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Knowledge How, Procedural Knowledge, and the Type-Token Action Clause

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Abstract

This paper argues that the propositions “S knowing how to Φ entails that S has the ability to Φ” and “S knowing how to Φ does not entail the ability to Φ” can both be true and non-contradictory when true, so long as one distinguishes between Φ as an action-type and Φ as an action-token. In order to defend this claim, recent work by Young (on the type-token action clause), Levy (on knowledge how and motor representations), and Gaultier (on procedural knowledge) is discussed with a view to integrating into a coherent and novel position certain commonalities within their respective views. As a consequence of this integration, a revised version of Young’s type-token action clause is suggested that provides comprehensive support for the assertion that knowing how to Φ both does and does not necessitate the ability to Φ, depending on whether one is talking about action types or action tokens.

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Notes

  1. Young (2017, p. 602)

  2. It is worth noting that “procedural knowledge” is a term used by cognitive psychologists. In line with its typical use, Gaultier takes procedural knowledge to be (i) ordinarily, knowledge of how to proceed in order to Φ, and, in a more technical sense, (ii) knowledge to be contrasted with conscious and verbally articulate declarative knowledge of how to proceed. So, while knowing how to Φ (say, escape from the labyrinth) may well involve knowing that one must do x, y, z (qua declarative knowledge that aligns with propositional knowledge or knowing that), “procedural knowledge of how to Φ is not primarily exercised and demonstrated in answering questions about the way to succeed in Φing [escaping the labyrinth by doing x, y z], but in the performance of Φing itself” (Gaultier 2017, p. 4961; emphasis added). As such, procedural knowledge should not be thought of, here, as a substitute term for all uses of knowledge how within epistemology. Its intended use within this paper should become clear as we progress.

  3. I thank the anonymous reviewer for drawing my attention to this point.

  4. Where S has the ability to G, I am assuming that there is nothing preventing G’s ability from being actualized (i.e., in the case of performing a salchow, the continued existence of ice rinks and ice skates, or the absence of laws prohibiting the performance of such a maneuver).

  5. Of course, one might also wish to say that corresponds to a token of the letter-type “vee written in the Edwardian style” at t1, but this is not of interest to this paper. By conceding this point, I am indicating my acceptance of the fact that an action-token on one occasion, based on one contingent means of classification, may also be conceived as an action-type on another occasions based on a different classification system. Such variation in the classification of types and tokens is dependent on the contingencies evident in any social construction. What I intend to defend is a version of TAC that is grounded on similarities at the level of motor representations (see Section 4).

  6. In being relative to oneself, I mean not only relative to one’s action capabilities but also the location of the object to oneself in egocentric space.

  7. That said, following Ferretti (2016), motor representations are not the product of a single representational process but, rather, are the culmination of the processing of a number of different sub-representations.

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  1. School of Historical and Philosophical Studies, University of Melbourne, Parkville Campus, Melbourne, VIC, 3010, Australia

    Garry Young

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Young, G. Knowledge How, Procedural Knowledge, and the Type-Token Action Clause. Acta Anal 34, 327–343 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-018-0376-1

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