Abstract
The goal of this paper is to explore, from a phenomenologically informed perspective, the phenomenon of the operative spatialization of human thinking, viewed in its relationship with the embodied human organism’s spatial experience. Operative spatialization in this context refers to the cognitive role and functioning of spatial schematizations and differentiations in human thinking. My particular focus is the domain of conceptualization. By drawing on Husserl’s discussion of the (linguistic) process of a sedimentation of meaning, I aim to show that spatialization functions in a structurally ambivalent manner. On the one hand, spatialization predisposes and thus narrows the scope of human conceptual thought. On the other hand, spatialization establishes an implicit cognitive scaffold indispensable for the development and practice of human higher-order thinking. The structure and functioning of this scaffold, I argue, is intrinsically related to the spatial structure and dynamics of human embodiment. Synthesizing insights from phenomenological studies concerning the experiential constitution of space, and classic and recent research findings from fields such as cognitive linguistics and psychology concerning the cognitive dimension of image-schemas and gestural behavior, I argue that the living human body functions centrally as the sense-constitutive ‘site of conversion’ (Husserl) between concrete structures of spatial experience and abstract structures of conceptual thought.
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Notes
For a thorough and critical discussion of the state of dialogue between the two fields see Zlatev (2010). As Zlatev shows, in the writings of some the ‘founders’ and most prominent proponents of the field of cognitive linguistics, notably Mark Johnson and George Lakoff, references to phenomenology are of a rather superficial and quite often contradictory nature. At the same time, Zlatev argues, there are a range of more recent developments in the field of cognitive linguistics which signal a tendentious rapprochement of cognitive linguistics with phenomenological issues and positions.
With regard to the latter pair, an etymological perspective proves particularly revealing. Etymologically, the word ‘object’ derives from the Latin obiectum (translated from the Greek
), which signifies in spatial terms that which is thrown to the opposite, exterior to and distant from the subject. The word ‘subject,’ by contrast, stems from the Latin subiectum (a translation of the Greek 
). It literally denotes that substratum which underlies, and forms the basis of something else. In this form, it is also very early on associated with autonomy and interiority.In his discussion, Hertz focuses on the superior role of right handedness in Maori culture but also develops a general sociological discussion concerning the pre-eminence of the right in human cultures. For a discussion of the superiority attributed to the right over left in Greek philosophy, see Lloyd (1973). Recent experimental studies demonstrate, however, that the manner in which a person associates right and left with positive and negative ideas is significantly influenced by the person’s handedness: in contrast to the majority of right-handed persons, left-handers commonly tend to associate the left with positive ideas (Casasanto, 2009). For a recent, comprehensive discussion of the phenomenon of handedness in biological and cultural contexts, see McManus (2004).
It is interesting to note that in the particular instance of the evolution of binary thinking, it has been claimed by palaeanthropologists that bilateral bodily organization, and the increase in mobility it entails in comparison to radial bodily organization, has, in the long run, established the condition for the development of complex human symbolic and technical behavior (see Leroi-Gourhan, 1993, 27). Of particular importance in this regard is that the evolution of bilateral bodily organization entails the polarization of mouth and hands. This polarization, in turn, with the acquisition of bipedal locomotion, eventually paves the way for the differentiation of language and technics (see ibid, 31ff). With regard to the emergence and dominance of binary modes of human thinking, it is then crucial that the front limbs of the upright human organism, once placed laterally on the body, entail a “lateral division of functions” (Brésard, 1993, 89) inasmuch as some actions are consistently performed by the right or the left hand. This manual lateral specialization, which corresponds to the lateralization of cerebral functioning, implies a habitually perpetuated, dyadic behavioral motor structure that may inform the binary patterning characteristic for many human conceptual frameworks. See, in this regard, also the discussion by Maxine Sheets-Johnstone (1990, 84ff). Sheets-Johnstone develops the interesting hypothesis that the rhythmically alternating pattern of the human gait, stemming from the evolutionary acquisition of bipedal locomotion, may have contributed to the development of hominid binary modes of thought and even human numerical thinking.
This emphasis on the fundamental cognitive role of human embodiment separates phenomenological approaches from the work of some of the pioneers of cognitive linguistics (e.g., Talmy, 1983, also to some extent Langacker, 1987, but then again see Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). More recently, Levinson (2003) has convincingly argued that the relation between the modus operandi of the human organism’s embodied spatial cognition and that of human modes of lingustically mediated spatial cognition is not always linear. This is because in some cultures, the cognitively dominant linguistic frames of spatial reference function without requiring explicit reference to the space of human embodiment (see also the discussion in “The human body as the ‘site of conversion’ of space and language” section). See, for a discerning discussion of the relation between embodied and linguistic spatial cognition, also Munnich and Landau (2003).
