Abstract
In this paper, we argue that boredom can be an important experience that contributes to personal autonomous agency by providing authentic motivation, and that strategies of social media providers to bind users’ attention to their platforms undermine this authenticity. As discussed in social epistemology and media ethics for a while now, such strategies can lead to so-called epistemic or filter bubbles. Our analysis of the relation between boredom and social media use focuses on a similarly impairing effect of social media on users’ autonomy, which we call authenticity bubbles.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
There may be factors that, perhaps against common intuition, can contribute to an authentic decisions-making process, if an individual endorses them as part of their personality, such as neurotic character traits. See Killmister (2015) for an account of how psychological conditions like this might still be considered authentic for certain individuals.
Here we refer to any mental states of an agent as internal factors and to activities of other agents as well as on social and environmental circumstances as external factors.
One male outlier has been reported to have applied 190 shocks to himself.
At least some of the applied user interface design strategies are often labelled as ‘dark patterns’, although the literature on this topic varies and is not always consistent. For a recent overview see, e.g., Mathur et al. (2021)
In that regard, our use of the term ‘nudge’ also includes what Thaler and Sunstein later label as ‘sludge’ (see, e.g., Thaler, 2018), which appears applicable to strategies that make people more likely to do things they don’t really prefer, like the one we describe in this paper.
There sometimes appears to be an overlap between instances that would count as coercion for Raz but could also be classified as domination according to, e.g., Pettit (1997). For our purpose, as outlined earlier, domination is an authenticity-diminishing factor, although perhaps to a slightly lesser degree than direct coercion.
Or rather, the data that online companies have that represent these convictions and attitudes.
Leung (2020) also highlights the effect that ‘habitual’ or ‘ritualised’ usage of smartphone apps might have on a user’s decision to engage with a certain type of media. While this type of effect might apply to any type of activity – one could, for example, imagine a musician who habitually picks up her guitar every time she is bored – the fact that smartphones have become such a constant companion in most people’s lives and social media are always ‘just a tap away’, might make the effect of ritualised usage more pertinent in the case of social media.
In that regard, boredom operates like pain. Also, like pain, boredom might even be pleasurable for some people and under specific circumstances. But even then, boredom will likely not always be pleasurable.
We assume that social media companies (or rather, the people running them) plainly have economic interests in keeping users on their platforms by optimising the choice architecture to this end. One could, however, follow a Heideggerian approach, for example, and argue that technology, and particularly contemporary digital technology, are not merely means to this end but rather a more comprehensive way of thinking or being, as developed in The Question Concerning Technology (1977). If one understands machines (or technological artifacts generally) as what he calls ‘standing-reserve’ or ‘Bestand’ (ibid., p. 17), they are things without individual character, without autonomy and, one might be tempted to say, without dignity. Further, this techno-ontological understanding facilitates, as some scholars argue, ‘a deeply instrumental and […] grotesque understanding of the world in general’ (Wheeler, 2020). From this perspective it is unsurprising that something like authenticity bubbles evolves from practices characterised (or perhaps even only made possible) by a world view like this. Yet, we prefer to not pursue this line of thought any further here, not least because Heidegger’s terminology is complex and often difficult to access, as others have noted before: ‘Heidegger’s theory of technology contains so many implausible notions that it is very difficult to defend it on a correspondence basis’ (Waddington, 2005, 578). Nevertheless, this remains a promising avenue for future exploration for philosophers of technology.
The degree of similarity differs depending on the account of akrasia one endorses. As our account of authenticity bubbles in the context of social media platforms clearly has a significant externalist component, our understanding of akrasia is found more likely in the neighbourhood of views like those defended in Stocker (1979) or Mele (1987) than of strongly internalist views.
References
Adorno, T. W. (1991). In J. M. Bernstein (Ed.), Routledge classics. The Culture Industry: Selected essays on Mass Culture. Taylor and Francis.
Alter, A. (2017). Irresistible: The rise of Addictive Technology and the business of keeping us hooked. Penguin.
