Abstract
In the current debates about zoosemiotics its relations with the neighbouring disciplines are a relevant topic. The present article aims to analyse the complex relations between zoosemiotics and cognitive ethology with special attention to their establishers: Thomas A. Sebeok and Donald R. Griffin. It is argued that zoosemiotics and cognitive ethology have common roots in comparative studies of animal communication in the early 1960s. For supporting this claim Sebeok’s works are analysed, the classical and philosophical periods of his zoosemiotic views are distinguished and the changing relations between zoosemiotics and cognitive ethology are described. The animal language controversy can be interpreted as the explicit point of divergence of the two paradigms, which, however, is a mere symptom of a deeper cleavage. The analysis brings out later critical differences between Sebeok’s and Griffin’s views on animal cognition and language. This disagreement has been the main reason for the critical reception and later neglect of Sebeok’s works in cognitive ethology. Sebeok’s position in this debate remains, however, paradigmatic, i.e. it proceeds from understanding of the contextualisation of semiotic processes that do not allow treating the animal mind as a distinct entity. As a peculiar parallel to Griffin’s metaphor of “animal mind”, Sebeok develops his understanding of “semiotic self” as a layered structure, characterised by an ability to make distinctions, foremost between itself and the surrounding environment. It appears that the history of zoosemiotics has two layers: in addition to the chronological history starting in 1963, when Sebeok proposed a name for the field, zoosemiotics is also philosophically rooted in Peircean semiotics and German biological philosophy. It is argued that the confrontation between zoosemiotics and cognitive ethology is related to different epistemological approaches and at least partly induced by underlying philosophical traditions.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Sebeok’s involvement with the issues of animal communication can be traced back to 1960–1961, when he had a scholarship at the Stanford Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences (Sebeok 1986: 72–73).
It may be that we should also distinguish the third—biosemiotic period—in Sebeok’s thinking, which is formed from the essays on zoo/biosemiotic topics published in the second half of the 1990s and in the beginning of the new millennium mostly in the collection Global Semiotics (2001). For discussion about Sebeok’s biosemiotic turn, see Kull 2003.
Is there not a hidden parallel with zoosemiotics as well as a certain irony, when one recalls Sebeok’s background in linguistics?
This attitude remains, even if later cognitive ethology distances itself from the studies of animal cognition and communication made in the controlled laboratory environment (e.g. Bekoff, Allen 1997b).
Similar contextual aspects of animal communication are also strongly emphasised in the works of W. John Smith in the form of the context-specificity of the messages transmitted in communication (Smith 1965).
Compare to Griffin’s program of comparative linguistics, discussed above.
We could also recall here von Frisch’s struggle against enthusiastic over-interpretation of his study as an indication of the consciousness of bees as reported by Tania Munz: “he [von Frisch] believed there were significant epistemological barriers to proving its presence scientifically and that the inaccessibility of its inner and outer manifestations dictated a scientific agnosticism” (Munz 2005: 546–548).
An interesting parallel is the distinction between generalist and ecological programs in animal cognition studies conducted by Jacques Vauclair (1996: 163–166). According to his view, the generalist program aims to investigate the generality and continuity of cognitive processes across species and the evolution of human cognition, whereas the ecological program searches for cognitive processes in natural settings and compares different species in similar environmental settings.
References
Allen, C., & Bekoff, M. (1999). Species of mind: The philosophy and biology of cognitive ethology. Cambridge: The MIT.
Allen, C., & Bekoff, M. (2007). Animal minds, cognitive ethology, and ethics. The Journal of Ethics, 11(3), 299–317.
Bateson, M. C. (1991). Our own metaphor. A personal account of a conference on the effects of conscious purpose on human adaptation. Washington, London: Smithsonian Institution.
