Among observers who shared his goal of transforming the communist system, those who most approve of Gorbachev's record as leader emphasize the extent to which he broke down the ancien regime. Among the same set of observers, those who most disparage Gorbachev's record focus instead on the extent to which he fell short of building the new system he envisaged. Neither of these approaches is wholly satisfying; nor is a combination of the two. They are both linear and rote comparisons of outcomes with baselines. But they are useful starting points toward a more complex analysis.

If the past is our baseline, and if we postpone the problem of determining Gorbachev's distinctive contribution to the outcome, it is easy to sum up what changed under Gorbachev. We witnessed:

• desacralization of the Brezhnevite political–economic order in the eyes of the mass public, including the official principles and mind-set that underpinned it – the leading role of the Party, the “community of peoples,” the planned economy, pride in the system's achievements, optimism about state socialism's potential, commitment to “class struggle” abroad, and a national-security phobia that justified a repressive, militarized regime;

• a sharp reduction in the power of constituencies that were pillars of the Brezhnevite political order – in particular, Party officials, ministers, and the military;

• legitimation in principle of movement in the direction of a market-driven economic order, a multiparty system, and the transformation of a unitary state into a democratic federal state;

• […]