Bai, J., Mo, K., Peng, Y., Hao, W., Qu, Y., Lei, X., & Yang, Y. (2020). The Relationship between the Use of Mobile Social Media and Subjective Well-Being: The mediating effect of Boredom Proneness. Frontiers in Psychology, 11, 568492. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2020.568492.
Beer, D. (2017). The Social Power of Algorithms. Information Communication & Society, 20(1), 1–13. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2016.1216147.
Bench, S. W., & Lench, H. C. (2013). On the function of Boredom. Behavioral Sciences (Basel Switzerland), 3(3), 459–472. https://doi.org/10.3390/bs3030459.
Benjamin, W. (2003). The Arcades Project. Harvard University Press. (Original work published 1982).
Berman, M. N. (2002). The normative functions of coercive claims. Legal Theory, 8, 45–89.
Bhargava, V. R., & Velasquez, M. (2021). Ethics of the attention economy: The Problem of Social Media Addiction. Business Ethics Quarterly, 31(3), 321–359. https://doi.org/10.1017/beq.2020.32.
Biolcati, R., Mancini, G., & Trombini, E. (2018). Proneness to Boredom and Risk behaviors during adolescents’ Free Time. Psychological Reports, 121(2), 303–323. https://doi.org/10.1177/0033294117724447.
Britton, A., & Shipley, M. J. (2010). Bored to death? International Journal of Epidemiology, 39(2), 370–371. https://doi.org/10.1093/ije/dyp404.
Carrera, E. (2023). Boredom. Elements in Histories of Emotions and the Senses. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009412360. Advance online publication.
Colburn, B. (2010). Autonomy and liberalism. Routledge.
Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1975). Beyond boredom and anxiety. The Jossey-Bass behavioral science series. Jossey-Bass.
Danckert, J., & Merrifield, C. (2018). Boredom, sustained attention and the default Mode Network. Experimental Brain Research, 236(9), 2507–2518. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00221-016-4617-5.
Danckert, J., Mugon, J., Struk, A., & Eastwood, J. (2018). Boredom: What Is It Good For? In H. C. Lench (Ed.), The Function of Emotions: When and Why Emotions Help Us (pp. 93–119). Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-77619-4_6.
Donati, M. A., Beccari, C., & Primi, C. (2022). Boredom and problematic Facebook Use in adolescents: What is the relationship considering trait or state boredom? Addictive Behaviors, 125, 107132. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.addbeh.2021.107132.
Dworkin, G. (2001). The theory and practice of autonomy. Cambridge University Press. (Original work published 1988).
Eastwood, J. D., Frischen, A., Fenske, M. J., & Smilek, D. (2012). The unengaged mind: Defining Boredom in terms of attention. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 7(5), 482–495. https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691612456044.
Elpidorou, A. (2020). Is Boredom one or many? A functional solution to the Problem of Heterogeneity. Mind & Language.
Elster, J. (2001). Sour grapes: Studies in the subversion of rationality. Cambridge University Press. (Original work published 1993).
Gaus, G. F. (2009). The place of autonomy within liberalism. In J. P. Christman, & J. Anderson (Eds.), Autonomy and the challenges to Liberalism: New essays (pp. 272–306). Cambridge University Press.
Goodstein, E. S. (2005). Experience without qualities: Boredom and Modernity. Stanford University Press.
Graeber, D. (2018). Bullshit Jobs: A theory. Allen Lane.
Griffiths, M. D. (2018). Adolescent social networking: How do Social Media operators facilitate habitual use? Education and Health, 36(3), 66–69.
Guignon, C. (2008). Authenticity. Philosophy Compass, 3(2), 277–290. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2008.00131.x.
Haager, J. S., Kuhbandner, C., & Pekrun, R. (2018). To be bored or not to be bored—how Task-Related Boredom influences Creative performance. The Journal of Creative Behavior, 52(4), 297–304. https://doi.org/10.1002/jocb.154.
