Abstract
In this paper, we study champions of corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance among the U.S. publicly traded firms and their common characteristics by utilizing machine learning algorithms to identify predictors of firms’ CSR activity. We contribute to the CSR and leadership determinants literature by introducing the first comprehensive framework for analyzing the factors associated with corporate engagement with socially responsible behaviors by grouping all relevant predictors into four broad categories: corporate governance, managerial incentives, leadership, and firm characteristics. We find that strong corporate governance characteristics, as manifested in board member heterogeneity and managerial incentives, are the top predictors of CSR performance. Our results suggest policy implications for providing incentives and fostering characteristics conducive to firms “doing good.”
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In this paper, we use CSR and ESG terms interchangeably as prior literature has pointed out that the only difference between the two terms is that ESG includes a governance component explicitly while CSR implicitly includes it into social responsibility of the firm (Gillan, Koch, & Starks, 2021).
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We performed a robustness check by excluding all firms that were dropped during the sample period. Specifically, we define dropped companies as voluntarily delisted companies (companies delisted at the company’s request) and mandatory delisted companies (companies delisted by exchanges). We identify those firms using CRSP delisting codes. We screen out firms with delisting codes in 400 range (“liquidations”) and the 500 range (“dropped”), excluding firms with delisting codes of 501–503 (“stopped trading on current exchange to move to NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ”). During our sample period, 83 out of 9825 firm-year observations fall into this category. We drop those 83 observations and reconstruct the seven machine learning models. The out-of-sample model performance is consistent with the main results and is presented in Panel B Table 3A of Online Appendix.
As a robustness check, we conduct analysis on a subsample of firms that are not operating in the “sensitive” industries. Specifically, we follow Cho and Patten (2007) and define environmentally sensitive industries (ESI) as companies with a primary SIC code of 13xx (oil exploration), 26xx (paper), 28xx (chemical and allied products), 29xx (petroleum refining), or 33xx (metals). During our sample period, 1198 out of 9825 firm-year observations fall into this category. We redid the main analysis on the subsample excluding ESI companies and included the results in Online Appendix 5A. The results are consistent with our main results confirming that our analysis is not driven by only environmentally sensitive industries.
We acknowledge that ESG scores are available from multiple data providers and, according to a recent study by Berg, Koelbel, & Rigobon (2022) those scores are based on different measurement techniques that result in less than perfect correlation among them. Thus, our results are not expected to be exactly the same across all ESG scores from various sources, although we can reasonably expect some positive correlation. Our chosen ESG scores dataset (Refinitiv/Asset4) has several advantages. The Refinitiv/Asset4 has the most comprehensive coverage with roughly the largest 3,000 companies in U.S. and across more than 450 different ESG metrics (Amiraslani, Lins, Servaes, & Tamayo, 2022). This data has been used widely used in prior studies in the field (Albuquerque, Koskinen, Yang, & Zhang, 2020; Dorfleitner, Kreuzer, & Sparrer, 2020; Drempetic, Klein, & Zwergel, 2020; Havlinova & Kukacka, 2023). This makes it a good fit for our purposes to ensure the credibility of results and consistency with the prior literature.
Since the industry component is reflected in ESG scores, we do not control for the industry in constructing independent variable groups.
Diebold-Mariano statistics for each pair of models are calculated according to the following steps. First, gather the out-of-sample predictive error for both models. Second, compute the absolute values of these errors and the mean of the difference of these absolute values. Third, compute the covariogram for lag/lead length of the out-of-sample prediction errors for the vector of the differences of the absolute values of the predictive errors.
tenfold cross validation is applied when training each model.
For example, the first model that predicts ESG scores for firms in 2012 is trained using 2007–2011 as a training and validation set. We repeat this process annually till the testing set reaches the end of the sample period, the year 2018.
To make the plot clear, we normalize the feature importance of all variables so that the most important feature gets the value 1.
The model construction methods of different algorithms are very different, which also brings about their different dependence on each predictor. Out of the seven models we tested, OLS, PLS, Lasso, Ridge, and ENet are linear models, while MARS and XGBoost are nonlinear models. The results in Fig. 1 show that ESG performance is highly dependent on corporate governance across all models. Generally speaking, feature importance is more informative for models with better out-of-sample predictive performance. Since feature importance indicates how much each feature contributes to the model’s prediction, the feature importance in the model with the best performance (XGBoost in our case, as shown in the results in Table 3A) is the most instructive.
Additionally, to assess the explanatory power of the four groups of variables, we report the out-of-sample performance of models based on the subsets of variables in Online Appendix Table 4A.
Since the model predicts annual company ESG scores, the proposed portfolio is reallocated annually at the end of the year, so we do not adjust for the momentum factor (Carhart, 1997).
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Bilokha, A., Cheng, M., Fu, M. et al. Understanding CSR champions: a machine learning approach. Ann Oper Res (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-024-05839-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-024-05839-3