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India’s TRIPS-Compliant Patent Decade – The Tumultuous Journey in Search of a Pragmatic Equilibrium

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Abstract

During the first decade of India’s TRIPS compliance (2005–2015), the country witnessed numerous patent-related disputes, mostly from the pharmaceutical sector on various issues pertaining to patent protection, enforcement of patent rights and compulsory licensing of granted patents. Even the non-pharmaceutical sector saw an increase in the number of various patent disputes. India, while enacting its three amendments, had tried to leverage the flexibility provided by the TRIPS Agreement to its member states, and to a great extent these amendments have resulted in an increase in patent-related disputes. This paper focuses on the patent disputes which have come up in the last ten years in order to analyse the approach of the Indian Patent Office and other quasi-judicial bodies such as the Intellectual Property Appellate Board and the higher judiciary.

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Notes

  1. “Projected GDP Ranking 2018–2023”, details available at http://statisticstimes.com/economy/projected-world-gdp-ranking.php. See also “India Overtakes France to Become World’s Sixth-Largest Economy”, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-07-11/india-pips-france-to-become-world-s-sixth-largest-economy-chart.

  2. Mueller (2007), pp. 68, 491, 502.

  3. According to Art. 141 of the Indian Constitution, the law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all courts within the territory of India, full text at http://lawmin.nic.in/olwing/coi/coi-english/coi-4March2016.pdf.

  4. Dalhman and Utz (2005), pp. 1–2.

  5. Greene (2007).

  6. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 15 April 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments – Results of the Uruguay Round Vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].

  7. India has witnessed a substantial increase in the number of patent litigations after its law was made TRIPS compliant.

  8. Mueller, supra note 2, p. 536.

  9. Sharma (2005). See also Sikka (2005).

  10. For a detailed analysis regarding the history of India’s patent law see Reddy and Chandrasekharan (2017), pp. 1–16.

  11. See Sagar (2007), pp. 164, 166. In England patents were essentially Royal grants issued by Queen Elizabeth (1558–1603) for monopoly privileges that advanced her economic and industrial policies. Mossoff (2001), p. 1255.

  12. Ragavan (2006), pp. 10, 273, 279.

  13. Rajagopala Ayyangar (1959).

  14. Reddy, supra note 10, p. 7.

  15. The Patents Act, 1970, Act No. 39, Parliament, 1970 (India) (hereinafter the IPA). See also History of Indian Patent System, Intell. Prop. India at para. 8, available at http://www.ipindia.nic.in/ipr/PatentHistory.htm (last visited 10 June 2016).

  16. Id. § 5(a)–(b).

  17. Details about WTO agreements are available at Understanding the WTO: The Agreements, Overview: A National Guide, World Trade Org., https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/tif_e.htm (last visited 26 May 2016).

  18. TRIPS, supra note 6.

  19. TRIPS, supra note 6, Art. 65.

  20. Id. Art. 70.8(a).

  21. Thomas (2005), pp. 609–610.

  22. TRIPS, supra note 6, Art. 70.9.

  23. Article 123 of the Indian Constitution grants the power to the President of India to issue an executive order called an “Ordinance” when the Parliament is not in session. Details at https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1090693/.

  24. The Patents (Amendment) Ordinance, No. 13 of 1994, available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/in/in001en.pdf. 

  25. Ragavan (2003), pp. 35, 117, 144.

  26. Okediji (2003), pp. 17, 819, 890–893. Reddy, supra note 10, at 58–59.

  27. Appellate Body Report, India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS50/ABIR (4 December 1997), hereinafter DSB, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-e/caseselds50_e.htm. See also WTO Appellate Body Report Action by the Dispute Settlement Body, India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS50/9 (27 January 1998) (hereinafter the DSB decision), available at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/79r.pdf.

  28. The Patents (Amendment) Act 1999 (hereinafter the 1999 Amendment), § 24B(1)(a)–(b), available at http://ipindia.nic.in/ipr/patent/patact_99.PDF.

  29. Id.

  30. The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2002, (hereinafter the 2002 Amendment), available at http://www.ipindia.nic.in/ipr/patent/patentg.pdf (amending Sec. 53). Accessed 26 May 2016).

