Abstract
Stabilising the exchange rate allows the Russian government to anchor inflation expectations and support consumption but comes at the cost of the financial repression of domestic savers.
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Oleg Itskhoki, University of California, Los Angeles, USA.
Dmitry Mukhin, London School of Economics, UK.
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Open Access: This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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