The first half of the twentieth century was the time of the German problem. Emerging from centuries as “the Germanies,” Bismarck's Second Reich had by 1900 established itself as the dominant power on the European Continent. Its leaders had every expectation that Germany would become a world power. On the weight of its industrial development, the educational level of its population, its cultural and national discipline, and geographic location, Germany seemed on the verge of emerging as a superpower, overshadowing its European rivals, including Britain, and perhaps even challenging the United States. But this failed to come to pass. In two great world wars, Germany caused its own downfall, and in the resulting disaster drowned itself, its neighbors, and much of the world in a sea of blood.

The nature of that European catastrophe had much to do with Germany's attitude toward its military services, especially the army, the peculiar cultural and intellectual forces that shaped those institutions, and a combination of battlefield brilliance mixed with a myopic strategic vision. That last combination proved deadly, and in both 1914 and 1939 Germany embarked on conflicts that offered only the slightest chance of victory. As early as the failure before Paris in September 1914 and the disaster in front of Moscow in December 1941, Germany reached turning points that made defeat inevitable. Yet, the tactical and operational competence of German military forces ensured that the final defeat in both world wars would not come for four more years and at a horrendous cost to all involved.