Path dependence in urban transport: An institutional analysis of urban passenger transport in Melbourne, Australia, 1956–2006
Introduction
As the world attempts to come to grips with the problem of climate change and develop appropriate long-term solutions, it is as well to remember that institutional structures have accumulated around quite different problems and solutions. Institutions, it has been argued, are ‘path dependent’ (Arthur, 1988a, Arthur, 1988b; Denzau and North, 1994; Torfing, 2001; Low et al., 2003, Low et al., 2005). Adapting transport systems to the requirements of climate change means changing the direction of transport governance. To understand why this is so it is necessary to look at where we have come from, and how that history affects where we are now.
The particular capacities and powers of organisations influence transport planning outcomes. If, as various analysts have contended (Litman, 1999; Newman and Kenworthy, 1999; Pacala and Socolow, 2004; Banister, 2005; Akerman and Hojer, 2006), there is now a need for reduced emphasis on private road traffic, increased emphasis on management of public transport as a unified network, and renewed investment in fixed rail infrastructure, it is as well to remember that, in some cases, the structure of governance of transport limits the capacity of government to respond effectively.
In this article we report an institutional case study of the urban passenger transport sector in Melbourne, Australia.1 For Melbourne, a 50-year perspective is timely in view of the Garnaut Review of climate change policy (Final Report published October 2008, see Garnaut, 2008), the Eddington Inquiry into Melbourne's transportation system (Eddington, 2008), and Eddington's chairmanship of the Australian federal government's new infrastructure authority, Infrastructure Australia. The beginning of 2009 evidenced the near collapse of the privatised suburban railway system in Melbourne following years of unsuccessful and expensive private management, poor operational procedures, lack of central planning and decades of underinvestment in the basic infrastructure of trains, tracks and signalling systems (see SKM-Maunsell-Evans and Peck, 2008, p. 32).2 But there are also more general lessons to be learned from the Melbourne case study that resonate with the experience of transport policy-making internationally. Transport systems for cities around the world are in different ways and to varying degrees path dependent, and their governance systems appear to be quite resistant to change (Mees, 2000; Banister, 2005).
Section snippets
Institutional path dependence
The concept of path dependence emerged from a critique of markets by economists Paul David (1985) and Brian Arthur (1988a). They argued that self-reinforcing mechanisms exist in the logic of production to ensure that a type of product prevails on the market even though better alternatives exist. Some economists have argued that the evidence base for economic path dependence is thin (Liebowitz and Margolis, 1990, Liebowitz and Margolis, 1995). However, the path dependence work focused attention
Structural changes
Modern management theory stipulates that effective control of stable technological systems such as road or public transport systems requires a ‘mechanistic’ (contrasted with an ‘organic’) structure, with as much as possible of the management task brought under central control (Shafritz et al., 2009, p. 254). This model embodies four main principles: specialisation, unity of direction, centralised authority, and a scalar chain of command (Gibson et al., 2009, p. 406). As with road infrastructure
Transport and land use planning
The institutions in the roads sector have been involved in the urban planning process for much of the last 50 years. The ability independently to develop and implement plans enables an organisation to pursue its preferred policy options. Being continually included and engaged in the planning process allows an organisation to bring to fruition a long-term vision.
The CRB contributed to the three key transport plans created in the last 50 years.5
Financial control
Funding for the roads institutions has changed significantly over the last 50 years (BTE, 1981). Increased accountability for expenditure through tighter control mechanisms initially limited the independence of the road authorities. Shifting to a narrow range of income streams created the need to generate support amongst a wider range of players in order to compete for funds. However, the federal government has increased and consolidated its contribution to road funding.
Today VicRoads’ main
Accountability
The accountability relationship between the roads authorities and the minister has shifted over the last 50 years. Declining independence has allowed a closer relationship to develop with the political level, enabling the roads institutions to influence the policy agenda at earlier stages.
The CRB had a significant degree of independence. The Governor in Council7 appointed the
Forums
The forums which the roads institutions have had access to have changed over the last 50 years. Increasing the number and variety of forums has enhanced the opportunities to share information and build relationships. The CRB was a member of one forum, the National Association of Australian State Road Authorities (NAASRA).8 The NAASRA was founded in 1934 and consisted of the state,
Other actors
The state roads agencies have had many opportunities to collaborate and develop initiatives with other actors over the last 50 years. The CRB could seek support for its policy preferences from four other players—the Royal Automobile Club of Victoria (RACV, 2006), the predecessor to the Australian Workers Union (AWU), the Municipal Association of Victoria (MAV, 2006) and a range of business contractors, which represented a variety of interests including motor users, civil construction workers
Conclusion
This paper has revealed how the institutional components in the urban passenger transport sector have changed and developed in the last 50 years. The direction and speed of the major shifts in structure, planning, access to funding, accountability frameworks, forums and the other stakeholders reveal features consistent with a path-dependent explanation of institutional inertia. Not only has integrated planning of transport for Melbourne become difficult, lack of integration in the public
Glossary
- ABS
- Australian Bureau of Statistics
- ARRB
- Australian Road Research Board
- ATC
- Australian Transport Council
- BAV
- Bus Association Victoria Inc.
- BTE
- Bureau of Transport Economics
- BTRE
- Bureau of Transport and Regional Economics
- CBR
- Commonwealth Bureau of Roads
- CRB
- Country Roads Board
- DoI
- Department of Infrastructure
- DoTF
- Department of Treasury and Finance
- GST
- Goods and Services Tax
- MAV
- Municipal Association of Victoria
- MMBW
- Melbourne and Metropolitan Board of Works
- MMTB
- Melbourne and Metropolitan Tramways Board
- MoT
- Ministry of
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