Hostname: page-component-8448b6f56d-dnltx Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-17T03:35:10.582Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Untying Hands: De-escalation, Reputation, and Dynamic Audience Costs

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 December 2021

Kai Quek Open the ORCID record for Kai Quek [Opens in a new window]
Kai Quek*
Affiliation:
Department of Politics and Public Administration, University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong
*
Corresponding author. Email: quek@hku.hk
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Two states in a dispute refuse to back down. One ties its own hands to strengthen its stand and gain advantage; the other tries to untie the tied hands to preempt disadvantage. Tying hands is a well-studied strategy, but it tells only part of the story, and the response strategy of untying hands remains unexplored. Can a state untie the tied hands of its opponent to give freedom back to its opponent—the freedom to concede? I identify three strategies of untying hands: counterthreat, reassurance, and normative framing. I show experimentally that these strategies can reduce the public costs of backing down and the perceived reputational damage from backing down. Tied hands and audience costs are not static and immutable, but dynamic and malleable by the other side.

Keywords

signalingdeterrencethreatreassuranceexperiment
Type
Letter
Information
British Journal of Political Science , Volume 52 , Issue 4 , October 2022 , pp. 1964 - 1976
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Altman, D and Powers, K (2019) The Puzzle of Coercion Failure: How Psychology Explains Resistance to Threats. Paper presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, 29 August to 1 September.Google Scholar
Altman, D and Quek, K (2021) Do States Signal Resolve by Sinking Costs or Downpaying Costs? Paper presented at the Annual Conference of the International Studies Association, 6–9 April.Google Scholar
Baum, MA (2004) Going private: public opinion, presidential rhetoric, and the domestic politics of audience costs in U.S. foreign policy crises. Journal of Conflict Resolution 48(5), 603–631.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
BBC (2004) Iraq War Illegal, Says Annan. 16 September.Google Scholar
Brehm, JW (1966) A Theory of Psychological Reactance. New York, NY: Academic Press.Google Scholar
Brutger, R (2021) The power of compromise. World Politics 73(1), 128–166.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brutger, R and Kertzer, J (2018) A dispositional theory of reputation costs. International Organization 72(3), 693–724.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Chan, ZT, (from Zenobia T. Chan) Liu, S, and Quek, K (2021) Audience costs and the credibility of commitments. In James P (ed.), Oxford Bibliographies in International Relations. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Chapman, TL (2007) International security institutions, domestic politics, and institutional legitimacy. Journal of Conflict Resolution 51(1), 134–166.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Chaudoin, S (2014) Promises or policies? An experimental analysis of international agreements and audience reactions. International Organization 68(1), 235–256.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Chen, J (2001) Mao's China and the Cold War. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.Google Scholar
Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2016) Wang Yi Talks about South China Sea Issue: Facts Will Tell and Justice Will Prevail. 24 May.Google Scholar
Cho, H-B (2018) Tying the Adversary's Hands: Provocation, Crisis Escalation, and Inadvertent War. PhD dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, USA.Google Scholar
Choi, S-W and James, P (2007) Media openness, democracy and militarized interstate disputes. British Journal of Political Science 37(1), 23–46.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Clinton, B (2004) My Life. New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf.Google Scholar
Cohn, C (1987) Sex and death in the rational world of defense intellectuals. Signs 12(4), 687–718.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Conrad, CR, Conrad, J, and Young, JK (2014) Tyrants and terrorism: why some autocrats are terrorized while others are not. International Studies Quarterly 58(3), 539–549.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Coppock, A and McClellan, OA (2019) Validating the demographic, political, psychological, and experimental results obtained from a new source of online survey respondents. Research and Politics 6(1), 1–14.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Croco, SE, Hanmer, MJ, and McDonald, JA (2021) At what cost? Reexamining audience costs in realistic settings. Journal of Politics 83(1), 8–22.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dafoe, A, Renshon, J, and Huth, P (2014) Reputation and status as motives for war. Annual Review of Political Science 17(1), 371–393.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Davies, GAM and Johns, R (2013) Audience costs among the British public: the impact of escalation, crisis type, and prime ministerial rhetoric. International Studies Quarterly 57(4), 725–737.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Desch, M (2002) Democracy and victory: why regime type hardly matters. International Security 27(2), 5–47.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Evangelista, M (2001) Norms, heresthetics, and the end of the Cold War. Journal of Cold War Studies 3(1), 5–35.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fearon, JD (1994) Domestic political audiences and the escalation of international disputes. American Political Science Review 88(3), 577–592.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fearon, JD (1997) Signaling foreign policy interests: tying hands versus sinking costs. Journal of Conflict Resolution 41(1), 68–90.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Finnemore, M (1996) Norms, culture, and world politics: insights from sociology's institutionalism. International Organization 50(2), 325–347.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fischer, S (1995) Central-bank independence revisited. American Economic Review 85(2), 201–206.Google Scholar
