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Individually Sufficient and Disjunctively Necessary Conditions for Moral Responsibility

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Abstract

In this paper, we motivate, propose and defend the following two conditions as individually sufficient and disjunctively necessary for moral responsibility: (1) PODMA(s) (the principle of doxastic moral asymmetry)—originally proposed by Coren, Acta Analytica, 33, 145–159, (2018), now cast as sufficient rather than necessary—and (2) the TWC* (twin world condition), which amends versions presented by Young (Philosophia, 44(3), 961–969, 2016; Philosophia, 45(3), 1365–1380, 2017). We explain why there is a need for new necessary and sufficient conditions, how these build on and improve existing ideas, particularly in relation to Frankfurt-style counterexamples and the continuing discussion on their effectiveness, and why PODMA(s) and the TWC* are good candidates. Finally, we defend the proposal against anticipated objections in order to clarify why we think these individually sufficient and disjunctively necessary conditions are plausible and able to inform the ongoing debate on the role of alternate possibilities in the ascription of moral responsibility.

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Notes

  1. As is widely known, FSCs involve the possibility of intervention from some form of counterfactual intervener in order to prevent the agent (S) from performing ‘other than E’ should they seek to do so. It is further contrived that S does not seek to ‘do other than E’ and so does E, anyway, in the absence of intervention. Intuitively, S is ascribed moral responsibility for doing E even though S could not have done otherwise, owing to the presence of the counterfactual intervener.

  2. To be clear, the sign the counterfactual intervener monitors—which has varied depending on the author of the FSC—indicates that the agent is about to decide to E (rather than ‘other than E’). It does not indicate that the decision has been made. Variations in the sign have included flushing bright red (Blumenfeld 1971) or similarly blushing (Widerker 1995), monitoring the protagonist’s brain for an unspecified sign (Fischer and Ravizza, 1991; Zagzebski 2000), or the initiation of a specified sequence of neuronal excitation (Stump 1996) or a neurological pattern in the brain (Fischer 2002), or the subject’s deliberations and intentions (McKenna 2005), or even the occurrence of moral reasoning of a specified force (Pereboom 2000).

  3. It is worth noting that Widerker (2005) also advances the argument that, for the ascription of moral responsibility, S must believe that it is within her power to E. More specifically, Widerker argues that feeling remorse requires that S believe she should not have acted as she did, which itself requires the belief that alternatives were available to her at the time.

  4. This scenario is inspired by an example presented in Levy (2008).

  5. For leeway incompatibilists, the introduction of TWC enables alternate possibilities to be utilized in FCSs in the absence of casual determinism, thereby allowing for moral responsibility to be ascribed. Alternatively, for source incompatibilists, TWC provides a means of illustrating fixed agent intention in the absence of causal determinism; again, allowing for the ascription of moral responsibility. For a recent discussion on leeway and source incompatibilism, see Timpe (2007). We thank the anonymous reviewer for pushing us to clarify our position on the role of causal determinism.

  6. Imagine A is trapped in a burning building and S’s options are (a) do nothing (meaning A will certainly die) or (b) attempt to rescue A which requires that S swim across a pool she justifiably believes is full of a highly corrosive acid (which would result in the death of S and therefore A). As it happens, the pool is actually filled with water and S is a capable swimmer. What justifies S’s (false) belief is the testimony of the fiendish Mr. White who falsely informs S that the pool contains acid and, unbeknownst to S, interferes with her scanning equipment so that an analysis of the pool’s content incorrectly registers concentrated sulphuric acid rather than water.

  7. Imaging further that at the left side of the pool is a path that would take S straight to the burning building in which A is trapped. The path is hidden, however, behind a paper-thin façade that, despite being easy to break through, has the appearance of impenetrable rock. Given the façade’s appearance, there is no reason for S to believe that a viable means of rescuing A is available along the side of the pool.

  8. It seems reasonable to say of Janet (in the drowning child example) that the false belief she had implanted—concerning her deep-water phobia—disqualifies her as a rational agent during this time; at least, that is, if she was incapable of correcting the belief.

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Young, G., Coren, D. Individually Sufficient and Disjunctively Necessary Conditions for Moral Responsibility. Acta Anal 36, 501–515 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-020-00453-x

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