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Role of governance on performance of microfinance institutions in Bangladesh

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Abstract

Using a sample of sixty-eight microfinance institutions (MFIs) from Bangladesh, this study investigates the possible impact of various governance attributes on their financial performance. Our results show that powerful CEOs do have a positive impact on financial performance of MFIs, and that gender diversity in board can only have a positive impact when it is also augmented by gender diversity in management. However, the correlation between financial performance and board size was not statistically significant in our empirical analysis.

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Notes

  1. Sustainability means an MFI can meet all the administrative costs and loan losses from its operating income.

  2. To become eligible the total volume of MFI’s credit portfolio must range between US$1 million and US$1.5 million dollars.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Heller College of Business, Roosevelt University, 430 Michigan Avenue, Chicago, IL, 60605, USA

    Tanweer Hasan

  2. Department of Economics, University of Massachusetts Lowell, One University Avenue, Lowell, MA, 01854, USA

    Shakil Quayes

  3. Institute of Inclusive Finance, 2/1 Block D, Lalmatia, Dhaka, 1207, Bangladesh

    Baqui Khalily

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  1. Tanweer Hasan
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  2. Shakil Quayes
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  3. Baqui Khalily
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Correspondence to Shakil Quayes.

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Hasan, T., Quayes, S. & Khalily, B. Role of governance on performance of microfinance institutions in Bangladesh. Eurasian Econ Rev 9, 91–106 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40822-018-0102-8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40822-018-0102-8

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