  31. The IPA, supra note 15, § 53(1).

  32. Id. § 104A.

  33. Id. §§ 84–87.

  34. Reddy, supra note 10, at 63.

  35. Id. at 64.

  36. Patents (Amendment) Act 2005 (hereinafter the 2005 Amendment), http://ipindia.nic.in/ipr/patent/patent_2005.pdf.

  37. https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/cover-story/story/20040531-left-front-forced-to-support-congress-to-counter-bjp-790037-2004-05-31.

  38. https://archives.peoplesdemocracy.in/2004/1003/10032004_snd.htm.

  39. http://archives.peoplesdemocracy.in/2005/0327/03272005_patent%20left.htm.

  40. https://www.thehindu.com/2005/03/24/stories/2005032408720100.htm.

  41. SeeDSB decision, supra note 27.

  42. TRIPS, supra note 6, Art. 33.

  43. The IPA, supra note 15, § 84(1)(c).

  44. TRIPS, supra note 6, Art. 27.1

  45. “Drug Patent: A Viagra for Indian Pharmaceutical Industry”, Deccan Herald, 4 April 2005, available at http://archive.deccanherald.com/Deccanherald/Apr42005/93626200543.asp.

  46. The IPA, supra note 15, § 3(d).

  47. Id. § 25(1). It should be noted that pre-grant opposition of patent applications has been recommended even for the US patent system by scholars, see Kesan (2002), pp. 763, 776.

  48. Chalmers (2006), 20, 29.

  49. Kristina M. L. Acri, et. al., “Evergreening of Pharmaceutical Exclusivity: Sorting Fact from Misunderstanding and Fiction”, paper available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3170628, at 38.

  50. The IPA, supra note 15, § 3(d).

  51. Singh (2005), pp. 67, 69.

  52. See Art. 10(2)(b), Directive 2001/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Community Code Relating to Medicinal Products for Human Use (6 November 2001), available at http://ec.europa.eu/health/files/eudralex/vol-1/dir_2004_27/dir_2004_27_en.pdf.

  53. Fyan (2010), pp. 15, 199, 207.

  54. Ho (2009), pp. 46, 1047, 1049.

  55. Reddy, supra note 10, at 74.

  56. Arup and Plahe (2010), pp. 1, 15–43, at 27–28.

  57. Lee (2008), pp. 23, 206.

  58. Burk and Lemley (2005), pp. 47, 371, 373.

  59. Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2003), rehearing denied, 348 F.3d 992 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (en banc) (hereinafter the Schering decision).

  60. Chisum (2004), § 3.03.

  61. The Schering decision, supra note 59, at 1380.

  62. [1996] R.P.C. 76 (UKHL 1995).

  63. Merck & Co Inc v. Arrow Pharmaceuticals Ltd, [2006] FCAFC 91; Aktiebolaget Hassle v. Alphapharm Pty Ltd [2002] HCA 59; H Lundbeck A/S v. Alphapharm Pty Ltd, [2009] FCAFC 70.

  64. The IPA, supra note 15, § 25.

  65. Id. § 25(1).

  66. Id. § 25(l)(a)–(k).

  67. The IPA, supra note 15, § 25(2).

  68. Id.

  69. Id. § 2(1)(t).

  70. Id. § 25(2)(a)–(k).

  71. Id. § 25(3)(b).

  72. Id. § 25(4).

  73. The 2005 Amendment, supra note 36, §11A(7).

  74. Id.

  75. Chaudhuri (2005), p. 69.

  76. The 2005 Amendment, supra note 36, § 2(ja).

  77. EPC, supra note 166. Article 56 states: “An invention shall be considered as involving an inventive step if, having regard to the state of the art, it is not obvious to a person skilled in the art.”

  78. Mueller, supra note 2, at 563.

  79. Full text available at http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/documents/Report4thCommission.pdf.

  80. http://indiancourts.nic.in/.

  81. The IPA, supra note 15, § 104.

  82. Id. pro viso to § 104.

  83. http://www.polityadda.com/district-court/.

  84. Bombay, Calcutta and Madras were the Chartered High Courts set up as a result of the enactment of the Indian High Courts Act 1861 by the British Parliament. These three, along with the Delhi High Court, have Original Civil Jurisdiction over matters, which will enable them to hear civil suits including those dealing with intellectual property in the first instance subject to certain limitations on territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction.

