Abstract
Marine governance of oil transportation is complex. Due to difficulties in effectively monitoring procedures on vessels en voyage, incentives to save costs by not following established regulations on issues such as cleaning of tanks, crew size, and safe navigation may be substantial. The issue of problem structure is placed in focus, that is, to what degree the specific characteristics and complexity of intentional versus accidental oil spill risks affect institutional responses. It is shown that whereas the risk of accidental oil spills primarily has been met by technical requirements on the vessels in combination with Port State control, attempts have been made to curb intentional pollution by for example increased surveillance and smart governance mechanisms such as the No-Special-Fee system. It is suggested that environmental safety could be improved by increased use of smart governance mechanisms tightly adapted to key actors’ incentives to alter behavior in preferable directions.
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Notes
Decisions taken at lower levels can certainly also affect regulations at higher levels, such as when Sweden and Finland convinced the other Baltic Sea Countries, except Russia, to approach IMO and ask for a classification of the complete Baltic Sea as a so-called PSSA (Particularly Sensitive Sea Area) (Uggla 2007).
However, a big enough country may sometimes be able to adopt unilateral measures, such as when the US began requiring all new vessels frequenting its ports to have double hulls in the 1990s.
Certificates are typically required by the authorities in the Flag State (where the vessel is registered), but as the effectiveness of Flag State monitoring varies considerably, operators may be tempted to strategically choose to register vessels in less ambitious states (e.g., in so called Open registries or Flags of convenience).
However, today there are more than 50 Classification Societies around, and their degree of competence and ambition levels do vary to considerable extents.
It should be noted that some of these initiatives have been undertaken under the auspices of IMO, even though they have regional or sub regional application.
Memoranda of Understanding or MoUs have been signed covering all of the world's oceans: Europe and the north Atlantic (Paris MoU); Asia and the Pacific (Tokyo MoU); Latin America (Acuerdo de Viña del Mar); Caribbean (Caribbean MoU); West and Central Africa (Abuja MoU); the Black Sea region (Black Sea MoU); the Mediterranean (Mediterranean MoU); the Indian Ocean (Indian Ocean MoU); and the Riyadh MoU.
However, it should be noted that even though the port fee is not affected, the prolonged stay at port certainly is costly to the operator, which has made the No-Special-Fee system less effective than what was hoped for.
The satellite surveillance is carried out via CleanSeaNet, administered by EMSA (European Maritime Safety Agency).
Aerial surveillance is to some extent coordinated by HELCOM, but is nevertheless carried out by national authorities.
The last year Russia reported surveillance flight hours to HELCOM was 1992 (HELCOM 2010).
The reported fraction of flight hours in darkness was in 2008 14% and in 2009 15%, and was only carried out at all by six of the nine Baltic Sea countries (HELCOM 2010).
Together with HELCOM STW, the HELCOM AIS can be used to track observed oil spills and give indications on the possible identity of the polluter.
This line of thought is explored further in Hassler (2006).
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Acknowledgments
Financial support from the Joint Baltic Sea Research Programme BONUS+, the Foundation for Baltic and East European Studies and the Swedish Research Council Formas, is gratefully acknowledged. Two anonymous reviewers are also thanked for valuable comments.
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Hassler, B. Accidental Versus Operational Oil Spills from Shipping in the Baltic Sea: Risk Governance and Management Strategies. AMBIO 40, 170–178 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13280-010-0128-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13280-010-0128-y