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The Possibility of Building a Peaceful Regime on the Korean Peninsula Via Multilateral Approaches

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Abstract

Multilateral approaches such as the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, the Four-Party and Six-Party Talks, and the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (established by the USA, Japan, and South Korea to solve North Korea’s issues and to build a peaceful regime on the Korean Peninsula) have achieved few accomplishments since the Cold War. Exceptions include the avoidance of deadly clashes during ongoing multilateral talks at the time of serious situations including the nuclear crisis in 1994 and the Bush administration’s attempt to strike on North Korea with nuclear weapons. The USA has hesitated to conduct kind military relationships with North Korea because they seem to strongly recognize the high risk associated with physical conflict. Additionally, the USA and its allies have experienced North Korea’s ability with nuclear weapons. Many which have attempted to target the USA during the later years of the Clinton and Bush administrations. Dealing with North Korea contributes to the knowledge of those involved in the Six-Party Talks regarding how to work with the USA and others. Are multilateral approaches still efficient under this situation? Even with a number of several types of proposals such as China’s recent dual-track approach or double suspension approach—also backed by Russia—there seems to be no certain attempt to collaborate on building a peaceful regime. This paper will examine why multilateral approaches to building a peaceful regime post Cold War on the Korean Peninsula have forwarded little to a contextual perspective of the changing regional circumstances.

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Notes

  1. Russia also backs the proposal, and the denuclearization issue with the double suspension approach in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has recently been discussed. Please refer to the following information: UNSC. (2017). Non-Proliferation/Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Resource document. UNSC. http://www.lemun.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/SC-Non-proliferation-Democratic-Peoples-Republic-of-Korea.pdf. (Accessed 18 January 2018).

  2. In terms of the issue regarding the Ukrainian denuclearization, please refer to the following material: Carter, Ashton B. & Perry, William J. (2000). Preventive Defense: A New Security Strategy for America. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

  3. The KEDO initiated by the USA, Japan, and South Korea (original KEDO Executive Board member countries) was established in March 1995. This international consortium, which based on the Agreed Framework, would have provided LWRs to the DPRK.

  4. Sanctions against North Korea by the USA began just after the Korean War, and the U.S. government in 1988 added North Korea as a “state sponsor of terrorism” following the bombing of Korean Air Flight 858 in November 1987. The status of state sponsor of terrorism was once removed in October 2008, but the Trump administration in November 2017 officially designated North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism.

  5. North Korean economy in the post-Cold War era has faced a serious situation since the most important partner country, the Soviet Union, collapsed. And, bad weather for years and the DPRK policy escalated the situation. Please see the following material which gives more detail on the food issue in North Korea since the Cold War over: Haggard, Stephan & Noland, Marcus (2005). Hunger and Human Rights: The Politics of Famine in North Korea. Resource Document. U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea. https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/Hunger_and_Human_Rights.pdf. (Accessed 14 March 2018).

  6. North Korea’s ignoring of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) after the Cold War had steadily increased; for instance, Pyongyang in April 1994 announced that it had withdrawn its representatives from the DMZ and abandoned its obligations under the Korean Armistice Agreement. Moreover, North Korea expelled the Polish members of the NNSC in February 1995 and closed the only north-south border crossing to ceasefire monitors in May 1995. Before these actions, Czechoslovakia in 1993 had already withdrawn its delegation from the NNSC. Please refer to following material detail on this issue: Ko, Swan Sik; Pinto, M.C.W.; & Syatauw, J.J.G. (Eds.). (1995). Asian Yearbook of International Law (p. 460). Vol. 5. The Hague: Kluwer Law International.

  7. Beijing indicated that the visit “broke a diplomatic protocol between China and the Unites States, which was not to allow any incumbent officials of Taiwan to visit,” and President “Lee was seen as a pro-independence leader” to China (Kai, He. (2016). China’s bargaining strategies for a peaceful accommodation after the Cold War (p. 207). In T. V. Paul (Ed.). Accommodating Rising Powers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

  8. China fought with North Korea during the Korean War and also signed the Korean Armistice Agreement in July 1993, but the Chinese government did not determine to participate in the KEDO project. For this reason, China considered that new multilateral talks were needed because the countries that signed the Korean Armistice Agreement should discuss how to replace North Korea with a peace regime.

  9. One of reasons why North Korea finally decided to participate in the Four-Party Talks was assumed that they needed the USA and its allies’ food supplements. Please refer to the following material: Haggard, Stephan & Noland, Marcus (2007). Famine in North Korea: Markets, Aid, and Reform (pp. 130–131). New York: Columbia University Press.

  10. Please see the following material which gives more details on this issue: MacCalman, Molly & Khan, A.Q. (2016). Nuclear Smuggling Network. Journal of Strategic Security, 9 (1), pp. 104–118.

  11. However, this meeting did not occur before Clinton’s second term ended. His visit to North Korea was materialized in August 2009 when he was a former president, and it was reported that he met with Kim Jong-il to facilitate two American journalists’ return to the USA. In addition, another presidential election was forthcoming; then, the US approach was left to the next administration.

  12. This change did not indicate that the Bush administration disregarded the multilateral framework, but they had actually been willing to fully use both unilateral and multilateral instruments. Either a bilateral or multilateral regime would be chosen if necessary, there was little difference between the Clinton and Bush administrations. For instance, President Bush announced that he planned to withdraw the USA from the Kyoto Protocol, but he simultaneously emphasized the multilateral functions of APEC and engaged it. To see more details on this issue, please see the following material: Seng, Tan (2016). Multilateral Asian Security Architecture: Non-ASEAN Stakeholders (p. 118). Routledge, London and New York.

  13. For instance, the South Korean government “refused to join the PSI even following North Korea’s test of a nuclear device” in October 2006. Snyder, Scott. (2009). Pursuing a Comprehensive Vision for the U.S.-South Korea Alliance (p. 26). Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies.

  14. North Korea during the Beijing Three-Party Talks admitted that “it possessed nuclear weapons and that it had completed the reprocessing of spent fuel rods” (Moon, Chung-in (2008). Managing the North Korean Nuclear Quagmire (p. 241). In Ikenberry, G. John & Moon, Chung-in (Eds.). The United States and Northeast Asia: Debates, Issues, and New Order. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.).

  15. According to the US National Information Council (NIC) report, as of 2008, North Korea was stated to possess nuclear weapons “while Iran is an aspiring nuclear power.” Please refer to the following material: NIC. (2010). Strategic Implications of Global Health. Resource document. NIC. http://www.dni.gov/nic/PDF_GIF_otherprod/ICA_Global_Health_2008.pdf. (Accessed 18 January 2018).

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  1. Tokyo Seitoku University, 2014 Hoshina, Yachiyo-shi, Chiba-ken, 276-0013, Japan

    Junghoon Lee

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Lee, J. The Possibility of Building a Peaceful Regime on the Korean Peninsula Via Multilateral Approaches. East Asia 35, 233–248 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12140-018-9287-4

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