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In whose interests? A response to Aaron Zimmerman’s Belief: A Pragmatic Picture

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Abstract

I provide a brief précis of Aaron Zimmerman’s book, Belief: A Pragmatic Picture, then explore two possible problems for the view. The first concerns whether the account of belief can successfully intervene in the debate between those who hold emotions are partly constituted by evaluative beliefs and those who deny this. The second concerns whether the view can explain that distinctive form of white ignorance that is manifest in an unwillingness to draw relatively obvious action-guiding beliefs from widely shared information. Thinking about cases of this kind raises the question of whether Zimmerman’s account is problematically individualist, because of downplaying the importance of converging on an account of belief given the role of belief attribution in a suite of critical practices that are essential to communities of inquiry. If we, collectively, must commit to converging on an account of belief, but different accounts serve the interests of different groups, then the meta-level thesis that we should choose an account on pragmatic grounds raises the question of whose interests such an account should serve.

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References

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Correspondence to Karen Jones.

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Jones, K. In whose interests? A response to Aaron Zimmerman’s Belief: A Pragmatic Picture. Philos Stud 177, 433–439 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-019-01400-2

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