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Case Study Evidence for an Irreducible Form of Knowing How to: An Argument Against a Reductive Epistemology

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Abstract

Over recent years, there has been a resurgence of interest in arguments favouring intellectualism—the view that Ryle’s epistemic distinction is invalid because knowing how is in fact nothing but a species of knowing that. The aim of this paper is to challenge intellectualism by introducing empirical evidence supporting a form of knowing how that resists such a reduction. In presenting a form of visuomotor pathology known as visual agnosia, I argue that certain actions performed by patient DF can be distinguished from a mere physical ability because they are (1) intentional and (2) knowledge-based; yet these actions fail to satisfy the criteria for propositional knowledge. It is therefore my contention that there exists a form of intentional action that not only constitutes a genuine claim to knowledge but, in being irreducible to knowing that, resists the intellectualist argument for exhaustive epistemic reduction.

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Notes

  1. For a discussion on the historical roots of this distinction, see Moran (2005).

  2. Adapted from Bengson et al. (2008).

  3. See Fantl (2008) for a more detailed discussion on each of these positions.

  4. See Koethe (2002); Rumfitt (2003); Rosefeldt (2004); Noë (2005) for criticisms.

  5. These are sometimes referred to as cases of knowing-wh.

  6. At this stage in the paper, I am willing to allow Snowdon his reduction of these alternative knowledge ascriptions to knowing that. However, later I will query whether this is in fact the case with all forms of knowing-wh. In particular, I will question whether knowing where is always reducible.

  7. See Williams (2008) for further examples of this lack of entailment.

  8. I have adapted this example slightly from the original, so that it is consistent with my own terminology.

  9. I accept that a skill requires ability. But such a requirement does not entail that skill and ability are the same. I thank Paul Gilbert (University of Hull) for drawing my attention to the appropriateness of the term in this context.

  10. By using the phrase “mere physical ability”, I do not intend ‘ability’ to be synonymous with ‘mechanistic’. I recognise that ‘ability’ has a normative (and therefore non-physical) component, even in the case of digestion or waste excretion. There is a standard or norm, arguably shaped by evolution (in these cases) that must be met in order for an ability to be demonstrated. For an informative discussion on the differences and similarities between capacity, ability and disposition, see Millikan (2000).

  11. I am not suggesting here that an exhaustive knowledge of the particulars of how to G must be known, only (as I will discuss later) that the subject knows that the performance s/he initiates is known to constitutes an appropriate (preferably the best) means of achieving G.

  12. For an earlier discussion on the knowledge claims presented here, see Young (2004)

  13. I believe this point also rules out the possibility of using ‘teachability’ as a suitable measure of a subject’s know-how. Not being able to pass on this knowledge does not mean that the would-be teacher is unable to demonstrate know-how themselves. In addition, a lack of ‘teachability’ raises the question as to whether what is missing is knowledge of how to G, for example, or knowledge of how to teach another (or even just this person) how to G. As Polanyi (1966) notes: “…what the pupil must discover by an effort of his own is something we could not tell him. And he knows it in his turn but cannot tell it.” (p.5)

  14. By ‘feeling right’, I also include ‘looking right’ or ‘sounding right’ etc.

  15. I recognise that I am riding somewhat roughshod over issues relating to the causal efficacy of experiential (qua representational) content. I am only suggesting here that, for the sake of argument, this position could be adopted by the intellectualists.

  16. An objection to the claim that experience is sufficient to guide knowledge-based movement might be: Suppose the subject experiences the notes as ‘sounding nice’, and therefore as appropriate, even though others judge them to be inappropriate. Under such conditions would it not in fact be legitimate to say that the subject does not know how to play the piano? In response, consider the man who rides a bicycle by sitting backwards on the seat and pedals backwards in order to move forwards. It might be claimed that his performance is inappropriate but would we want to say, in addition, that it is not something he knows how to do?

  17. For an update on research relating to DF, see Goodale and Milner (2004)

  18. I borrow this example from Carr (1979)

  19. Hutto (2005) also notes that actions that exhibit know-how, in the form of a certain ability (or what I would call ‘skill’), do not require this ability to be “infallible” (p.390).