Another succinct and instructive phenomenological discussion of metaphor is found in Edie (1963). A more comprehensive, programmatic outline of a phenomenologically informed theory of metaphor is that by Hans Blumenberg (1960). While not being directly aligned with the phenomenological project, the studies on the cognitive function of metaphors by cognitive linguists George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (1980, 1999) are also worth mentioning here (see also my discussion in the “The human body as the ‘site of conversion’ of space and language” section). These authors, as in the phenomenological tradition, emphasize the cognitive dimension of human embodiment and sensorimotor action.
Given the phenomenological orientation of my discussion, it is also worth bearing in mind here that a range of phenomenological key concepts, with respect to their own linguistic formulation, are likewise established only against the backdrop of semantic references to potentially predisposing spatial processes. The most prominent example is probably the concept of the phenomenological reduction, or epoché, referring to the bracketing (einklammern) of all preconceived opinions, theories or interests. The term ‘bracketing’ semantically implies a (quasi-spatial) process of demarcation and exclusion. Likewise, Husserl’s speaking of a “complete transformation [Umstellung],” or reorientation, of attitudes (Einstellungen) (Husserl, 1970a, 150) and of a “putting out of action [Außer-Spiel-setzen]” of interests (Husserl, 1959, 110, my translation) is informed by semantic references to spatial ordering processes. In view of this semantic spatialization, one may ultimately wonder whether Husserl’s assertion that the use of the epoché “completely shuts me off from any judgement about spatiotemporal factual being [räum-zeitliches Dasein]” (Husserl, 1982, 61) should not be taken with a grain of salt; more so since this use unavoidably implies the use of the medium of language.
Following Sonesson’s discussion, I use the term ‘primary embodiment’ to signify the fact that the living body forms, for the individual human mind, its “condition of access to the experience of the world” (2007, 27). As a matter of fact, human thinking is also significantly informed by both ‘secondary embodiment’—the fact that other human minds encountered in the world are also embodied—and tertiary embodiment, which refers to the extrasomatic embodiment of thought in material structures of the surround (see Sonesson, 2007). In this paper, I primarily focus on the cognitive role of ‘primary embodiment’.
Problematic in Cassirer’s developmental account is his thesis of the primacy of embodied rest (1985, 165ff). That is to say, in the evolution of symbolic expression, what is primary according to Cassirer is a static process of transference of bodily parts into linguistic expressive forms. The transference of dynamic gestalts of lived movement, by comparison, is only considered a secondary process. However, phenomenological findings, particularly if combined with a developmental and evolutionary perspective, rather suggest a constitutive ‘primacy of movement’ (Sheets-Johnstone, 1999). This is more so since it is only the perceptual and locomotive movements of the human body that allow for the primordial structuration of the spatial environment into a field of distinguished regions and places, thus establishing a differentiated, immediately sense-bestowed field that serves as a matrix for the establishment of cognitively salient, symbolic structures.
With regard to the conceptual comprehension of spatial directions and distinctions, and the general cognitive functioning of spatial reference frames, one can thus distinguish at least two ways in which human embodiment contributes to the functioning of spatial cognitive processes. First of all, there are those structures of human spatial cognition which directly derive their meaning from the structure of human embodiment, specifically, from the (body-)centric structure of perceptual space. In the domain of spatial conceptualization, for instance, this pertains to spatial determinations such as ‘here’ and ‘there’. Secondly, however, there exists a wide range of structures intrinsic to the functioning of human spatial cognition where human embodiment plays only an indirect role. There are those structures, for instance, that have as their main operative referent not the embodied subject’s own body but (bodily perceived or perceivable) extrasomatic material anchors. As one referee of this journal pointed out to me, a range of more recent psychological studies even suggest that many of the spatial orientation systems to be observed among both human infants and great apes are not of an ego- (and body-)centric nature but instead are based on absolute, allocentric frames of reference (see, e.g., Haun et al., 2006; Gentner, 2007, see also Acredolo, 1978).
Zlatev (2010) observes that within the field of cognitive linguistics there exists no coherent, monolithic notion of the image-schema. This is not the place to elaborate on the various meanings of the notion of image-schema within the discourse of cognitive linguistics. For practical reasons, in the discussion above I follow Grady’s suggestion (2005) and use the notion of the image-schema strictly in the sense of patterns of sensorimotor experience (including their representation, broadly conceived).
