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Acknowledgments
We would like to thank Jeff Horty and Frank Veltman for agreeing to this special issue of the Journal of Philosophical Logic, the authors who submitted articles, and the referees for their detailed and helpful reports. We owe a special thanks to Anil Gupta for discussion and support throughout the process of editing this special issue.
Standefer’s work on this issue and the editors’ introduction was supported by the Australian Research Council, Discovery Grant DP150103801.
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Bruni, R., Standefer, S. Guest Editors’ Introduction. J Philos Logic 48, 1–9 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-018-9478-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-018-9478-x