Bekoff, M. (1999). Cognitive ethology. In W. Bechtel & G. Graham (Eds.), A companion to cognitive science. Blackwell companions to philosophy (pp. 371–379). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bekoff, M. (2002). Minding animals: Awareness, emotions, and heart. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bekoff, M., & Allen, C. (1997a). Intentional communication and social play: How and why animals negotiate and agree to play. In M. Bekoff & J. A. Byers (Eds.), Animal play: Evolutionary, comparative, and ecological perspectives (pp. 97–114). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bekoff, M., & Allen, C. (1997b). Cognitive ethology: Slayers, skeptics, and proponents. In R. W. Mitchell, N. Thompson, & L. Miles (Eds.), Anthropomorphism, anecdotes, and animals (pp. 313–334). New York: State University of New York Press.
Burghardt, G. M. (1985). Animal awareness: current perceptions and historical perspective. American Psychologist, 40(8), 905–919.
Conferences. (1961). Current Anthropology, 2(2), 139–144.
Conferences. (1966). Conferences. Current Anthropology, 7(2), 251–255.
Deely, J. (2003). The quasi-error of the external world. An essay for Thomas A. Sebeok, in memoriam. Cybernetics and Human Knowing, 10(1), 25–46.
Griffin, D. R. (1976). The question of animal awareness: Evolutionary continuity of mental experience. New York: Rockefeller University Press.
Griffin, D. R. (1977). Expanding horizons in animal communication behaviour. In T. A. Sebeok (Ed.), How animals communicate (pp. 26–32). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Griffin, D. R. (1981). The question of animal awareness: Evolutionary continuity of mental experience (Revised and enlarged ed.). New York: The Rockefeller University Press.
Griffin, D. R. (1982). Introduction. In D. R. Griffin (Ed.), Animal mind—human mind. Report of the Dahlem workshop on animal mind—human mind, Berlin 1981, March 22–27 (pp. 1–12). Berlin: Springer-Verlag.
Griffin, D. R. (1994). Animal minds. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Griffin, D. R. (2001). Animal minds: Beyond cognition to consciousness. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Kull, K. (2003). Thomas A. Sebeok and biology: building biosemiotics. Cybernetics and Human Knowing, 10(1), 7–20.
Maran, T., Martinelli, D., & Turovski, A. (2010). Introduction. In T. Maran, D. Martinelli, & A. Turovski (Eds.), Readings in zoosemiotics. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
Martinelli, D. (2007). Zoosemiotics. Proposal for a Handbook (= Acta Semiotica Fennica 26). Imatra: Finnish Network University of Semiotics; Imatra: International Semiotics Institute; Helsinki: Semiotic Society of Finland.
Munz, T. (2005). The bee battles: Karl von Frisch, Adrian Wenner and the honeybee dance language controversy. Journal of the History of Biology, 38(3), 535–570.
Peirce, C. S. (1994). The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce. [Electronic version (Folio Bound Views); vols. 1–6, C. Hartshorne, P. Weiss (Eds.), 1931–1935; vols. 7–8, A. W. Burks (Ed.), 1958.] Cambridge: Harvard University Press. [In-text references are to CP, followed by volume and paragraph numbers].
Radick, G. (2005). Primate language and the playback experiment, in 1890 and 1980. Journal of the History of Biology, 38(3), 461–493.
Ristau, C. A. (Ed.). (1991). Cognitive ethology. The minds of other animals. Essays in Honor of Donald R. Griffin. Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Sebeok, T. A. (Ed.). (1968a). Animal communication: Techniques of study and results of research. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Sebeok, T. A. (1968b). Zoosemiotics. American Speech, 43(2), 142–144.
Sebeok, T. A. (1972a). Perspectives in zoosemiotics (= Janua Linguarum. Series Minor 122). The Hague: Mouton.
Sebeok, T. A. (1972b). Semiotics and ethology. In T. A. Sebeok (Ed.), Perspectives in zoosemiotics (= Janua Linguarum. Series Minor 122) (pp. 122–161). The Hague: Mouton.
Sebeok, T. A. (1979). Prefigurements of art. Semiotica, 27(1–3), 3–74.
