An ethical examination of the public response to nonhuman mammalian cloning

Abstract

In this essay I respond to the general public debate that we have seen so far concerning the prospect of cloning nonhuman mammals by Nuclear Somatic Transfer, or NST. In this process, the genetic material from an adult, differentiated cell is transferred to an enucleated oocyte. The resulting cell is then induced to develop so that the new individual is genetically identical to the individual from whom the somatic cell was taken, except for the presence of foreign mitochondrial DNA from the oocyte and possible mutations in the donor cell.

The elements of the public debate to which I attend are twofold. First, I examine the apparent belief of most people that the cloning of nonhuman mammals is not in itself morally problematic. Second, I address the widespread opinion that it is not seriously wrong to clone nonhuman mammals in order to exploit them or use them in various familiar and unfamiliar ways to be discussed. I will generally agree with the first of these views, and in large part disagree with the second.

I further argue that even though cloning nonhuman mammals does not raise any significant new or unfamiliar moral questions, and may not be wrong in principle, its inevitable use in certain ways might be seen as manifesting and promoting an increasingly instrumental and exploitative attitude towards nonhuman mammals. This attitude, I suggest, ought to be replaced by a recognition of nonhuman mammals as our moral equals.