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Exploring the Link Between Human Rights, the Capability Approach and Corporate Responsibility

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Abstract

The capability approach is gaining momentum as a theory of corporate responsibility and business ethics at a time when the UN Guiding Principles have become a most important framework. A novel approach is now emerging that seeks to understand and specify human rights obligations of businesses within the framework provided by the capability approach. This article partially examines the triad corporate responsibility–human rights–capability approach by exploring the relationship between human rights and capabilities. Thus, it offers conceptual and practical implications for a human rights perspective on corporate responsibility. The bulk of our thesis focuses on studying Nussbaum’s and Sen’s claim that human rights are entitlements to capabilities by means of a discussion of the notion of human dignity. In particular, we show the capability approach’s ability to dissipate theoretical and practical challenges posed by the notion of dignity. This article does not offer a detailed explanation of the implications of our investigation for human rights responsibilities of business. However, an outline of its potential contribution toward unfolding those obligations, conceptually and practically, is provided.

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Notes

  1. In this group, we also find Renouard (2011), Wanderley (2001), Bertland (2009), Westermann-Behaylo and co-authors (2016), Shivarajan and Srinivasan (2013), Parra (2008) and González-Cantón (2012).

  2. In this line, there are scholars like Enderle (2004), Bonvin and Moachon (2012), Gagnon and Cornelius (1999), Cornelius et al. (2007), Cornelius (2002), Cornelius and Gagnon (2004), Cornelius and Skinner (2005, 2008), Leßmann (2012), and Leßmann and Bovin (2011).

  3. The link between dignity and capabilities has received little attention. Some scholars have engaged in a theoretical conversation with the CA (Formosa and Mackenzie 2014; Bendik-Keymer 2014; Claassen 2014; Pirson 2017), whilst others have applied it to different topics. Westermann-Behaylo et al. (2016) have explored it in the context of stakeholder theory. Markova (2014) criticizes Nussbaum’s notion of dignity for lack of strong theoretical justification and find it necessary to turn to Marcel’s Christian humanism for guidance. Bertland (2009) considers that the CA can support virtue business ethics by suggesting human dignity as a proxy basis for the controversial notion of teleology.

  4. However, Nussbaum’s (2011b) emphasis on ‘active striving’ would seem to weaken the attribution of dignity to fetuses or people in permanent vegetative state, which has drawn criticism on Nussbaum. For instance, Kittay (2005) suggests to change the source of dignity from minimal agency to the capacity to care and be cared for, which clearly provides broader coverage to the most vulnerable.

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Acknowledgments

This paper was (partly) financed by the Spanish Ministry of Economy (DGICYT) and FEDER Fund, through the research Project BENEB2 (FFI20014-56391-P).

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Annex 1

Annex 1

Life: Being able to live a human life of normal length; not dying prematurely, or to live a life that is not reduced to the point of being not worth living.

Bodily health: Being able to enjoy a good health; to be adequately nourished; to have adequate shelter.

Bodily integrity: Being able to move freely; freedom from violence, including sexual assault and domestic violence; having opportunities for sexual satisfaction and freedom in matters of reproduction.

Senses, imagination, and thought: Being able to use the senses, to imagine, think, and reason—and most importantly to do so in a “truly human” way, a way which that is cultivated by proper education. Being able to use imagination and thought in order to experience and produce works and events of one’s own choice, whether religious, literary, musical, and so forth. Being able to use one’s mind in ways protected by freedom of expression. Being able to have pleasurable experiences and being able to avoid non-beneficial pain.

Emotions: Being able to have attachments to things and people outside ourselves; to love, to grieve, to experience longing, gratitude, and anger. Not having one’s emotional development suppressed by fear and anxiety.

Practical reason: Being able to form a conception of the good life and to engage in critical evaluation of our plans of life. This entails protection of freedom of thought and religious liberties.

Affiliation: A. Being able to live and socialize with others, to show concern for other human beings; to be able to identify with the situation of another. Protecting this specific capability requires the protection of institutions and freedoms that constitute and nourish such forms of affiliation. B. Having the social bases of self-respect and non-humiliation; being treated in a dignified way; the recognition of our equal worth as human beings. This entails provisions of non-discrimination on the basis of race, sex, sexual orientation, ethnicity, caste, religion, national origin.

Other species: Being able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants, and the world of nature.

Play: Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational activities.

Control over one’s environment: A. Political control: being able to participate effectively in political choices that govern one’s life; having the right of political participation, protections of free speech and association. B. Material control: being able to hold property and having property rights on an equal basis with others; having the right to seek employment on an equal basis with others; having the freedom from unwarranted search and seizure. In work, being able to work as a human being, exercising practical reason, and entering into meaningful relationships with other workers.

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González-Cantón, C., Boulos, S. & Sánchez-Garrido, P. Exploring the Link Between Human Rights, the Capability Approach and Corporate Responsibility. J Bus Ethics 160, 865–879 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-018-3801-x

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