For all the meanings that “democracy” has acquired, there is broad scholarly agreement that it can best be defined and applied in terms of the procedural criteria that Robert Dahl (1971) has specified: a political regime characterized by free and open elections, with relatively low barriers to participation, genuine political competition, and wide protection of civil liberties. Elaborating Dahl's definition, Juan Linz writes that a political system can be regarded as democratic

This procedural conception of democracy is a demanding “ideal type.” All of its criteria must be approximated closely before a regime can be called “democratic.” Obviously, no real-world regime fits the ideal type perfectly; indeed, many regimes that hold regular elections fall far short. Some regimes tie voting rights to stringent property qualifications, as in most Western countries during the nineteenth century. Some deny the suffrage to whole ethnic categories, as in South Africa or the American South until quite recently. Some outlaw parties that espouse radical ideologies and programs, as has happened to Communist parties in a number of countries. Others marshal majority support for governing parties through corrupt and coercive practices, as the Mexican regime has done for decades.