  85. This was a remedy provided when high courts were first set up by way of Letters Patent in the 1860s.

  86. Appeals from High Court go to the Supreme Court in civil matters if the High Court concerned certifies: (a) that the case involves a substantial question of law of general importance; and (b) that, in the opinion of the High Court, the said question needs to be decided by the Supreme Court. Constitution of India, Art. 133, available at http://lawmin.nic.in/olwing/coi/coi-english/coi-4March2016.pdf.

  87. Id. Art. 136.

  88. The IPA, supra note 15, § 117A(2).

  89. Constitution of India, Art. 226.

  90. Novartis AG v. Union of India MANU/TN/2158/2015, para. 8.

  91. MANU/DE/0297/2010.

  92. Id. at para. 22.

  93. Id. at para. 18.

  94. The IPA, supra note 15, § 64(1)(a)–(q). The power of IPAB is to only deal with stand-alone revocation; whereas, in many patent infringement suits the defendant may raise a counter-claim to revoke the patent. In that case the High Court will decided both the matters.

  95. Dr. Aloys Wobben v. Yogesh Mehra & Ors. (Civil Appeal No. 6718 of 2013, Supreme Court), available at http://supremecourtofindia.nic.in/outtoday/ac671813.pdf.

  96. Id. at para. 21.

  97. Id. at para. 18.

  98. MANU/SC/0281/2013 (hereinafter the Novartis SC decision).

  99. Id. at para. 11.

  100. Id. at para. 12.

  101. Id. at para. 13.

  102. Id. at para. 14.

  103. Id. at para. 15.

  104. Id. at para. 15.

  105. Id. at para. 18.

  106. Id. at para. 16.

  107. Id. at para. 17.

  108. Id. at para. 21.

  109. Id. at para. 157.

  110. Id. at para. 158.

  111. Id.

  112. Id. at para. 163.

  113. Id. at para. 170.

  114. Id.

  115. Id. at para. 180.

  116. Id. at para. 181.

  117. Id. at para. 180. Since the subject matter under consideration was a drug to treat a disease, the Court held the relevant test here would be to find out the "therapeutic efficacy".

  118. Id. at para. 175.

  119. Wertheimer and Santella (2005b), p. 8.

  120. Id. at para. 175.

  121. Id. at para. 191.

  122. Ghoshray (2014), pp. 13, 719, 733.

  123. Decision available at https://docs.google.com/file/d/0Bxi2TzVXul5ZYVF0SDhiTWF6ZzA/edit?pref=2&pli=1.

  124. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Cipla (hereinafter the Roche Division Bench decision), MANU/DE/3672/2015. As noted above, this judgment was substituted with the another judgment issued on 8 December 2015 available at http://delhihighcourt.nic.in/dhcqrydisp_o.asp?pn=258821&yr=2015, Roche was the licensee of the Erlotinib patent.

  125. MANU/DE/0517/2008, at paras. 1–5. Cipla was manufacturing the drug under the brand name “Erlocip”, which was a particular polymorphic form (Polymorph B) of the erlotinib hydrochloride compound that had been patented by Roche, (hereinafter the Erlotinib patent).

  126. Id. at paras. 9–10.

  127. CS (OS) No. 89/2008 and C.C. 52/2008, http://lobis.nic.in/ddir/dhc/MAN/judgement/10-09-2012/MAN07092012S892008.pdf (hereinafter the Roche Single Bench decision).

  128. Id. at paras. 302–303.

  129. The IPA, supra note 15, § 8 mandates that the patent applicants disclose all information relating to the corresponding foreign applications of the Indian application being prosecuted.

  130. The Roche Division Bench decision, supra note 124, at para. 38.

  131. Id. at para. 40.

  132. Id. at para. 105. This, according to Cipla, could motivate any person skilled in the art to use the “226 patent” as a starting point. Cipla also pointed out that the “226 patent” was the first patent document to disclose the use of quinazoline derivatives for their anti-cancer properties. The only difference between a large number of compounds exemplified in EP_226 and those exemplified in the suit patent was a mere substitution of methyl with ethynyl on the 3 meta position. Id.

  133. Id. at para. 106

  134. Id. at para. 118.

  135. Id. at para. 136.

  136. Id. at para. 82. Cipla argued Roche ought to have disclosed to the Indian Patent Office that it had filed an application for grant of patent for polymorph B of erlotinib hydrochloride in US while prosecuting its Indian application, which was eventually granted in 2007.

  137. Id. at para. 88.

  138. Roche Division Bench decision, supra note 124, at para. 91.

  139. Id. at para. 34(xiv)

  140. Id. at para. 74.

  141. Id. at para. 76.

  142. Natco Pharma Ltd v. Bayer Corp (2012) C.I.A. No. 1 of 2011 (hereinafter the Natco Controller decision), http://www.ipindia.nic.in/ipoNew/compulsory_License_12032012.pdf.

  143. Id. at para. 3.

  144. Id. at para. 4.

  145. Id. at 9.

  146. Id. at 22.

  147. Id. at 23–24.

  148. Id. at 36.

  149. Id. at 45.

  150. Id.

  151. Id. at 61.

  152. Id. at 60.

  153. Bayer v. Union of India and Natco OA/35/2012/PT/MUM, http://www.ipabindia.in/Pdfs/Order-45-2013.pdf (hereinafter the Bayer Bombay High Court decision).

  154. Id. at 43.

  155. Id. at 44.

  156. Id. at 45.

  157. W.P. No. 1323/2013. Full text at https://indiankanoon.org/doc/28519340/.

  158. Id. at para. 15.

  159. Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (C) NO(S). 30145/2014. See alsohttp://www.lawyerscollective.org/updates/supreme-court-says-no-to-bayer-upholds-compulsory-license-on-nexavar.html.

  160. Basheer (2005), pp. 3, 309, 310.

  161. http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-09-12/news/42011558_1_dasatinib-compulsory-licence-sprycel.

  162. http://www.ipindia.gov.in/iponew/compulsoryLicense_Application_20January2016.pdf.

  163. Roche v. Ranbaxyhttp://ipindiaservices.gov.in/decision/959-MAS-1995-462/207232.pdf.

  164. The Roche Division Bench decision, supra note 124.

  165. the Novartis SC decision, supra note 98.

  166. https://www.msfaccess.org/our-work/addressing-medical-challenges/article/467.

  167. The Novartis SC decision, supra note 98, para. 8.

  168. http://www.livemint.com/Companies/nAHUvoEXEzEXXiC66jG6ZI/India-revokes-patent-for-Pfizers-Sutent.html.

  169. https://indiankanoon.org/doc/181905163/ para. 6.

  170. http://ipindiaservices.gov.in/decision/IN-PCT-2002-00785-DEL-2255/Post%20Grant%20final%20decision%20IN%20%20209251.pdf.

  171. http://www.thehindu.com/business/Industry/relief-for-pfizer-in-sutent-patent-case/article4781998.ece.

  172. MANU/TN/0174/2008, (hereinafter the TVS case)

  173. The IPA, supra note 15, § 106. TVS plead before the court to declare that the threats held out by the defendant Bajaj on 1 and 3 September 2007 that the plaintiff was infringing the defendant's patent No. 195904 and that the defendant’s proposing to take infringement action against the plaintiff were unjustified. Id. at para. 3.

  174. Id. at para. 73.

  175. MANU/TN/0976/2009.

  176. MANU/SC/1632/2009.

  177. Id. at para. 13.

  178. Id. at para. 11, Supreme Court directed the Madras High Court to decide the case of infringement by trial on 30 November 2009.

  179. https://summerslg.com/patent-infringement-litigation-in-the-us-district-courts-part-3/.

  180. https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/3-623-0277?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&firstPage=true&comp=pluk&bhcp=1.

  181. http://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp13072.pdf at 4.

  182. http://www.prsindia.org/uploads/media/Commercial%20courts/Commercial%20courts%20Act,%202015.pdf.

  183. MANU/IC/0034/2009 (Novartis IPAB decision).

  184. Id. at para. 10.V.

  185. Id. at 10.II

  186. Id.

  187. Id. at para. 10.III

  188. Id. at para. 10.III

  189. Id. at para. 10.V

  190. Id.

  191. Id.

  192. However, the finding regarding anticipation of imatinib mesylate is not very important as the Court held that the beta crystalline version of imatinib mesylate (the subject matter of the Indian patent application) to be novel.

  193. The Novartis Supreme Court decision, supra note 98, at para. 124.

  194. Zimmerman patents claim No. 23 read as follows: “The compound according to claim 1 of the formula I, said compound being N-{5-[4-(4-Methyl-piperazino-methyl)-benzoylamido]-2-methyl-phenyl}-4-(3-pyridyl)-2-pyrimidine-amine or a pharmaceutically acceptable salt thereof.”

  195. The Roche Single Bench decision, supra note 127.

  196. The Roche Division Bench decision, supra note 124.

  197. The TVS case, supra note 172.

  198. The Novartis Supreme Court decision, supra note 98.

  199. The IPA, supra note 15, at § 8.

  200. The IPA, supra note 15, § 8(2).

  201. ORA/18/2010/PT/MUM, decision at http://www.ipabindia.in/Pdfs/Order-166-2012-ORA-18-2010-PT-MUM.pdf.

  202. Id. at para. 107. Another important decision of the IPAB where noncompliance of § 8 was accepted as one of the grounds for revoking a patent is Ajanta Pharma v. Allergan Inc., ORA/20/2011/PT/KOL available at http://www.ipabindia.in/Pdfs/Order%20No.172-2013-ORA-20-2011-PT-KOL.pdf.

  203. MANU/DE/2785/2014.

  204. Id. at para. 38.

  205. Id. at para. 40.

  206. The Roche Division Bench decision, supra note 124, para. 91.

  207. The Novartis IPAB decision, supra note 183.

  208. The Roche Single Bench decision, supra note 127, paras. 84–86.

  209. Id. para. 85.

  210. (1975) RPC 513, the points to be satisfied are plaintiff having a prima facie case and balance of convenience in favour of plaintiff.

  211. Such injunctions are given to restrain wrongful acts which are threatened or imminent but have not yet begun.

  212. http://archivepharma.financialexpress.com/latest-updates/3738-novartis-granted-injunctions-against-four-other-generic-makers-over-galvus. See also Vishwanathan (2014).

  213. Id. at para. 2. Apart from the two injunctions, two generic companies gave statements before the court that they would not manufacture or market the said drug untill the next hearing, Id para 3.

  214. Novartis AG v. Cipla, MANU/DE/0019/2015.

  215. Id. at para. 83.

  216. Id. at para. 88.

  217. Id. at para. 131.

  218. Merck Sharp and Dohme Corporation and another v. Glenmark Pharmaceuticals, MANU/DE/0852/2015, the relief was granted in an appeal filed by Merck against the Delhi High Court single bench decision which denied it an injunctive relief.

  219. Id at para. 30.

  220. Id. at para. 78.

  221. http://indianexpress.com/article/business/companies/sc-restrains-glenmark-from-selling-copy-of-mercks-diabetes-drug/.

  222. Merck Sharp and Dohme Corporation v. Glenmark Pharmaceuticals, MANU/DE/2963/2015.

  223. Id. at para. 108.

  224. The Roche Division Bench decision, supra note 124.

  225. http://ipindiaservices.gov.in/decision/2382-CHENP-2004-2477/237489%20post%20grant%20opposition.pdf (hereinafter Novartis Post Grant Opposition).

  226. 550 U.S. 398 (2007).

  227. Id. at 421. Novartis post-grant opposition, supra note 225, at 17.

  228. 480 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (hereinafter the Pfizer case).

  229. Id. at 1364. Novartis post-grant opposition, supra note 225, at 17.

  230. T 0287/99 (Aerosol medicaments/GLAXO).

  231. Novartis post-grant opposition, supra note 225, at 16.

  232. Ajanta Pharma, supra note 373, para. 25.

  233. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., No. 2008-1511 (Fed. Cir. 2011).

  234. Ajanta Pharma, supra note 202 para. 72.

  235. 367 F.3d 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2004).

  236. Ajanta Pharma, supra note 202, paras. 83–87.

  237. Apotex Inc v. Sanofi-Synthelabo Canada Inc, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 265.

  238. The General Tire & Rubber Company v. The Firestone Type and Rubber Company Ltd, [1972] R.P.C. 457. This UK decision is cited in many courts and IPAB judgments while dealing with novelty and obviousness in patent law.

  239. Janssen Pharmaceutica v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals, 456 F.Supp.2d 644 (D.N.J. 2006), Innogenetics N.V. v. Abbott Labs., 512 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2008).

  240. Bishwanath Prasad Radhey Shyam v. Hindustan Metal Industries, MANU/SC/0255/1978MANU/SC/0255/1978.

  241. (1967) R.P.C. 297, id. para.26.

  242. MANU/WB/0049/1996, paras. 55–56.

  243. [1913] 30 RPC 465.

  244. (1985) RFC 59.

  245. The Novartis SC decision, supra note 98, para. 154. References were also made to UK case law such as in A.C. Edwards Ltd. v. Acme Signs and Displays Ltd. (1992) R.P.C.

  246. 315 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2003)

  247. 363 F.3d 1247 (Fed. Cir. 2004).

  248. The Roche Division Bench decision, supra note 124, para. 114.

  249. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).

  250. 550 U.S. 398(2007).

  251. T 0467/94 (Pyridinium compounds/EISAI) of 4.11.1999.

  252. eBay v. MerckExchange, 547 U.S. 388 (2006). Scholars point out that eBay set the trend for a major reconsideration regarding the manner in which property rights, remedial doctrines and IP commercialisation relate to one another, Claeys (2015).

  253. Novartis AG v. Cipla, supra note 214.

  254. MANU/DE/0774/2015.

  255. Ali et al. (2018).

  256. Id. at 6.

  257. In one of the largest mergers in Indian pharmaceutical sector, Ranbaxy Laboratories, controlled by the Japanese pharma major Daiichi Sankyo, merged into Sun Pharma in March 2015, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2015-03-24/news/60439136_1_new-delhi-sun-ranbaxy-year.

  258. http://www.business-standard.com/article/companies/cipla-bms-settles-patent-dispute-115061700840_1.html. See also Unni (2015), pp. 165, 169.

  259. “Gilead Licenses Hepatitis C Drug To Cipla, Ranbaxy, Five Others”, http://in.reuters.com/article/gilead-sciences-india-idINKBN0HA0TI20140915.

  260. http://www.ip-watch.org/2016/03/09/gilead-solvaldi-case-reveals-patent-health-fissures-in-india/.

  261. One good example could be the emergence of Indian companies like Suven Life Sciences, which has already achieved a strong presence in the drug discovery sector, http://www.thehindu.com/business/suven-life-sciences-gets-product-patent-in-australia-canada/article8256995.ece.

  262. Details at http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/compilation-of-mobile-phone-patent-litigation-cases-in-india.

  263. Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. v. Rajesh Bansal And Ors., https://indiankanoon.org/doc/156062069/.

  264. Id. para. 14.

  265. Id. para. 13.13.

  266. Nuziveedu Seeds Ltd. and Ors. v. Monsanto Technology LLC and Ors., full text at http://lobis.nic.in/ddir/dhc/SRB/judgement/12-04-2018/SRB11042018FAOOSCOMM862017.pdf.

  267. Id. at 59.

  268. Id. at 47.

  269. “Bayer to Slash by Nearly Half Price U.S. Pays for Anthrax Drug”, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1003966074330899280.

  270. https://www.usitc.gov/secretary/fed_reg_notices/337/337-794_notice06042013sgl.pdf.

  271. “Obama Vetoes Apple Sales Ban in U.S.” http://www.cnet.com/au/news/obama-vetoes-apple-sales-ban-in-u-s/.

  272. http://www.androidauthority.com/apple-wins-obama-administration-doesnt-veto-itc-import-ban-samsung-281586/.

  273. 561 U.S. 593 (2010).

  274. 132 S.Ct. 1289 (2012).

  275. 133 S.Ct. 2107 (2013).

  276. 134 S.Ct. 2347 (2014).

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  1. Ph.D; Professor at the Public Policy and Management Group, Indian Institute of Management, Calcutta, India

    V. K. Unni

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I would like to express my sincere thanks to the “Center for the Protection of Intellectual Property”, the Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University, Virginia, USA for their phenomenal support and guidance in the preparation of this paper through a Thomas Edison Innovation Fellowship (2016–2017). For comments on earlier drafts, many thanks to Adam Mossoff, Mark Schultz, Matthew Barblan, J. Devlin Hartline, Jay Kesan, Ted Sichelman, Eric Claeys, Michael Risch, Robert Cooter, Zorina Khan, Peter Yu, Ryan T. Holte, Michael Mireles, all Thomas Edison Innovation Fellowship awardees (2016–2017), and my colleagues at the Indian Institute of Management Calcutta. Finally, I gratefully acknowledge the constructive feedback given by the anonymous referees of IIC.

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Unni, V.K. India’s TRIPS-Compliant Patent Decade – The Tumultuous Journey in Search of a Pragmatic Equilibrium. IIC 50, 161–195 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40319-019-00783-3

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