Skip to main content

Advertisement

Log in

Why is there no revolution in North Korea?

The political economy of revolution revisited

  • Published:
Public Choice Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

The paper critically assesses the Acemoglu–Robinson approach to revolutions, as it is focused on inequality of wealth or income rather than on collective-action problems. We show that income inequality is not a sufficient and not even a necessary condition for a revolution to occur. Rather, a necessary condition for a revolution is that any subpopulation can expect net benefits from it, for which inequality is not a precondition. As a result, a certain structure of commitment devices or their absence rather than inequality is crucial for explaining why revolutions sometimes occur and sometimes not.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. (2000a). Why did the west extend the franchise? Democracy, inequality, and growth in historical perspective. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115, 1167–1199.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. (2000b). Inequality, growth and development. Democratization or repression? European Economic Review, 44, 683–693.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. (2001a). A theory of political transitions. American Economic Review, 91, 938–963.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. (2001b). The colonial origins of comparative development: An empirical investigation. American Economic Review, 91, 1369–1401.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. (2002). The political economy of the Kuznets curve. Review of Development Economics, 6, 183–203.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. (2003). Why not a political Coase theorem? Social conflict, commitment, and politics. Journal of Comparative Economics, 31, 620–652.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. (2006). Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Berman, E. (2003). Hamas, Taliban and the Jewish underground: An economist’s view of radical religious militias (NBER working paper #10004).

  • Berman, E., & Laitin, D. D. (2008). Religion, terrorism and public goods: Testing the club model. Journal of Public Economics, 92, 1942–1967.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Besley, T., & Kudamatsu, M. (2008). Making autocracy work. In E. Helpman (Ed.), Institutions and economic performance. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bienen, H., & van de Walle, N. (1989). Time and power in Africa. American Political Science Review, 83, 19–34.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bloch, P. C. (1986). The politico-economic behavior of authoritarian governments. Public Choice, 51, 117–128.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Buchanan, A. (1979). Revolutionary motivation and rationality. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 9, 59–82.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bueno de Mesquita, B. D., Morrow, J. D., Siverson, R. M., & Smith, A. (2003). The logic of political survival. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Caplan, B. (2008). The myth of the rational voter. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Congleton, R. D. (forthcoming). Perfecting parliament. Liberalism, constitutional reform and the rise of western democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

  • Fearon, J. A., & Laitin, D. D. (2003). Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war. American Political Science Review, 97, 75–90.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fest, J. (1996). Plotting Hitler’s death. The story of German resistance. New York: Henry Holt & Company.

    Google Scholar 

  • Grossman, H. I. (1991). A general equilibrium model of insurrections. American Economic Review, 81, 912–921.

    Google Scholar 

  • Grossman, H. I. (1994). Production, appropriation, and land reform. American Economic Review, 84, 705–712.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gurr, T. (1970). Why men rebel. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hardin, R. (1997). One for all. The logic of group conflict. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kuran, T. (1989). Sparks and prairie fires: A theory of unanticipated political revolution. Public Choice, 61, 41–74.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kurrild-Klitgaard, P. (1997). Rational choice, collective action and the paradox of rebellion. Copenhagen: Copenhagen Political Studies Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kurrild-Klitgaard, P. (2004). The paradox of rebellion. In C. K. Rowley & F. Schneider (Eds.), The encyclopedia of public choice (pp. 403–406). Kluwer: Dordrecht.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lichbach, M. I. (1995). The rebel’s dilemma. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • McGuire, M. C., & Olson, M. (1996). The economics of autocracy and majority rule. Journal of Economic Literature, 34, 72–96.

    Google Scholar 

  • Olson, M. (1965). The logic of collective action. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Orwell, G. (1945). Animal farm. A fairy story. London: Secker and Warburg.

    Google Scholar 

  • Popper, K. R. (1945). The open society and its enemies (Vol. 2). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

    Google Scholar 

  • Roemer, J. E. (1985). Rationalizing revolutionary ideology. Econometrica, 53, 85–108.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tullock, G. (2005). The social dilemma. The selected works of Gordon Tullock (Vol. 8). Indianapolis: The Liberty Fund.

    Google Scholar 

  • Usher, D. (1981). The economic prerequisite to democracy. New York: Columbia University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Weingast, B. (2006). Designing constitutional stability. In R. D. Congleton & B. Swedenborg (Eds.), Democratic constitutional design and public policy: analysis and evidence. Cambridge: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wintrobe, R. (1998). The political economy of dictatorship. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Thomas Apolte.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Apolte, T. Why is there no revolution in North Korea?. Public Choice 150, 561–578 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-010-9716-4

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-010-9716-4

Keywords

JEL Classification

Navigation