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Organs, embryos, and part-human chimeras: further applications of the social account of dignity

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The Original Article was published on 11 July 2017

Abstract

In their recent paper in this journal, Zümrüt Alpinar-Şencan and colleagues review existing dignity-based objections to organ markets and outline a new form of dignity-based objection they believe has more merit: one grounded in a social account of dignity. This commentary clarifies some aspects of the social account of dignity and then shows how this revised account can be applied to other perennial issues in bioethics, including the ethics of human embryo research and the ethics of creating part-human chimeras.

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Notes

  1. This example could be understood in two ways. The promotion of dignity could be seen as one moral goal that needs to be balanced against others, such as the promotion of utility, liberty, and/or equality. Alternatively, dignity could be seen as the foundational ethical principle from which other ethical principles derive, in which case perhaps certain kinds of dignity interests—such as those captured by Alpinar-Şencan et al. social account of human dignity—would need to be weighed against other kinds of dignity interests. On this view, in promoting (for example) utility or liberty, one would be promoting dignity itself (see e.g. Foster 2014). I thank an anonymous peer reviewer for highlighting this distinction.

  2. For one exception, see: Kerstein (2009).

  3. Perhaps it could be argued that organ selling would be inherently (seen as) degrading because violations of bodily integrity are inherently (seen as) degrading. However, Alpinar-Şencan and colleagues would likely reject this claim, as it would apply equally to both organ selling and organ donation.

  4. This example is taken from a recent paper by Tonkens (2018).

  5. Concerns about the symbolic value of human embryos might be relevant to the 14-day rule if—as seems plausible—such concerns would intensify as the embryo increasingly resembles a person over the course of embryonic development.

  6. For a more fully developed defence of the claim that symbolic value per se does not matter morally, see Bortolotti and Harris (2006).

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Koplin, J. Organs, embryos, and part-human chimeras: further applications of the social account of dignity. Monash Bioeth. Rev. 36, 86–93 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40592-018-0087-9

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