For an instructive overview of more recent empirical research and theoretical discussions concerning the functioning and role of images schemas see the various articles in the book edited by Beate Hampe and Joseph E. Grady (2005).
See for a contextualizing discussion also Jon Tolaas' article exploring the origin of spatialization metaphors (Tolaas 1991). In his discussion, Tolaas goes through a range of implicitly or explicitly normative English expressions which metaphorically lean against the vertical axis. It is interesting that Tolaas sees a link between the genesis and structure of vertical spatialization metaphors and the ontogenetic process of the acquisition of upright posture.
Merleau-Ponty himself is quoting here from Kurt Goldstein’s and Adhemar Gelb’s essay on the amnesia of color names (Goldstein and Gelb 1925, 158). In his more recent book exploring the relation between gesture and thought, McNeill himself also explicitly invokes the passage by Merleau-Ponty quoted above (McNeill 2005, 91ff).
For a recent, empirically informed discussion of the constitutive relation between gestures, speech and conceptualization of time in English language see Cooperrider & Núñez (2007).
An excellent collection of recent research findings and theoretical perspectives concerning the cognitive nexus between metaphor and gesture is Cienki & Müller (2008).
A possible objection to Bühler’s conception is that his assumption of an absolute origo, synonymous with the living Ego–body, implies a considerable egocentric constriction of the actual field-structure of human deictic praxis. See, for a contrasting view, Beata Stawarska (2008). Stawarska, without explicitly mentioning Bühler, argues that the phenomenon of human deixis, in its spatial and linguistic functioning, is always already a social phenomenon, and thus primarily organized in a polycentric fashion. For a comprehensive, multidisciplinary overview over recent research findings and discussions concerning the deictic gesture of pointing, see Kita (2003). For a good discussion of deixis from the viewpoint of embodied cognitive science, see the paper by Ballard et al. (1997).
The distinction between ‘declarative’ and ‘imperative’ pointing was introduced by Elizabeth Bates, Luigia Camaioni, and Virginia Volterra on the basis of their studies on the development of pre-verbal communication in infants (Bates, Camaioni, & Volterra 1975). See, for a comprehensive, empirically informed discussion on the same topic also Carpenter, Nagell, & Tomasello (1998).
It is interesting to consider Goldstein’s insight into the difference of concrete and abstract movements in the light of the findings of a recent empirical study undertaken by Jonathan Cole, Shaun Gallagher and David McNeill (2002). The object of this study was the gestural behavior of a person who, as a consequence of an infection, lost all proprioceptive and tactile senses from the neck down, and thus also control of motor functions that involve proprioceptive feedback. Experiments showed that the test person was able to perform instrumental and spontaneous motor operations (which are roughly analogous to what Goldstein calls concrete movements) only with great difficulty. At the same time, the test person, without too much ease was capable of performing communicative and expressive gestural movements that serve to convey meaning (roughly corresponding to what Goldstein calls abstract movements). All this suggests, in line with Goldstein’s original research, that abstract gestural operations serving a communicative function, while necessarily embodied and dynamic, nevertheless constitute a different kind of action than purely instrumental, concrete bodily movements. See for another relatively recent, empirical study that confirms that Goldstein’s general distinction between abstract and concrete movements also applies on the level of human ontogenesis (in the form of the difference between the performative acts of reaching and pointing) Franco & Butterworth (1996).
Specifically, in his Ideas II Husserl refers to the human living body as being a ‘site of conversion’ in a related, yet differently accentuated fashion. Here, the living body or lived-body (Leib) is understood as the “point of conversion from spiritual causality to natural causality” (1989, 299).
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Acknowledgments
The discussion presented here further develops themes from my paper ‘Die Ambivalenz des Denkens des Raumes. Phänomenologische Überlegungen zur Grundproblematik einer konzeptionellen Fassung von Räumlichkeit’ to be published in German in an edited book titled Wieviel ‘Raum’ braucht das Denken?, forthcoming with Wilhelm Fink Press. I would like to thank the editors of the book, Petra Gehring, Marc Rölli, and in particular Suzana Alpascar, for their cooperation. I also would like to thank John Sutton and two unknown reviewers for a range of helpful comments and suggestions on this paper.
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Woelert, P. Human cognition, space, and the sedimentation of meaning. Phenom Cogn Sci 10, 113–137 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-010-9153-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-010-9153-3