Sebeok, T. A. (1981a). Close encounters with canid communication of the third kind. In T. A. Sebeok (Ed.), The play of musement (pp. 117–133). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Sebeok, T. A. (1981b). Smart simians: The self-fulfilling prophecy and kindred methodological pitfalls. In T. A. Sebeok (Ed.), The play of musement (pp. 134–209). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Sebeok, T. A. (1981c). The ultimate enigma of “Clever Hans”. In T. A. Sebeok (Ed.), The play of musement (pp. 260–265). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Sebeok, T. A. (1986). Vital signs. In T. A. Sebeok (Ed.), I think I am a verb: More contributions to the doctrine of signs (pp. 59–79). New York: Plenum.
Sebeok, T. A. (1990a). Essays in zoosemiotics (= Monograph Series of the TSC 5). Toronto: Toronto Semiotic Circle; Victoria College in the University of Toronto.
Sebeok, T. A. (1990b). Naming in animals, with reference to playing: A hypothesis. In T. A. Sebeok (Ed.), Essays in zoosemiotics (= Monograph Series of the TSC 5) (pp. 77–92). Toronto: Toronto Semiotic Circle; Victoria College in the University of Toronto.
Sebeok, T. A. (1990c). ‘Talking’ with animals: Zoosemiotics explained. In T. A. Sebeok (Ed.), Essays in zoosemiotics (= Monograph Series of the TSC 5) (pp. 105–113). Toronto: Toronto Semiotic Circle; Victoria College in the University of Toronto.
Sebeok, T. A. (1990d). Zoosemiotic components of human communication. In T. A. Sebeok (Ed.), Essays in zoosemiotics (= Monograph Series of the TSC 5) (pp. 49–75). Toronto: Toronto Semiotic Circle; Victoria College in the University of Toronto.
Sebeok, T. A. (1990e). Zoosemiotics: At the intersection of nature and culture. In T. A. Sebeok (Ed.), Essays in zoosemiotics (= Monograph Series of the TSC 5) (pp. 37–47). Toronto: Toronto Semiotic Circle; Victoria College in the University of Toronto.
Sebeok, T. A. (1991a). Communication. In T. A. Sebeok (Ed.), A sign is just a sign (pp. 22–35). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Sebeok, T. A. (1991b). In what sense is language a “primary modeling system”? In T. A. Sebeok (Ed.), A sign is just a sign (pp. 49–58). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Sebeok, T. A. (1991c). The semiotic self. In T. A. Sebeok (Ed.), A sign is just a sign (pp. 36–40). Bloomington, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
Sebeok, T. A. (1991d). The semiotic self revisited. In T. A. Sebeok (Ed.), A sign is just a sign (pp. 41–48). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Sebeok, T. A. (2001a). Biosemiotics: Its roots, proliferations, and prospects. In T. A. Sebeok (Ed.), Global semiotics (pp. 31–43). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Sebeok, T. A. (2001b). Signs, bridges, origins. In T. A. Sebeok (Ed.), Global semiotics (pp. 59–73). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Sebeok, T. A. (2001c). “Tell me, where is fancy bred?” The biosemiotic self. In T. A. Sebeok (Ed.), Global semiotics (pp. 120–127). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Sebeok, T. A. (2001d). The cognitive self and the virtual self. In T. A. Sebeok (Ed.), Global semiotics (pp. 128–134). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Sebeok, T. A., & Ramsay, A. (Eds.). (1969). Approaches to animal communication (= Approaches to Semiotics 1). The Hague: Mouton.
Smith, W. J. (1965). Message, meaning, and context in ethology. American Naturalist, 99(908), 405–409.
Sorabji, R. (1983). Animal Minds & Human Morals: The Origins of the Western Debate. Cornell Studies in Classical Philology. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Vauclair, J. (1996). Animal cognition. An introduction to modern comparative psychology. Cambridge; London: Harvard University Press.
Acknowledgments
This research was supported by the European Union through the European Regional Development Fund (Centre of Excellence CECT, Estonia) and by Estonian Science Foundation Grant No. 7790.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Maran, T. Why Was Thomas A. Sebeok Not a Cognitive Ethologist? From “Animal Mind” to “Semiotic Self”. Biosemiotics 3, 315–329 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12304-010-9079-8
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12304-010-9079-8