Haksar, V. (1976). Coercive proposals [Rawls and Gandhi]. Political Theory, 4(1), 65–79.
Healy, S. D. (1984). Boredom, self, and culture. Fairleigh Dickinson University.
Heidegger, M. (1995). The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude (N. Walker & W. McNeill, Trans.). Studies in Continental thought. Indiana University Press.
Heidegger, M. (1977). The question concerning technology. In the question concerning Technology, and other essays (W. Lovitt, Trans), 3–35. (Original work published 1954).
Jackson, N., & Carter, P. (2011). In praise of Boredom. Ephemera, 11(4), 387–405.
Kant, I. (1990). Critique of pure reason. N. K. Smith.
Kierkegaard, S. (1992). Either/or: A fragment of life. Penguin classics. Penguin Books.
Killmister, S. (2015). The Woody Allen Puzzle: How authentic alienation. Complicates Autonomy Noûs, 49(4), 729–747. https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12069.
Kracauer, S. (1995). In T. Y. Levin (Ed.), The Mass Ornament: Weimer essays. Harvard University Press.
Lemov, R. (2020). Into the Whirlpool: How predictive data put brainwashing on the spin cycle. The Hedgehog Review, 22(2), 74. link.gale.com/apps/doc/A630406369/AONE?u = anon ~ 2adb3023&sid = bookmark-AONE&xid = 449e304b.
Leung, L. (2020). Exploring the Relationship between Smartphone activities, Flow Experience, and Boredom in Free Time. Computers in Human Behavior, 103, 130–139. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2019.09.030.
Markey, A., Chin, A., Vanepps, E. M., & Loewenstein, G. (2014). Identifying a Reliable Boredom induction. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 119(1), 237–253. https://doi.org/10.2466/27.PMS.119c18z6.
Mathur, A., Kshirsagar, M., & Mayer, J. (2021). What Makes a Dark Pattern… Dark? In Y. Kitamura, A. Quigley, K. Isbister, T. Igarashi, P. Bjørn, & S. Drucker (Eds.), Proceedings of the 2021 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (pp. 1–18). ACM. https://doi.org/10.1145/3411764.3445610.
Mele, A. R. (1987). Irrationality: An essay on Akrasia, Self-Deception and Self-Control. Oxford University Press.
Mercer-Lynn, K., Bar, R., & Eastwood, J. (2014). Causes of boredom: The person, the situation, or both? Personality and Individual Differences, 56, 122–126. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2013.08.034.
Mills, C. (2015). The heteronomy of Choice Architecture. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 6(3), 495–509. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-015-0242-7.
Nguyen, C. T. (2020). Echo chambers and Epistemic Bubbles. Episteme, 17(2), 141–161. https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2018.32.
Nietzsche, F. (1967). Die fröhliche Wissenschaft. In G. Colli & M. Montinari (Eds.), Friedrich Nietzsche, Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe (FW). de Gruyter. http://www.nietzschesource.org/#eKGWB/FW-42.
Nozick, R. (1969). Coercion. In S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes, & M. White (Eds.), Philosophy, Science, and Method: Essays in honor of Ernest Nagel (pp. 440–472). St. Martin’s.
Pariser, E. (2011). The Filter bubble: What the internet is hiding from you. Viking.
Pascal, B. (1990). Thoughts (W. Trotter, Trans.). NetLibrary. (Original work published 1670).
Pettit, P. (1997). Republicanism: A theory of Freedom and Government. Oxford political theory. Clarendon Press; Oxford University.
Raffaelli, Q., Mills, C., [Caitlin], & Christoff, K. (2018). The knowns and unknowns of Boredom: A review of the literature. Experimental Brain Research, 236(9), 2451–2462. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00221-017-4922-7.
Raz, J. (2009). The morality of Freedom. Oxford University Press. (Original work published 1986).
