Abstract
The first aim of the paper is to proffer a series of objections to the God machine thought experiment, as presented by Savulescu and Persson, The Monist, 95(3), 399-421, (2012). The second aim is to show that these objections must be overcome by any form of direct moral intervention by technological means, not just the God machine. The objections raised against the god machine involve (i) questioning its intelligibility in light of established views on the relationship between beliefs, desires, intention and intentional action, (ii) pointing out the seeming inability of individuals to attribute warranted moral praise to others or themselves in the case of abstentions from grossly immoral acts (iii) identifying a problematic ‘slippery slope’ argument, and (iv) questioning the rationale underlying the Freedom Lover’s intention to enrol on a moral enhancement course, as well as arguing that that Savulescu and Persson’s notion of ‘complete freedom’ is too stringent.
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Notes
It is important to note that Savulescu and Persson have been at pains to point out that the God machine itself should not be thought of as a form of moral enhancement (see Persson and Savulescu 2015, 2016; Savulescu and Persson 2012), despite claims to the contrary (e.g., Harris 2014, 2016); rather, it is simply a means of moral intervention.
The ability to withstand these objections is therefore necessary (even if not sufficient) if we are to accept the viability of moral intervention by technological means. Moreover, by referring to ‘direct’ intervention, I seek to rule out from this discussion the use of technology in a more indirect sense: say, in education as a means of facilitating changes in one’s moral outlook.
I am assuming that S1 is not being coerced into killing A. If he were then I accept that it is possible that S1 could intend to kill A without desiring to do so, although, even in such a situation, it is likely that S1 does desire that, whatever is the cause of S1’s coercion, it is removed. In that sense, then, the intent is still positioned between a particular desire and the behavior.
I say ‘believing’ because, given that society members know that the God machine is in place and that it prevents grossly immoral acts from occurring, one could argue that A (the ‘victim’) would not actually believe (as in, have no justifiable reason to believe) that he was about to be murdered. Consequently, he would have no reason to be afraid; or perhaps he would have an emotional response similar to that experienced when watching a horror film or riding on a rollercoaster. Presumably, though, in this scenario, A would come to learn that S1 desires to murder him. This newly acquired knowledge would no doubt change the dynamic within their relationship! Given this, perhaps a ‘nip G in the bud’ strategy (thereby avoiding the aforementioned confrontation) has certain advantages and should be favoured.
A world inhabited by the God machine would also undermine (perhaps make altogether invalid) work in the field of moral phenomenology which concerns itself with certain experiential aspects of a person’s moral life (Kriegel 2008) or, put more crudely, the what-it-is-likeness of moral experience (Horgan and Timmons 2005).
Taken from Young (2016, p.962). It is important to clarify that Young (2017) maintains that the person must be aware of being able to do otherwise (that is, he/she must be aware of having at least one option available that is at least equivocally morally superior or inferior to what they do; see also Coren 2018)
The fact that people are aware of the God machine’s presence and purpose differentiates them and their world from our own. In a world where the God machine does not exist, abstention from grossly immoral acts, all thing being equal, is worthy of moral praise precisely because, all things being equal, one is aware that one could have acted otherwise (e.g., done something grossly immoral).
While the God machine continues to operate, it remains a contested claim that individuals (including Freedom Lovers) could ever achieve complete freedom, given that they do not always have available an alternate possibility (i.e., something other than a non-grossly immoral intention and subsequent act), but this is something that has already been discussed.
For the sake of brevity, I would like to leave to one side the more fundamental issue of what makes an event an immoral event (I use the term ‘event’ so as to include behaviour and cognition). In the absence of further knowledge about the science of morality said to inform the God machine in Savulescu and Persson’s thought experiment, let us define ‘immorality’ as that which the majority of members of a given society agree is immoral or, in the case of gross immorality, grossly immoral (i.e., a consensus-based morality culminating in a social norm or accepted community standard).
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Young, G. Objections to the God Machine Thought Experiment and What they Reveal about the Intelligibility of Moral Intervention by Technological Means. Philosophia 48, 831–846 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-019-00095-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-019-00095-3