Abstract
This paper examines the relationship between knowing how to G and the ability to G, which is typically presented in one of the following ways: (a) knowing how to G entails the ability to G; (b) knowing how to G does not entail the ability to G. In an attempt to reconcile these two putatively opposing positions, I distinguish between type and token actions. It is my contention that S can know how to G in the absence of an ability to \(\hbox {G}_{\mathrm{token}}\), where this action is derived from an action-type, but not in the absence of the ability to perform the action-type itself \((\hbox {G}_{\mathrm{type}})\). This refinement is an attempt to reconcile differences between intellectualism and anti-intellectualism (broadly construed) with regard to knowledge how and ability.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Snowdon (2003, p. 2) uses the term “Capacity Thesis” when discussing a possible entailment between knowledge how and ability. The Capacity Thesis states: Knowing how to G does in fact consist in being able to G, in having the capacity to G. Knowing how ascriptions ascribe abilities or capacities to do the mentioned action. Statement (i) would therefore support the Capacity Thesis; statement (ii) would oppose it.
Intellectualism (broadly construed) is the view that knowledge how is dependent on, insofar as it is reducible to, knowledge that (or propositions). Anti-intellectualism (again, broadly construed) is the view that knowledge how and knowledge that are independent. Each constitutes a different species of knowledge such that the former is not reducible to the latter.
See Fantl (2008) for a detailed discussion on varieties of knowledge how.
To borrow an example from Millikan (2000), let us allow that performance G equates to cooking dodo meat (the dodo is an extinct bird that is believed to have died out around 1681). At time \(\hbox {t}_{0}\) (say, 1650), it was the case that people had the ability to cook dodo meat and the dodo bird existed (to be cooked). Given these enabling conditions, people were able to exercise their ability to cook dodo meat and so performance G could be, and was, performed. However, at time \(\hbox {t}_{1}\) (in 1700), several years after the dodo bird officially became extinct, it seems reasonable to surmise that people at this time also had the ability to cook dodo meat but, owing to the bird’s extinction, were unable to exercise this ability. As a result, G could not be performed, but not owing to a lack of ability.
I distinguish performing G from G happening. The latter could be attributed to chance (some freak occurrence), the former requires the intention to G and for G to be performed intentionally (see the conditions for intelligent action, Sect. 3).
To be clear, I am not saying that the abstracted ability entailment is sufficient for S to know how to G. It is perfectly possible and likely that there will be lots of people who do not know how to G (whatever G may be) even where the ability to G is ubiquitous. Instead, I am merely saying that, as far as ability’s relationship to knowledge how (qua knowledge-about-how) is concerned, the abstracted ability entailment is sufficient to satisfy the entailment between knowledge how and ability.
It may be that the chilialchow (or even some of the other suggested salchows) requires drastic changes to how one approaches the manoeuvre which bears little relation to triple, quadruple or even quintuple salchows, and therefore entails a different ability to that required for these salchows.
See Stanley and Williamson (2001, p. 416) for a similar example.
Hutto (2005) also notes that actions which exhibit knowledge how, in the form of a certain ability (or perhaps what might be thought of as a certain ‘skill’), do not require this ability/skill to be infallible; rather, one must be able to engage in these actions reliably or competently (see also Jung and Newen 2010).
Borrowing from Wittgenstein, one might try to think of all the possible tokens of the type “game” and see if consensus can be achieved.
Similar to a point made earlier (see footnote 8), it may be that these salchows require drastic changes to how one approaches the manoeuvre. As such, the change to the action may involves more than increasing the rotations through the air and so may be less akin to the sit-ups example than suggested here.
Simpson (2010) refers to examples of knowledge how (potentially) in the absence of ability—similar to some of the examples used here—as having conceptually clear but empirically vague boundaries.
Of course, one cannot draw an ontological conclusion from an epistemic premise. It is therefore invalid to reason as follows: we believe it is possible to perform a sextuple salchow therefore it is possible to perform a sextuple salchow. Such a fact does not undermine the PTAC per se; rather, it undermines its practical application in certain cases.
References
Bengson, J., & Moffett, M. A. (2007). Know-how and concept possession. Philosophical Studies, 136, 31–57.
Bengson, J., & Moffett, M. A. (2012). Nonpropositional intellectualism. In J. Bengson & M. A. Moffett (Eds.), Knowing how: Essays on knowledge, mind, and action (pp. 161–195). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Carr, D. (1979). The logic of knowing how and ability. Mind, 88(351), 394–409.
Devitt, M. (2011). Methodology and the nature of knowing how. Journal of Philosophy, CVIII, 205–218.
Dickie, I. (2012). Skill before knowledge. Philosophical and Phenomenological Research, 85(3), 737–745.
Fantl, J. (2008). Knowing-how and knowing-that philosophical. Compass, 3(3), 451–470.
Fridland, E. (2013). Problems with intellectualism. Philosophical Studies, 165, 879–891.
Hawley, K. (2003). Success and knowledge how. American Philosophical Quarterly, 40(1), 19–31.
Hutto, D. D. (2005). Knowing what? Radical versus conservative enactivism. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 4, 389–405.
Jung, E.-M., & Newen, A. (2010). Knowledge and abilities: The need for a new understanding of knowing how. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 9(1), 113–131.
Jung, E.-M., & Newen, A. (2011). Understanding knowledge in a new framework: Against intellectualism as a semantic analysis and an analysis of the mind. In A. Newen, A. Bartels, & E.-M. Jung (Eds.), Knowledge and representation (pp. 79–105). Palo Alto: CSLI Publications and Paderborn: Mentis Verlag.
Millikan, R. G. (2000). On clear and confused ideas: An essay about substance concepts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Noë, A. (2005). Against intellectualism. Analysis, 65(4), 278–290.
Ryle, G. (1949). The concept of mind. London: Hutchinson.
Simpson, D. (2010). Language and know-how. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 9, 629–643.
Snowdon, P. (2003). Knowing how and knowing that: A distinction reconsidered. Proceedings of the Aristotealian Society, 105(1), 1–25.
Sosa, E. (2009). Reflective knowledge: Apt belief and reflective knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Stanley, J., & Williamson, T. (2001). Knowing how. Journal of Philosophy, 98(8), 411–444.
Young, G. (2011). Irreducible forms of knowledge how in patients with visuomotor pathologies: An argument against intellectualism. In A. Newen, A. Bartels, & E.-M. Jung (Eds.), Knowledge and representation (pp. 31–57). Palo Alto: CSLI Publications.
Acknowledgments
I would like to thanks the anonymous reviewers for their insightful and constructive comments.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Young, G. Knowledge how, ability, and the type-token distinction. Synthese 194, 593–607 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0961-4
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0961-4