Ryan, T., Reece, J., Chester, A., & Xenos, S. (2016). Who gets hooked on Facebook? An exploratory typology of problematic Facebook users. Cyberpsychology: Journal of Psychosocial Research on Cyberspace, 10(3). https://doi.org/10.5817/CP2016-3-4.
Sætra, H. S. (2019). When nudge comes to shove: Liberty and nudging in the era of big data. Technology in Society, 59, 101130. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techsoc.2019.04.006.
Schopenhauer, A. (2010). The World as Will and representation. The Cambridge edition of the works of Schopenhauer. Cambridge University Press.
Seneca, L. A. (2003). De Brevitate Vitae (on the shortness of life). In G. D. Williams (Ed.), De Otio; De Brevitate Vitae. Cambridge University Press.
Shokeen, J., & Rana, C. (2020). Social Recommender systems: Techniques, domains, Metrics, Datasets and Future Scope. Journal of Intelligent Information Systems, 54(3), 633–667. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10844-019-00578-5.
Sloterdijk, P. (2009). Inspiration Ephemera, 9(3), 242–251.
Sommers, J., & Vodanovich, S. J. (2000). Boredom Proneness: Its relationship to psychological- and physical-health symptoms. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 56(1).
Stocker, M. (1979). Desiring the bad: An essay in Moral psychology. The Journal of Philosophy, 76(12), 738. https://doi.org/10.2307/2025856.
Sunstein, C. R. (2018). #Republic: Divided Democracy in the age of Social Media. Princeton University Press.
Svendsen, L. F. H. (2011). A Philosophy of Boredom (Reprinted.). Reaktion Books.
Thaler, R. H. (2018). Nudge, not Sludge. Science (New York N Y), 361(6401), 431. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aau9241.
Thaler, R. H., & Sunstein, C. R. (2003). Libertarian paternalism. American Economic Review, 93(2), 175–179. https://doi.org/10.1257/000282803321947001.
Waddington, D. I. (2005). A Field Guide to Heidegger: Understanding ‘The question concerning Technology’. Educational Philosophy and Theory, 37(4), 567–583. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-5812.2005.00141.x.
Westgate, E. C., & Wilson, T. D. (2018). Boring thoughts and bored minds: The MAC Model of Boredom and Cognitive Engagement. Psychological Review, 125(5), 689–713. https://doi.org/10.1037/rev0000097.
Wheeler, M. (2020). Martin Heidegger. In E. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2020 Edition). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2020/entries/heidegger/.
Willson, M. (2017). Algorithms (and the) everyday. Information Communication & Society, 20(1), 137–150. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2016.1200645.
Wilson, T. D., Reinhard, D. A., Westgate, E. C., Gilbert, D. T., Ellerbeck, N., Hahn, C., Brown, C. L., & Shaked, A. (2014). Just think: The challenges of the disengaged mind. Science (New York N Y), 345(6192), 75–77. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1250830.
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank audiences at the PhiDOS Second International Meeting 2022, the Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association 2022, and the Conference for Practical Philosophy 2022 in Salzburg, where earlier versions of this paper have been presented. We would also like to thank an anonymous reviewer for their suggestions.
Funding
The authors declare that no funds, grants, or other support were received during the preparation of this manuscript.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Contributions
Both authors have contributed in equal parts to the manuscript.
Corresponding author
Ethics declarations
Ethical Approval
This is a philosophy paper, not an empirical study. It did not involve any human or animal subjects and did not need ethics approval.
Consent to Participate
Not necessary, please refer to ‘Ethics approval’ above.
Consent to Publish
Not necessary, please refer to ‘Ethics approval’ above.
Competing Interests
The authors have no competing interests to declare.
Additional information
Publisher’s Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Rights and permissions
Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law.
About this article
Cite this article
Podschwadek, F., Runkel, A. From Boredom to Authenticity Bubbles: The Implication of Boredom-Induced Social Media Use for Individual Autonomy. Philos. Technol. 37, 50 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-024-00741-z
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-024-00741-z