Style of third party intervention, face-saving and bargaining behavior
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Cited by (32)
Beyond cheap talk accounts: A theory of politeness in negotiations
2021, Research in Organizational BehaviorCitation Excerpt :A second line of inquiry addresses how concerns about seeming weak, i.e., losing face shape negotiators’ behavior. This work establishes that concerns about appearing weak negatively predict the magnitude of concessions negotiators make (Johnson & Tullar, 1972; Pruitt & Johnson, 1970) and their willingness to initiate negotiations (Miles, 2010), and positively predict the likelihood of an impasse (Tjosvold, 1974, 1977, 1978), the time spent reaching an agreement (Tjosvold & Huston, 1978), and inefficient agreements (Carnevale et al., 1979; Wilson, 1992). Finally, a third line of inquiry has measured individual differences in sensitivity to face threats (FTS) and established that it helps predict negative reactions to nonpolite acts and subsequent detriments to performance (White et al., 2004).
Lab Labor: What Can Labor Economists Learn from the Lab?
2011, Handbook of Labor EconomicsCitation Excerpt :Thus, the evaluation of arbitration mechanisms is one area where laboratory research by labor economists has already been successful in influencing economic policy. While laboratory experiments testing different arbitration (and other forms of third-party intermediation) systems have a long history in psychology (see for example Johnson and Tullar, 1972), the earliest experiment on arbitration by economists of which we are aware (Farber and Bazerman, 1986) is noteworthy for its methodology in view of current debates in economics about the lab “versus” the field: Farber and Bazerman essentially conduct what is now called an (unpaid) “artefactual” field experiment by confronting professional labor arbitrators with hypothetical cases and asking them to choose a settlement under different arbitration schemes. Since then, economists have performed a multitude of experiments evaluating different arbitration schemes, most of them “traditional” laboratory experiments, such as Ashenfelter et al. (1992).
The choice of a group spokesman in bargaining: Member or outsider?
1977, Organizational Behavior and Human PerformanceThe impact of initial bargaining position and alternative modes of third party intervention in resolving bargaining impasses
1976, Organizational Behavior and Human PerformanceEffects of intervention mode and conflict of interest on dispute resolution
1982, Journal of Personality and Social PsychologyPredicting the effects of anticipated third party intervention: A template-matching approach
1981, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology