Style of third party intervention, face-saving and bargaining behavior

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Abstract

Four forms of third party intervention were investigated under both high- and low-need to save face in a bargaining study. These forms were: nonbinding suggestion (mediation), binding decision (arbitration), selection of the best of the bargainers own proposals (govplan), and no third party intervention (control). This variable was crossed with high- vs low-need to save face. The interaction of these variables indicated that when there was a high-need to save face bargainers were more conciliatory when no intervention was anticipated. When there was low-need to save face those expecting arbitration were most likely to reach agreement. After intervention, those who received a suggestion for settlement were no more likely to reach agreement than were those who did not receive a suggestion. It was found that in the high face-saving condition there was a negative association between the magnitude of the first concession and the final offer. The relationship was reversed in the low face-saving condition. Finally, the issue of the relative effects of the anticipation of intervention and the actual intervention is posed.

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