Bankruptcy and optimality in a closed trading mass economy modelled as a non-cooperative game

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Abstract

In this paper we establish the existence of (a) an optimal bankruptcy rule which enables us to describe the Walrasian trading economy as a game with trade in fiat money; and (b) non- cooperative equilibrium points of this game which (in terms of prices and the final allocation yielded) include the competitive equilibrium points, and the accompanying money rate of interest (induced by borrowing at a central bank), when the bankruptcy rule is different from optimal.

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