of Management Review, 30(1), 146–165.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jaccard, J., & Wan, C. K. (1996). LISREL analyses of interaction effects in multiple regression. Newbury Park: Sage.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jap, S. D. (1999). Pie-expansion efforts: collaboration processes in buyer–supplier relationships. Journal of Marketing Research, 36(4), 461–475.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jap, S. D., & Anderson, E. (2003). Safeguarding interorganizational performance and continuity under ex post opportunism. Management Science, 49(12), 1684–1701.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jap, S. D., & Ganesan, S. (2000). Control mechanisms and the relationship life cycle: implications for safeguarding specific investments and developing commitment. Journal of Marketing Research, 37(2), 227–245.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • John, G. (1984). An empirical investigation of some antecedents of opportunism in a marketing channel. Journal of Marketing Research, 21(3), 278–289.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • John, G., & Weitz, B. A. (1988). Forward integration into distribution: an empirical test of transaction cost analysis. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 4(2), 337–355.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jöreskog, K. G., & Sörbom, D. (2006). LISREL 8.80. Lincolnwood: Scientific Software International, Inc.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jöreskog, K. G., & Yang, F. (1996). Nonlinear structural equation models: The Kenny-Judd Model with interaction effects. In G. A. Marcoulides & R. E. Schumacker (Eds.), Advanced structural equation modeling: Issues and techniques (pp. 57–88). Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kabadayi, S., Eyuboglu, N., & Thomas, G. P. (2007). The performance implications of designing multiple channels to fit with strategy and environment. Journal of Marketing, 71(4), 195–211.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Katsikeas, C., Skarmeas, D., & Bello, D. (2009). Developing successful trust-based international exchange relationships. Journal of International Business Studies, 40(1), 132–155.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Klein, S., Frazier, G. L., & Roth, V. J. (1990). A transaction cost analysis model of channel integration in international markets. Journal of Marketing Research, 27(2), 196–208.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lewicki, R. J., McAllister, D. J., & Bies, R. J. (1998). Trust and distrust: new relationships and realities. Academy of Management Review, 23(3), 438–458.

    Google Scholar 

  • Li, J. J., Poppo, L., & Zhou, K. Z. (2010). Relational mechanisms, formal contracts, and local knowledge acquisition by international subsidiaries. Strategic Management Journal, 31(4), 349–370.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lin, N., Cook, K. S., & Burt, R. S. (2001). Social capital: Theory and research. New York: Aldine de Gruyter.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Lindell, M. K., & Whitney, D. J. (2001). Accounting for common method variance in cross-sectional research designs. Journal of Applied Psychology, 86(1), 114–121.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lusch, R. F., & Brown, J. R. (1996). Interdependency, contracting, and relational behavior in marketing channels. Journal of Marketing, 60(4), 19–38.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Macneil, I. R. (1980). The new social contract. New Haven: Yale University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Malhotra, N. K., Kim, S. S., & Patil, A. (2006). Common method variance in is research: a comparison of alternative approaches and a reanalysis of past research. Management Science, 52(12), 1865–1883.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mohr, J., & Nevin, J. R. (1990). Communication strategies in marketing channels: a theoretical perspective. Journal of Marketing, 54(4), 36–51.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nahapiet, J., & Ghoshal, S. (1998). Social capital, intellectual capital, and the organizational advantage. Academy of Management Review, 23(2), 242–266.

    Google Scholar 

  • Netemeyer, R. G., Boles, J. S., McKee, D. O., & McMurrian, R. (1997). An investigation into the antecedents of organizational citizenship behaviors in a personal selling context. Journal of Marketing, 61(3), 85–98.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Noordewier, T. G., John, G., & Nevin, J. R. (1990). Performance outcomes of purchasing arrangements in industrial buyer-vendor relationships. Journal of Marketing, 54(4), 80–93.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nowicki, T. (2011). Apple’s secret sauce. The stern opportunity. Accessed online Feb. 27th, 2012 at http://www.sternopportunity.com/mobile/apple-s-secret-sauce-1.2585536.

  • Ouchi, W. G. (1980). Markets, bureaucracies, and clans. Administrative Science Quarterly, 25(1), 129–141.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Palmatier, R. W., Dant, R. P., & Grewal, D. (2007). A comparative longitudinal analysis of theoretical perspectives of interorganizational relationship performance. Journal of Marketing, 71(4), 172–194.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Park, S. H., & Ungson, G. R. (2001). Interfirm rivalry and managerial complexity: a conceptual framework of alliance failure. Organization Science, 12(1), 37–53.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Peng, M. W. (2005). Perspectives—from China strategy to global strategy. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 22(2), 123–141.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ping, R. A. (1995). A parsimonious estimating technique for interaction and quadratic latent variables. Journal of Marketing Research, 32(3), 336–347.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Podsakoff, N. P., & Organ, D. W. (1986). Self-reports in organizational research: problems and prospects. Journal of Management, 12(4), 531–544.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Podsakoff, P. M. P. M., MacKenzie, S. B. S. B., Lee, J. Y. J.-Y., & Podsakoff, N. P. N. P. (2003). Common method biases in behavioral research: a critical review of the literature and recommended remedies. Journal of Applied Psychology, 88(5), 879–903.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Powell, W. W., & Smith-Doerr, L. (1994). Networks and economic life. In N. Smelser & R. Swedberg (Eds.), Handbook of economic sociology (pp. 368–402). Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pretty, J. (2003). Social capital and the collective management of resources. Science, 302(5652), 1912–1914.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Provan, K. G., & Skinner, S. J. (1989). Interorganizational dependence and control as predictors of opportunism in dealer-supplier relations. Academy of Management Journal, 32(1), 202–212.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Putnam, R. D. (1995). Tuning in, tuning out: the strange disappearance of social capital in America. PS: Political Science and Politics, 28(4), 664–683.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rindfleisch, A., & Heide, J. B. (1997). Transaction cost analysis: past, present, and future applications. Journal of Marketing, 61(4), 30–54.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rokkan, A. I., Heide, J. B., & Wathne, K. H. (2003). Specific investments in marketing relationships: expropriation and bonding effects. Journal of Marketing Research, 40(2), 210–224.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ross, W. T., & Robertson, D. C. (2007). Compound relationships between firms. Journal of Marketing, 71(3), 108–123.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Selnes, F., & Sallis, J. (2003). Promoting relationship learning. Journal of Marketing, 67(3), 80–95.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sheng, S., Zhou, K. Z., & Li, J. J. (2011). The effects of business and political ties on firm performance: evidence from china. Journal of Marketing, 75(1), 1–15.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Smith, D. C. (2003). The importance and challenges of being interesting. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 31(3), 319–322.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Swink, M. L., Golecha, R., & Richardson, T. (2010). Does supply chain excellence really pay off ? Supply Chain Management Review, 14(2), 14–21.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tangpong, C., Hung, K.-T., & Ro, Y. K. (2010). The interaction effect of relational norms and agent cooperativeness on opportunism in buyer–supplier relationships. Journal of Operations Management, 28(5), 398–414.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tsai, W., & Ghoshal, S. (1998). Social capital and value creation: the role of intrafirm networks. Academy of Management Journal, 41(4), 464–476.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Villena, V. H., Revilla, E., & Choi, T. Y. (2011). The dark side of buyer–supplier relationships—a social capital perspective. Journal of Operations Management, 28, 398–414.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wathne, K. H., & Heide, J. B. (2000). Opportunism in interfirm relationships: forms, outcomes, and solutions. Journal of Marketing, 64(4), 36–51.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Williamson, O. E. (1975). Markets and hierarchies: Analysis and antitrust implications. New York: The Free Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Williamson, O. E. (1985). Assessing contract. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 1(1), 177–208.

