Skip to main content
Log in

A characterization of efficient, bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms

  • Research Articles
  • Published:
Economic Theory Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Summary.

A mechanism that is both efficient and incentive compatible in the Bayesian-Nash sense is shown to be payoff-equivalent to a Groves mechanism at the point in time when each agent has just acquired his private information. This equivalence result simplifies the question of whether or not an efficient, Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism can satisfy other desired objectives, for the search for an appropriate mechanism can be restricted to the family of Groves mechanisms. The method is used to extend the result of Myerson and Satterthwaite on the inefficiency of bilateral bargaining to a multilateral setting.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Additional information

Received: June 30, 1997; revised version: May 22, 1998

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Williams, S. A characterization of efficient, bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms. Economic Theory 14, 155–180 (1999). https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050286

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050286

Navigation