Degrowth, energy descent, and ‘low-tech’ living: Potential pathways for increased resilience in times of crisis
Introduction
Energy is often called the ‘lifeblood’ of civilisation, yet the overconsumption of fossil energy lies at the heart of two of the greatest challenges facing humanity today: climate change and peak oil (Anderson, 2015, Mohr et al., 2015). While transitioning to renewable or low-carbon energy systems is an essential ‘supply side’ strategy in response to climate change and peak oil (Wiseman et al., 2013), the extent of the problems and the speed at which decarbonisation must occur means that there must also be a ‘demand side’ response (Anderson and Bows, 2011). As outlined below, this means consuming much less energy not just ‘greening’ supply, at least in the most developed, energy-intensive regions of the world.
The dominant approach to reducing carbon emissions is through the application of what could be called ‘hi-tech’ options, such as electric vehicles, solar panels, and new, energy-efficient appliances. The primary reason this approach to sustainability is socially and politically popular is because it does not significantly challenge high-consumption lifestyles or the dominant macroeconomics of growth (Hamilton, 2003). Indeed, it typically assumes that people need to purchase more things in order to live sustainably, not less. From this techno-optimistic perspective, the primary societal goal is to maintain a growth-orientated consumer economy and attempt to decouple this form of life from environmental impact via technological innovation and market mechanisms (Hatfield-Dodds et al., 2015, Kerschner and Ehlers, 2016). The alternative strategy of moving away from energy-intensive, consumerist lifestyles and adapting to an energy descent pathway of planned economic contraction – or degrowth – remains largely unspeakable in mainstream political and economic contexts (Purdey, 2010).
Focusing on that alternative strategy, this paper outlines a variety of what are called ‘low-tech’ options – such as solar shower bags, washing lines, alternative heating and cooling methods, and cycling – and raises questions about the extent to which these types of ‘simple living’ practices could help increase household resilience in conditions of economic disruption, instability, or crisis (Greer, 2009, Tverberg, 2012, De Decker, 2016). While a widespread adoption of the low-tech options under consideration may have the potential to reduce and decarbonise energy consumption – and thus lead to significant environmental benefits – that argument would require a full life-cycle analysis, which is not attempted here. Instead, the paper explores the ways in which low-tech options might help households meet essential needs in circumstances where energy-intensive lifestyles are no longer available or affordable due to energy scarcity or economic crisis. It is argued that such a future is plausible – and in some contexts has already arrived or has always been the case – hence the relevance of this analysis to the contemporary global situation.
While acknowledging the range of complex theoretical issues surrounding definitions of technology (see Schraff and Dusek, 2003), this practically-focused paper proceeds on the basis that ‘technology’ can be understood simply as a tool, method, or design practice that helps humans solve problems and achieve goals. More specifically, for present purposes, a technology can be considered ‘low-tech’ if it does not require electricity or fossil fuels to operate, or if it relies on passive or direct (non-electric) solar, wind, or human-powered energy. For example, a washing line uses direct wind and solar energy to dry clothes (low-tech), not electricity to power a clothes dryer (hi-tech). Similarly, a bicycle uses human-powered energy to operate (low-tech), whereas a car uses fossil fuels or electricity (hi-tech). There are of course important questions about the embodied energy of technologies that need to be considered in any such analysis, but for all the low-tech options under review it will be seen that they have far lower and sometimes negligible embodied energy compared with their hi-tech alternatives. While this distinction between low-tech and high-tech defies analytically sharp definition, it is sufficiently suggestive of two alternative approaches for present purposes.
A literature review suggests this is the first scholarly analysis of low-tech living in an energy descent scenario (but see De Decker, 2016). While this study contributes to filling this knowledge gap, the research agenda is in its infancy and it is acknowledged that this study has significant limitations. Nevertheless, by providing a theoretical consideration of low-tech living as a path to increased resilience, as well as presenting some quantitative findings, it is hoped that this might open up space to reimagine the human relationship to technology in ways that are relevant to the theory and practice of degrowth. Significant challenges of low-tech options will also be acknowledged, including the ever-present risk of rebound effects and other indirect impacts (Figge et al., 2014).
There are two other preliminary issues deserving of immediate comment. First, it is important to clarify that the following examination of low-tech options should not be interpreted as a blanket rejection of appropriate hi-tech options. The key word there, of course, is ‘appropriate’ (Schumacher, 1973) – or, to use Illich's (1973) term, ‘convivial’. There is surely a place for hi-tech innovations like solar PV and wind turbines, and arguably computers should or could be a part of the good, sustainable, and interconnected society (although let us not forget that life went on well enough without computers not so long ago). Without doubt, many medical treatments are genuine ‘goods’ also, and the list could go on. The point, therefore, is not so much to reject hi-tech innovation so much as it is to highlight the potential of various low-tech alternatives.1
Finally, while the focus herein is on low-tech living at the household level, the sub-text of the argument is that prefiguring a ‘simpler way’ to live (Trainer, 2010) has deeper significance too, in that it helps create the cultural conditions needed for a politics and macroeconomics of degrowth to emerge (Alexander, 2013), which it is argued is a necessary part of any decarbonisation project. In this paper, however, space does not permit any sustained engagement with those underlying political or macroeconomic issues. But their importance is acknowledged here to ensure that the analysis is not interpreted as merely advocating ‘lifestyle’ solutions to problems that will also require deep structural and systemic responses (Kallis et al., 2012, Lorek and Fuchs, 2013).
Section snippets
Degrowth, crisis, and the energy descent future
If once humanity inhabited a relatively ‘empty’ planet, science is now impressing upon us that Earth is ‘full’ (Daly, 1996, Meadows et al., 2004). Our expanding dominance of and impact on the biosphere is pushing human civilisation beyond the safe operating space of planetary boundaries (Rockstrom et al., 2015). There are now more than seven billion people on the planet, most of whom – even the richest – are seeking material advancement on a planet that has declining biocapacity (Schramski
A review of ‘low-tech’ living
Having outlined why energy consumption must be reduced in developed regions of the world, the analysis will now explore various low-tech options that have the potential to assist in that critically important societal goal. This analysis is particularly relevant to the energy-intensive lifestyles prevalent in the most highly developed regions of the world, but it is also relevant to the poorer parts of the world. With respect to the latter, the argument is not so much that the poorest need to
Indirect impacts of demand-reduction strategies
While space does not permit a thorough analysis of the various indirect impacts of demand-reduction strategies, it is worth highlighting some of the complexities at play here in order to outline further lines of research. The first is the now well known ‘rebound effect’ – including the ‘sufficiency rebound effect’ (Alcott, 2008). These phenomena always threaten to take back some or all of the resource reductions gained from efficiency or sufficiency strategies through a reinvestment of those
Conclusion
Adapting to energy descent is a neglected scenario primarily due to a pervasive techno-optimism which assumes that technological innovation and market mechanisms will be able to solve the challenges of climate change and peak oil without the need for questioning hi-tech, energy-intensive, consumer lifestyles. By contrast, this paper has accepted the possibility and indeed the likelihood of an energy descent future, and explored what role various low-tech options might play in helping households
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