    Google Scholar 

  • Williamson, O. E. (1996). The mechanisms of governance. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wong, A., Tjosvold, D., & Yu, Z.-Y. (2005). Organizational partnerships in China: self-interest, goal interdependence, and opportunism. Journal of Applied Psychology, 90(4), 782–791.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wuyts, S., & Geyskens, I. (2005). The formation of buyer–supplier relationships: detailed contract drafting and close partner selection. Journal of Marketing, 69(4), 103–117.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Yli-Renko, H., Autio, E., & Sapienza, H. J. (2001). Social capital, knowledge acquisition, and knowledge exploitation in young technology-based firms. Strategic Management Journal, 22(6/7), 587–613.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Zaheer, A., & Venkatraman, N. (1995). Relational governance as an interorganizational strategy: an empirical test of the role of trust in economic exchange. Strategic Management Journal, 16(5), 373–392.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Zaheer, A., McEvily, B., & Perrone, V. (1998). Does trust matter? Exploring the effects of interorganizational and interpersonal trust on performance. Organization Science, 9(2), 141–159.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Zajac, E. J., & Olsen, C. P. (1993). From transaction cost to transactional value analysis: implications for the study. Journal of Management Studies, 30(1), 131–145.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Editor-in-Chief Tomas Hult and four anonymous reviewers for their guidance and constructive comments on earlier versions. The work described in this paper was fully supported by a grant from the Research Grants Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China (Project No. CityU 146910). The authors gratefully acknowledge the helpful comments and suggestions of seminar participants at the 2011 Winter American Marketing Association (AMA) Conference, Austin, TX; the 2010 The Bi-Annual Institute for the Study of Business Markets (ISBM) Academic Conference, Harvard University, Boston, Massachusetts; and the Marketing groups at the Pennsylvania State University, the City University of Hong Kong, and the University of Oklahoma.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Division of Marketing and Supply Chain Management, The Price College of Business, University of Oklahoma, 307 West Brooks, Room 1-k, Norman, OK, 73019, USA

    Qiong Wang

  2. Department of Marketing, City University of Hong Kong, Tat Chee Avenue, Kowloon, Hong Kong

    Julie Juan Li

  3. Department of Marketing, School of Business, University of Connecticut, 2100 Hillside Road Unit, Storrs, CT, 06269-1041, USA

    William T. Ross Jr.

  4. Department of Supply Chain & Information Systems, Pennsylvania State University, Smeal College of Business, Suite 465, University Park, PA, 16802, USA

    Christopher W. Craighead

Authors
  1. Qiong Wang
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Julie Juan Li
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  3. William T. Ross Jr.
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  4. Christopher W. Craighead
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Qiong Wang.

Appendix: Measurement items and validity assessment

Appendix: Measurement items and validity assessment

Constructs

Factor Loadings

Partner opportunism (Adapted from Rokkan et al. (2003); 7-Likert Scale: “strongly disagree/strongly agree”)

1. On occasion, this supplier lies about certain things in order to protect their interests.

0.69

2. This supplier sometimes promises to do things without actually doing them later.

0.74

3. This supplier does not always act in accordance with our contract(s).

0.79

4. This supplier sometimes tries to breach informal agreements between our companies to maximize their own benefit.

0.90

5. This supplier will try to take advantage of “holes” in our contract to further their own interests.

0.89

6. This supplier sometimes uses unexpected events to extract concessions from our firm.

0.87

 

Social interactions (Adapated from Lusch and Brown (1996); 7-Likert Scale: “strongly disagree/strongly agree”)

1. Our company and this supplier often visit each other.

0.78

2. Our company and this supplier often have activities that are purely social such as after work get-togethers.

0.77

3. Our company and this supplier often offer gifts/favor to each other.

0.85

 

Identification-based trust (Adapted from Lewicki et al. (1998); 7-Likert Scale: “strongly disagree/strongly agree”)

1. Both parties would let the other make decisions because we both think like one another.

0.79

2. Both parties can effectively act for the other because both share the same understanding of what matters.

0.86

3. Both parties are confident that their interests will be fully valued and protected.

0.90

Shared values (Adapted from Heide and John (1992); 7-Likert Scale: “strongly disagree/strongly agree”)

1. Problems that arise in the course of this relationship are treated by my firm and this supplier as joint rather than individual responsibilities.

0.70

2. Both parties are committed to improvements that may benefit the relationship as a whole, and not only the individual parties.

0.83

3. In most aspects of the relationship the parties are jointly responsible for getting things done

0.73

 

Focal firm’s relationship-specific investments (Adapted from Cannon and Perreault (1999) and Jap and Ganesan (2000); 7-Likert Scale: “strongly disagree/strongly agree”)

You may have made investments in time, energy, and/or money specifically to accommodate this supplier and its products. These investment would be lost if your firm switched to another supplier. Please indicate the extent to which your firm has made investments or changes specifically to accommodate this supplier (1 = none, 7 = a great deal)

0.81

1. Product features

0.86

2. Sales personnel

0.90

3. Inventory and distribution procedures

0.91

4. Retailing strategy

0.87

5. Capital equipment and tools

 

Evaluation of partners’ performance (7-Likert Scale: “Very poor/Excellent”)

Please rate Supplier X’s performance in comparison with all other suppliers delivering similar products

1. Product quality

0.83

2. Timeliness of Delivery.

0.83

3. Sales, service, and/or technical support.

0.86

4. Cost control (compared with expected purchase price)

0.77

5. Total value received

0.80

Behavioral uncertainty (Adapted from Heide (2003); 7-Likert Scale: “strongly disagree/strongly agree”)

1. It is difficult to measure the collective performance of this supplier

0.88

2. Evaluating the performance of this supplier requires extensive incoming inspection

0.84

3. It is difficult to evaluate if this supplier follows our recommended operating procedures

0.88

 

Transaction costs (Adapted from Dahlstrom and Nygaard (1999); 7-Likert Scale: “strongly disagree/strongly agree”)

1. Bargaining costs

 1) negotiations of financial adjustments to the contract are typically difficult and lengthy

0.85

 2) when unexpected changes arise, at least one party was dissatisfied with negotiated outcomes

0.80

 3) Our negotiations with this supplier are usually difficult.

0.84

 4) Neither party is willing to yield to the demand of the other party in negotiations.

0.82

2. Monitoring costs

 1) We spend a lot of time to control quality and quantities of delivers from this supplier.

0.88

 2) We use too much time to make sure the on-time deliveries from this supplier.

0.91

 3) We spend too much time on monitoring the operation procedure of this supplier.

0.88

3. Maladaption costs

 1) The information from this supplier is often poorly formulated and difficult to understand.

0.93

 2) Important information from this supplier seldom comes at the right time.

0.88

 3) The information from this supplier is either incomplete or too voluminous to understand.

0.89

 

Buyer dependence (7-Likert Scale: “strongly disagree/strongly agree”)

1. We are dependent on this supplier

0.76

2. It would be difficult to replace this supplier.

0.84

3. It would be costly to lose this supplier

0.84

 

Competitive intensity (7-Likert Scale: “strongly disagree/strongly agree”)

1. Price competition is a hallmark of our industry.

0.76

2. There are many “promotion wars” in our industry.

0.73

3. There are many competitors in our industry.

0.76

Note: For the survey questions above, respondents were asked to respond to all scales with respect to one of their major suppliers. End points for the scales were 1 = “strongly disagree” to 7 = “strongly agree.”

Focal firm’s total income

Your company’s income in last year (in RMB amount): ___________

Transactional frequency

How frequently do your company place order from this supplier : _ (1 = more than 2 times a day; 2 = once a day; 3 = 1–5 times a week; 4 = 2–3 times a month; 5 = once a month; 6 = 5–10 times a year; 7 = 2–4 times a year;8 = once a year)

Age of the firm

What year was your company established? __________

Size of the firm

How many employees are there in your company? ___________

Length of the business relationship

How many years your company has been doing business with this particular supplier? __________

Note: For the questions above, respondents were asked to respond to all scales with respect to one major supplier they identified earlier.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Wang, Q., Li, J.J., Ross, W.T. et al. The interplay of drivers and deterrents of opportunism in buyer–supplier relationships. J. of the Acad. Mark. Sci. 41, 111–131 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11747-012-0310-9

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11747-012-0310-9

Keywords

Search

Navigation