  20. I do not wish to make condition (ii) too demanding. The subject simply needs to be aware that the method is appropriate; this appropriateness can be based on cultural norms, or be quite idiosyncratic—appropriate (as in, it works) for me.

  21. Apart from DF’s lack of ability to consciously perceive objects (as objects), she is, of course, in all other respects ‘normal’. She is aware of her condition, and of what the researcher is asking her to do, and of the supposed mismatch between task and ability. Her initial surprise at the request is testament to this. Therefore, however reluctant she may be (initially, at least) to perform action p, her initiation of the action conforms to the requirements of the command, as best she understands it. It is this compliance that makes performance p intentional, and distinguishes it from, say, digesting food.

  22. By “more specific details”, I simply mean a conscious awareness of the slot’s orientation that see will have to mirror in order to post the letter. I certainly do not require DF to be aware of precise angles of orientation, or trajectory, which would be beyond most (if not all) of us to articulate.

  23. It might be objected that, in intending to post the letter through the slot, DF does not intend to move her arm at such and such an orientation and trajectory; neither does she know that the angle of orientation is x and the trajectory y. To this, I would say that these specific aspects of the global movement are intentional (rather than mere physical abilities), because they accord with the subject’s intention to G, rather than being something that occurs irrespective of it. The further fact that DF is unable to articulate such motor-performance in propositional terms, even though it is an intentional action, further supports my claim for an irreducible form of knowing how to G.

  24. More specifically, Bennett and Hacker claim that walking is an example of a two-way ability because the subject can choose to initiate the action or refrain from doing so.

  25. Fantl (2008) draws the same conclusion using a different example.

  26. Even if DF never acquires this functional connection, the principle should remain that if she were to acquire such a connection, it would not change her performance.

  27. A possible response by contemporary intellectualists may be to adopt a weaker position than the one described here. It could be claimed that the reductions involved in (K.C.1) and (K.C.2) suggest that intellectualists are necessarily endorsing some form of psychologism whereby knowledge claims are determined by the subject’s internal (mental) characteristics and structures. Must it be assumed, therefore, that a subject’s ‘possession’ of knowledge is dependent on his/her ability to articulate or experience ‘factually-based propositions’? If, in contrast, the intellectualists were to adopt an externalist view, then they could claim that such a move would make them less susceptible to the anti-reductionist challenge posed by the case study evidence presented here. Whilst accepting that such a move is open to the intellectualists, it is nevertheless beyond the scope of this paper to discuss its validity further.

  28. It might also be claimed that, as well as knowing how to post the letter through the slot, DF knows where the slot is; yet this knowing where is demonstrable only, and cannot be reduced to knowing that. In other words, DF can demonstrate where the slot is, by posting the letter through it, without being able to articulate that it is situated at such and such a location or without experiencing it so situated. This challenges Snowdon’s earlier claim that all other forms of knowledge ascription (what, where, whom etc.) are reducible to knowing that. Again I thank Paul Gilbert for drawing this to my attention.

  29. By this, I mean that I experience it as such within the framework of what I have learned constitutes correct cycling or swimming. The level of correctness may vary depending on context, but it is a measure I can be instructed to aim for and therefore experience as correct when achieved.

  30. For a detailed discussion on the sort of non-conceptual thinking alluded to by (K.C.2), see Bermúdez (2003).

  31. I thank Jack Marr for bringing this objection to my attention.

  32. One might want to say that returning the serve is a specific (subordinate) goal within the subject’s overall intention of playing tennis.

  33. fMRI scans of DF have confirmed the ventral stream damage (see Culhan and Kanwisher 2001; James et al. 2003).

  34. Cases of optic ataxia demonstrate the role of the retained ventral stream in the absence of a fully functioning dorsal stream (see Milner et al. 2001).

  35. I thank the anonymous referee for raising this objection.

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Correspondence to Garry Young.

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Young, G. Case Study Evidence for an Irreducible Form of Knowing How to: An Argument Against a Reductive Epistemology. Philosophia 37, 341–360 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-008-9169-x

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