Fursenko, A and Naftali, T (1997) One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958–1964. New York, NY: W. W. Norton.Google Scholar
Garthoff, RL (1994) The Great Transition: American–Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.Google Scholar
Gartner, SS (2008) The multiple effects of casualties on public support for war: an experimental approach. American Political Science Review 102(1), 95–106.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gelpi, C and Grieco, J (2015) Competency costs in foreign affairs: presidential performance in international conflicts and domestic legislative success, 1953–2001. American Journal of Political Science 59(2), 440–456.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gelpi, C, Feaver, PD, and Reifler, J (2009) Paying the Human Costs of War: American Public Opinion and Casualties in Military Conflicts. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gowa, J (1999) Ballots and Bullets: The Elusive Democratic Peace. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Goddard, SE (2018) When Right Makes Might: Rising Powers and World Order. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
Grieco, J et al. (2011) Let's get a second opinion: international institutions and American public support for war. International Studies Quarterly 55(2), 563–583.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hall, TH (2017) On provocation: outrage, international relations, and the Franco-Prussian War. Security Studies 26(1), 1–29.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hitler, A (1941) Speech before the Reichstag on January 30, 1941. Available from http://www.worldfuturefund.orgGoogle Scholar
Huddleston, RJ (2019) Think ahead: cost discounting and external validity in foreign policy survey experiments. Journal of Experimental Political Science 6(2), 108–119.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Johns, R and Davies, G (2019) Civilian casualties and public support for military action: experimental evidence. Journal of Conflict Resolution 63(1), 251–281.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Johnston, AI (2001) Treating international institutions as social environments. International Studies Quarterly 45(4), 487–515.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Katagiri, A and Min, E (2019) The credibility of public and private signals: a document-based approach. American Political Science Review 113(1), 156–172.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Katzenstein, PJ (ed.) (1996) The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.Google Scholar
Kertzer, J and Brutger, R (2016) Decomposing audience costs: bringing the audience back into audience cost theory. American Journal of Political Science 60(1), 234–249.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kurizaki, S (2007) Efficient secrecy: public versus private threats in crisis diplomacy. American Political Science Review 101(3), 543–558.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Leeds, BA (1999) Domestic political institutions, credible commitments, and international cooperation. American Journal of Political Science 43(4), 979–1002.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Levendusky, M and Horowitz, M (2012) Backing down is the right decision: partisanship, new information and audience costs. Journal of Politics 74(2), 323–338.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Levy, JS et al. (2015) Backing out or backing in? Commitment and consistency in audience costs theory. American Journal of Political Science 59(4), 988–1001.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Li, X and Chen, D (2021) Public opinion, international reputation, and audience costs in an authoritarian regime. Conflict Management and Peace Science 38(5), 543–560CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lin-Greenberg, E (2019) Backing up, not backing down: mitigating audience costs through policy substitution. Journal of Peace Research 56(4), 559–574.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mercer, J (1996) Reputation and International Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
Miron, AM and Brehm, JW (2006) Reactance theory—40 years later. Zeitschrift fur Sozialpsychologie 37(1), 9–18.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mueller, JE (1973) War, Presidents and Public Opinion. New York, NY: Wiley.Google Scholar
New York Times (2019a) Maduro Sounds Conciliatory but Warns: U.S. Intervention Would Be Worse Than Vietnam. 30 January.Google Scholar
New York Times (2019b) Russia Warns U.S. Not to Intervene in Venezuela as Military Backs Maduro. January 24.Google Scholar
Nomikos, WG and Sambanis, N (2019) What is the mechanism underlying audience costs? Incompetence, belligerence, and inconsistency. Journal of Peace Research 56(4), 575–588.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Potter, PBK and Baum, MA (2014) Looking for audience costs in all the wrong places: electoral institutions, media access, and democratic constraint. Journal of Politics 76(1), 167–181.Google Scholar
Press, D (2005) Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
