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Self-Censorship

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Abstract

This article seeks to explore the conceptual structure and moral standing of an idea that has received almost no attention from analytical philosophers: self-censorship. It is argued that at the heart of the concept is a tension between the thoughts of the self-censor as, on the one hand, the author, and on the other, the instrument, of the censorship. Which of these aspects is emphasised also importantly helps shape how self-censorship is viewed normatively. Focusing on authorship tends to lead to seeing self-censorship as more akin to a freely chosen act of self-restraint, while focusing on the self-censor as instrument presents it as one specific form of ordinary censorship. It is the tension between these two aspects that accounts for the moral ambivalence that is often felt towards the practice of self-censorship.

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Notes

  1. For a complex and sophisticated general defence of conceptual analysis, see Jackson (1998). There is an excellent and fair-minded discussion of the relationship between conceptual analysis and political theory in Gaus (2000), Part One. I do not explicitly address the challenge that perhaps we do not have a shared concept of self-censorship. However, I take it that the facts (and I claim they are facts) that there is significant agreement in the application of the concept, and that even where there is disagreement there is nonetheless often a large measure of agreement about the relevant criteria for its application, to be sufficient to show that there is a shared concept in play This is of course consistent both with some disagreement about whether the concept of self-censorship applies in any particular case and with some differences over the criteria for its application.

  2. The literature is so extensive that it is arbitrary to select any particular works. However, for a good overview with a distinctive view of its own, see Haworth (1998).

  3. I have been unable to unearth anything of even article length written in the English language by a philosopher that is specifically concerned with self-censorship.

  4. See, for example, Strauss (1988).

  5. It is important to note that there is still an asymmetry here. While those who want to censor something typically do not want that something to be expressed, those who want to be free from censorship in this regard do not necessarily themselves want to express what it is they think should be allowed to be expressed. Indeed, it is quite consistent for them to prefer that it is not expressed.

  6. For instance, it is sometimes argued that there is a special case for academic freedom, which amounts to the claim that the expression of some views should be permitted only in an academic context. Although this might seem to restrict freedom of expression in some matters to a particular context or place rather than to particular people, it can hardly be denied that it also favours some people (academics) as against other people (non-academics).

  7. For a good discussion of some of the central issues, see Mele (2001).

  8. To avoid misunderstanding, I should make it clear that it is not my view that self-censorship must be a manifestation of such morally dubious attributes of character; as I shall go on to argue later.

  9. The danger here is that all censorship short of someone being physically prevented from expressing something could be understood as self-censorship.

  10. There are some interesting but complicated issues that arise in circumstances where the conditions that effectively inhibit free expression are caused by the intentional actions of others but not with the specific intention of preventing expression.

  11. There is a question here about how far some conceptions of civility imply a duty to self-censor on some occasions. It could be argued that this is an implication of at least some conceptions of public reason, perhaps including that of Rawls (1997).

  12. Joseph Raz claims that the importance of this aspect of freedom of expression is exaggerated. He writes: ‘Freedom of expression is a liberal puzzle. Liberals are all convinced of its vital importance, yet why it deserves this importance is a mystery. The source of the problem is simple. While a person’s right to freedom of expression is given high priority, and is protected (or, in political morality, is held to deserve protection) to a far greater degree than a person’s interest in having employment, or in not running a risk of an accident when driving along public roads, it is evident that most people value these interests, and many others which do not enjoy special legal protection, much more than they value their right to free expression. Worse still, there can be little doubt that most people are right not to value their right to free expression highly. With few exceptions, people’s interest in their right to free expression is rather small’ (Raz 1994, p. 131). Raz argues that the principal value of freedom of expression is that it is a public good.

  13. For instance, if one is a witness to a crime, one may have a duty not to withhold information, which overrides any reasons one has for self-censoring.

  14. In some ways it is perhaps more interesting to think about when we might praise someone for self-censoring. In particular, it seems harder to think of the praise for self-censorship being appropriately bestowed on anyone other than the self-censor. The more self-censorship is the result of the actions of others, then, if we believe it to be justified, the more likely we are simply to think of it as a legitimate form of ordinary censorship.

  15. Many will hold, and not without good reason, that if it is right to self-censor mockery or ridicule of one religion then it is right to do so of other religions as well, in so far as they are similarly regarded. However, context can make a difference, and one’s attitude to self-censorship may quite legitimately be influenced by, for example, whether one is dealing with a socially dominant and perhaps overbearing religion or one whose adherents are few in number, socially disadvantaged and without any influence.

  16. For a discussion of the ‘Rushdie affair’, see the contributions in Horton (1993).

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Acknowledgments

Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Morrell Conference on ‘Self-Censorship’ held at the University of York in September 2008; the meeting on ‘Religion and Freedom of Expression’, forming part of the AHRC/ESRC Seminar Series on ‘Religion and Society’, in Oxford in December 2008; and the Keele Philosophy Research Seminar in May 2010. I am very grateful for the helpful and stimulating discussion that the paper received on all three occasions as well as to the valuable comments on the final draft by Peter Jones and an anonymous referee for Res Publica.

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Correspondence to John Horton.

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Horton, J. Self-Censorship. Res Publica 17, 91–106 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-011-9145-3

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