Putnam, RD (1988) Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games. International Organization 42(3), 427–460.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Quek, K (2016) Are costly signals more credible? Evidence of sender–receiver gaps. Journal of Politics 78(3), 925–940.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Quek, K (2017) Type II audience costs. Journal of Politics 79(4), 1438–1443.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Quek, K (2021a) Four costly signaling mechanisms. American Political Science Review 115(2), 537–549.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Quek, K (2021b) “Replication data for: Untying Hands: Deescalation, Reputation, and Dynamic Audience Costs”, https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/8ZFY3U, Harvard Dataverse, V1, UNF:6:n3FTMvVKF2IKECesApINow== [fileUNF].Google Scholar
Quek, K and Johnston, AI (2016) Crisis Management in the Shadow of Audience Costs. Paper presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, 1–4 September.Google Scholar
Quek, K and Johnston, AI (2018) Can China back down? Crisis deescalation in the shadow of popular opposition. International Security 42(3), 7–36.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ramsay, K (2004) Politics at the water's edge: crisis bargaining and electoral competition. Journal of Conflict Resolution 48(4), 459–486.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Riker, WH (1996) The Strategy of Rhetoric: Campaigning for the American Constitution. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Schelling, TC (1960) The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Schelling, TC (1966) Arms and Influence. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Schultz, KA (2001a) Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schultz, KA (2001b) Looking for audience costs. Journal of Conflict Resolution 45(1), 32–60.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schwartz, JA and Blair, CW (2020) Do women make more credible threats? Gender stereotypes, audience costs, and crisis bargaining. International Organization 74(4), 872–895.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Slantchev, B (2006) Politicians, the media, and domestic audience costs. International Studies Quarterly 50(2), 445–477.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Slantchev, B (2011) Military Threats: The Costs of Coercion and the Price of Peace. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Smith, A (1998) International crises and domestic politics. American Political Science Review 92(3), 623–638.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Snyder, GH and Diesing, P (1977) Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Snyder, J and Borghard, ED (2011) The cost of empty threats: a penny, not a pound. American Political Science Review 105(3), 437–456.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tago, A and Ikeda, M (2013) An “A” for effort: experimental evidence on UN Security Council engagement and support for US military action in Japan. British Journal of Political Science 45(2), 391–410.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tang, S (2005) Reputation, cult of reputation, and international conflict. Security Studies 14(1), 34–62.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
The Guardian (2014) Obama Says US Will Defend Japan in Island Dispute with China. 24 April.Google Scholar
The Telegraph (2014) Ukraine Crisis: Moscow Assures Pentagon It Will Not Invade. 29 April.Google Scholar
Tomz, M (2007) Domestic audience costs in international relations: an experimental approach. International Organization 61(4), 821–840.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Trachtenberg, M (2012) Audience costs: an historical analysis. Security Studies 21(1), 3–42.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Trager, RF and Vavreck, L (2011) The political costs of crisis bargaining: presidential rhetoric and the role of party. American Journal of Political Science 55(3), 526–545.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Uzonyi, G, Souva, M, and Golder, SN (2012) Domestic institutions and credible signals. International Studies Quarterly 56(4), 765–776.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Voeten, E (2005) The political origins of the UN Security Council's ability to legitimize the use of force. International Organization 59(3), 527–557.Google Scholar
Washington Post (2019) China Says It Will Sanction US Firms in Taiwan Warplane Sale. 21 August.Google Scholar
Weeks, JL (2008) Autocratic audience costs: regime type and signaling resolve. International Organization 62(1), 35–64.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Weiss, JC and Dafoe, A (2019) Authoritarian audiences, rhetoric, and propaganda in international crises: evidence from China. International Studies Quarterly 63(4), 963–973.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wendt, A (1992) Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics. International Organisation 46(2), 391–425.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wu, C (2020) Untying Hands after Public Threats: Signaling Domestic Preferences in International Crisis Bargaining. Working paper.Google Scholar
Yarhi-Milo, K (2018) Who Fights for Reputation in International Politics? Leaders, Resolve, and the Use of Force. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Yoder, BK (2019) Retrenchment as a screening mechanism: power shifts, strategic withdrawal, and credible signals. American Journal of Political Science 63(1), 130–145.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Zabriskie, EH (1973) American–Russian Rivalry in the Far East: A Study in Diplomacy and Power Politics 1895–1914. New York: Praeger.Google Scholar
Supplementary material: Link

Quek Dataset

Dataset

https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/8ZFY3U
Link
Supplementary material: PDF

Quek supplementary material

Quek supplementary material

Download Quek supplementary material(PDF)
PDF 1.6 MB